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Abstract
Many English verbs expressing transfer can be used in two different constructions, one with
no preposition (Rick gave Kate a coffee) and one with the preposition to (Rick gave a coffee to
Kate). Whenever speakers use such a verb, they have to choose between these two constructions.
This choice is determined in part by some features of the two objects: all other things being
equal, speakers are more likely to use whichever construction places a shorter object before a
longer one (Rick gave a coffee to the tall and well-dressed woman standing next the the desk at
the southern side of the room), an animate object before an inanimate one (Rick gave Kate a
coffee), a plural object before a singular one (Rick gave Kate and Roy an espresso machine), and
so on. This system of feature-based choices is established very well for adult language using
language corpora and experiments, but there are fewer corpora and experimental studies of child
language. Because of this dearth of data, it is unknown how children acquire this choice-making
system: do they start making choices determined by only one of these features and add the others
piecemeal, or do they learn the system wholesale and only tweak which features win out over
others?
The three experiments in this thesis are a first step in answering this question. They are designed
to map out the effects of length, animacy, and grammatical number on these choices over the
course of typical first language acquisition. Because animacy is less stable a concept than length
and number, the first experiment measures children’s and adults’ conceptions of animacy more
indirectly. The second experiment presents the same participants with sentences using give
where one of the two objects has been replaced by noise, and measures which of a constrained
set of options they gaze at and which they choose to fill the noise gap. This provides measures
of their expectations and preferences for the length, animacy, and number of the objects in these
gaps. The third experiment has participants reproduce give sentences with different combinations
of animacy, number, and construction. Participants reproduce sentences that conform to their
choice-making system more easily.
The results of these three experiments show that children as young as four years already prefer
the animate-before-inanimate order. The shorter-before-longer preference is not found in any
age group when the difference in lengths is just one syllable. This evidence adds to a growing
body of literature converging on the finding that choices in ordering phenomena are affected
by the same features wherever these phenomena occur, throughout language acquisition as
well as across languages. Data from the second experiment also substantiates the common
assumption that touchscreen input and eye gaze are both closely linked to attention. This will
allow researchers in the cognitive sciences to use touchscreens as an alternative to eyetracking
more confidently.
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1 Introduction
Linguistic phenomena are rarely pure and never simple—even the most straightforward and ele-
gant explanations have exceptions, unexplained underlying assumptions, and trouble accounting
for their phenomena in variation and diachrony. While striving for elegance is not futile, dealing
with untidy aspects can not be avoided completely. Moreover, the mere fact that there is so much
untidiness suggests that it is worth studying: if the human language faculty is able to handle
highly complex and varying systems, the complexity and variation will need to be understood
before a full account of the language faculty is possible.
Gradient phenomena make good subjects for these studies. One of them, the English dative
alternation (or dative shift), has been studied much in the past 15 years. It is the curious
availability of two distinct constructions for many ditransitive verbs that express transfer of
some sort. One construction, which I will call the double object construction here, consists of
the recipient object, describing the goal or receiver of the transfer event, expressed as a noun
phrase (NP)1 followed by the theme object, describing the thing transferred, also expressed as
an NP. An example of the double object construction is given in (1.1a). The other construction
is the prepositional construction, where the theme object NP is followed by the recipient
object expressed as a prepositional phrase (PP) headed by the preposition to. An example of the
prepositional construction is given in (1.1b).
(1.1) a. Rick gave Kate a coffee.
b. Rick gave a coffee to Kate.
Recent work on this construction suggests that speakers make highly complex choices between
these two constructions whenever one or the other is used, and that the specific factors and
how they are weighted differ across different varieties of English. However, the acquisition
of this gradient phenomenon is severely understudied, and most of the few existing studies
used corpus data. Due to the inherent limitations of corpora, these studies have not been
successful in determining whether all the factors that seem to affect adult speakers’ choices
between the two construction also affect the choice in child language. There is no consensus
on whether the animacy and grammatical number of the two objects, both known to affect the
dative alternation choice in adults, are also at work in child language. The interactions between
these different features as well as between any animacy effect and the most common pattern of
animacy, namely an inanimate theme and an animate recipient, have also not been established.
The best-established effect in adult and child language is that of the relative lengths of the two
1For convenience, I will refer to phrases like he and Kate and a coffee as noun phrases rather than determiner
phrases throughout this thesis.
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objects: when one object is longer than the other, speakers appear to prefer the construction
that places the shorter object before the longer one. However, the smallest length difference that
causes this effect and the most appropriate measure of length are not known. Psycholinguistic
experiments are necessary to answer these specific questions.
As technologies develop, the toolbox of psycholinguistics grows. Desktop computers allow
reaction-time measurements with millisecond accuracy as well as very involved interactive or
reactive designs that adapt to each participant’s responses. Eye- and mouse-tracking allow
psycholinguists to investigate participants’ attention and processing. Touchscreen technology
has overcome initial difficulties and is now very intuitive to use. This makes it an interesting
option for psycholinguistics, as touchscreen interactions are more natural than mouse-based
interactions and thus may make a better attention-measure, even approaching the usefulness of
eyetracking.
Chapter 2 of this thesis discusses previous research on the English dative alternation as well as
the acquisition of the cognitive concepts behind animacy, grammatical number, and length. The
three experiments used here are described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, and Section 5.2 discusses
statistical and methodological challenges and how they were approached. The results of these
three experiments, presented in Sections 4.2, 5.3, and 6.2, show that animacy does affect
children’s dative alternation choices, but number does not. A length difference of one syllable
appears to be too little to trigger the length effect. Touchscreens as such emerge as a highly
useful hardware for psycholinguistic research, but the experimental task has to be designed with
users’ likely behavior in mind. The results of experiment 3 show that even four-year-olds prefer
the more common animacy patterns, although the expression of this preference changes with
age. These results and their implications for our understanding of the dative alternation as well
as for future research are discussed in Chapter 7.
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2 Background
2.1 The dative alternation in English
As the term ‘dative’ itself suggests,2 the dative alternation is observed with verbs of transfer
or giving. The recipient in such a transfer event is often marked with the dative case cross-
linguistically. The English object pronouns (her/him/them) are well-known examples of dative-
marked forms, and some linguists have even defined ‘dative’ as the typical marking of such a
recipient object (for example Lambert 2010). The verbs that participate in the dative alternation
can be used in several distinct constructions, so the sentences that contain these verbs alternate
between the different constructions. While there are dative alternations in languages all over
the world,3 the phenomenon is “not very frequent in the world’s languages” (Malchukov et al.
2010a:18). The English dative alternation involves two distinct syntactic structures that order
the two objects (theme and recipient) differently, but also differ in (at least) one other respect:
the recipient–theme ordering, as in (2.1a) (repeated below for convenience), has both objects
being realized as NPs, whereas the theme–recipient ordering in (2.1b) has the recipient as a
PP with the preposition to.4 Because of this difference, the former is called the double object
(dative) construction, and the latter is called the prepositional (dative) construction.
2Though dative itself is obviously Latinate, the term can be traced back to Greek writers: the grammar of
Dionysios Thrax (170–90 BCE) speaks of the “piτω¯σεις . . . δοτική” or “ἐpiισταλτική” (Davidson 1874:10 and
tinyurl.com/greekThrax), that is the ‘case of giving’ or ‘sending (of letters)’. The former term is also used by
Strabo (64 BCE–24 CE) (Jones 1950:254–255). Aulus Gellius quotes Nigidius Figulus (ca. 98–45 BCE) on the
“dandi casus”, the ‘giving-case’, in Latin (Rolfe 1927:502); and Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE) uses the
same term (Kent 1951:400–401, 548–549, and 582–583). The term dativus is used in the second century CE by the
grammarians Velius Longus (Keil 1961:57) and Quintus Terentius Scaurus (Keil 1961:24; though see Law 1987
on the authorship and date of this grammar).
3Alternations like the English one discussed here have been claimed to exist in Greek (Cuervo 2003b), Spanish
(Cuervo 2003b and (2003a)), Chinese (Liu 2006), Croatian (Zovko Dinković 2007), Dutch (Colleman and de Clerck
2009; see also van der Ziel 2012’s account of scope interactions in the Dutch and English dative alternations), Basque
(Ormazabal and Romero 2010; though compare Oyharçabal 2010), and all Scandinavian languages (Anderssen
et al. 2012, Kizach and Balling 2013); see Malchukov et al. (2010b) for more.
4Emonds (1976:81) argues that the double object construction also includes a preposition (heading the theme),
as evidenced by credit/furnish/supply/provide with-constructions. This makes the dative alternation fit into his
transformational theory quite elegantly, but it does not add any explanatory power. However, Emonds is right
to argue that these verbs should be considered as part of the dative alternation—web searches with the pattern
“(verb)ed her/him/them the” show that they are used in the ‘canonical’ double object construction:
i it . . . credited him the point for finding it (tinyurl.com/creditedpoint)
ii a bank error mistakenly credited him the money (tinyurl.com/creditedmoney)
iii being away . . . furnished her the luxury of focusing totally on the music (tinyurl.com/furnishDO)
iv Meet the man who killed Jim Morrison . . . or at least supplied him the heroin
(tinyurl.com/supplyDO)
v makeup artistry provided her the opportunity for something far greater than creative expression
(tinyurl.com/provideDO)
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(2.1) a. Rick gave Kate a coffee.
b. Rick gave a coffee to Kate.
In these simple examples, it would seem that both sentences have exactly the same meaning. On
this basis, one could argue that the dative alternation is a purely syntactic phenomenon, since
involves two different structures but no difference in meaning. However, an explicit interruption
of the transfer event is more felicitous with the prepositional construction. Give in particular
obscures this: its meaning specifies the transfer of possession, and therefore, as (2.2) shows, an
interruption is infelicitous with give no matter which construction is used (see also Rappaport
Hovav and Levin 2008). Other verbs make the possibility of an interruption in the prepositional
construction more obvious: so-called verbs of ballistic transfer demonstrate this particularly
well, as in (2.3). A typical throw event, for example, certainly specifies the thrower’s intention
to hit a certain goal, but it also includes the possibility for the thrown entity to never get to that
goal (the throw may be badly executed, a gust of wind may interfere, and so on).
(2.2) a. * Rick gave Kate a coffee, but it didn’t reach her.
b. * Rick gave a coffee to Kate, but it didn’t reach her.
(2.3) a. ? Rick threw Kate a bagel, but it didn’t reach her.
b. Rick threw a bagel to Kate, but it didn’t reach her.
It has been argued that (2.3b) is more acceptable than (2.3a) because of a subtle meaning
difference between the two constructions: the double object construction encodes caused
possession of an object by a recipient, whereas the prepositional construction encodes caused
motion of an object towards a goal or recipient or an event which we know to be “normally
sufficient to bring [the theme] into the sphere of [the recipient]’s physical control” (Oehrle
1976:129). The caused possession includes a caused motion event, at least with metaphorical
motion, but it does specify the possession at the end of the motion path. Therefore, if the motion
is interrupted and changed, the possession at its end is no longer possible, while the motion
itself still exists, albeit in a changed way. Thus, the double object construction is ruled out for
interrupted transfer events (see Gropen et al. 1989:241–242, Shimpi et al. 2007:1335, or Ogawa
2008).
However, the difference in acceptability between (2.3a) and (2.3b) that this analysis is partially
based on is at best a tendency. There are ‘interrupted’ double object sentences in the literature
that are claimed to be acceptable, such as (2.4).5
(2.4) Max handed her a cigarette, but she wouldn’t take it. (Oehrle 1977:206)
5I presented sentences like (2.3a) to a few friends of mine, native speakers of New Zealand English all, who
accepted them as ‘good English’ and understood the intended meaning perfectly.
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The presence or absence of caused possession therefore does not necessarily determine which
construction is used. Neither does the idiomatic form in idioms using transfer verbs: Bresnan
et al. (2007:72), for example, list examples of give the creeps/a headache to X, even though the
idiomatic form for these is the double object construction, of course. Bruening (2010) argues that
these examples are not true prepositional constructions, but rather double object constructions
with the recipient phrase moved rightward (and to inserted or made overt). He bases this account
on two phenomena: the locative inversion and scope interactions. Prepositional constructions
that are not based on idioms can be passivized, as in (2.5a), and the recipient PP can then be
fronted by what Bruening calls locative inversion, as in (2.5b). Double object idioms themselves
can also be passivized, as (2.6a) shows, but the locative inversion pattern with the prepositional
construction, as in (2.6b), is not possible according to Bruening (2010).
(2.5) a. Helicopters were given to the generals that lost the battle.
b. To the generals that lost the battle were given helicopters. (Bruening 2010:297)
(2.6) a. The generals that lost the battle were given hell.
b. * To the generals that lost the battle were/was given hell.
(both Bruening 2010:297, original judgments)
Ormazabal and Romero (2012) argue against this position by pointing out that the passive
construction which (2.6b) would be derived from is not (2.6a), but rather (2.7).
(2.7) * Hell was given to the generals that lost the battle.
(Ormazabal and Romero 2012:458, original judgment)
This passive, which mirrors (2.5a) neatly, is ungrammatical according to Ormazabal and Romero
(as well as Abeillé 1990:294) and can therefore not serve as a “source” (Ormazabal and
Romero 2012:459) for the locative inversion. Since the passive for the idiomatic double object
construction (2.6a) is grammatical, Bruening (2010:298)’s claim that the prepositional version
of the idiom “patterns like the double object construction” is false in Ormazabal and Romero’s
view.
However, the examples in (2.8)6 and (2.9) show that the non-inverted passives for (some of)
these are in fact available.7
6Admittedly, (2.8b) is the only example I could find for give the sack that clearly intended the idiomatic meaning
and was clearly written by a native speaker.
7At this point, I should explain why Kilgarriff (2007)’s criticism of using Google search results as linguistic
data, though valid, does not apply in this case: Kilgarriff argues that web search engines should not be used as tools
of corpus linguistics “[i]f the goal is to find frequencies or probabilities” (Kilgarriff 2007:147); my goal here is just
to show that these (odd) constructions are in fact used, and are therefore available.
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(2.8) a. * The sack was given to him. (Ormazabal and Romero 2012:458, original judgment)
b. . . . if the sack was given to him by carrier pigeon. . .
(tinyurl.com/sackwasgiven)
(2.9) a. * The moon was promised to him. (Ormazabal and Romero 2012:458, original judgment)
b. I didn’t leave thinking the moon was promised to me
(tinyurl.com/moonwaspromised)
Ormazabal and Romero’s argument on this point is therefore invalid. Their comments on
Bruening’s argument from scope stand, however: Bruening (2010:292–293) shows that the
prepositional dative forms of double-object idioms like give the sack and give a headache behave
unlike other prepositional constructions, but exactly like other double object constructions in that
both (2.10a) and (2.10b) only allow the reading with the recipient having scope over the theme,
meaning that one specific person (who is different from a previously discussed person) gets all
the headaches. The other reading, where Charlie gets a cluster headache, Mitch gets a migraine,
Tina gets a tension headache, and so on, is unavailable with both of these sentences.
(2.10) a. This lighting gives a different person every kind of headache.
b. This lighting gives every kind of headache to a different person.
(both after Bruening 2010:294)
For the double object construction in (2.10a), this is as expected, since similar non-idiomatic
sentences with the double object construction also allow only the one reading: (2.11a) can only
mean that one specific child gets all the candy bars. The scope restriction for the prepositional
construction in (2.10b), on the other hand, is surprising, since similar non-idiomatic sentences
like (2.11b) do allow both the reading where one child gets all candy bars and the reading where
Charlie gets a Curly-Wurly, Mitch gets a Mars bar, and Tina gets a Toblerone.8
(2.11) a. I gave a different child every candy bar. (Bruening 2010:292)
b. I gave every candy bar to a different child. (Bruening 2010:293)
Since it behaves like other double object constructions in this respect, Bruening (2010:292–294)
argues that the rare ‘prepositional’ idiom as in (2.10b) has the same underlying structure as other
double object constructions. His account of the structure of the (non-idiomatic) prepositional
construction is repeated in (2.12) below, and the structure of double object constructions (both
idiomatic and non-idiomatic) is as in (2.13) (both Bruening 2010:289).
8It is interesting that children do not interpret scope in these examples like adults do at all (see van der Ziel
2012). This is not discussed further here because the present study does not touch on quantifier scope.
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(2.12) VP
V PP
NP
a different candy bar
P′
P
to
NP
every child
(2.13) ApplicativeP
NP
a different child/person
Appl′
Appl VP
V NP
every candy bar/kind of headache
In the prepositional structure given in (2.12), both the recipient P′ and the theme NP are at the
same level and are thus both equally able to take scope. In the double-object (2.13), however, the
recipient NP is at a higher level and thus always takes scope. Bruening then uses this structural
difference to explain the availability of two readings in the prepositional construction, but of
of only one (the one where the indefinite on the recipient has scope over the the theme) in the
double object construction.
Since the idiomatic ‘prepositional’ construction (2.10b) also allows only that one reading, it
follows that this sentence has the same structure as in (2.13), but with the order of the imme-
diate daughters of ApplP reversed to give the required theme-before-recipient order (Bruening
2010:294):9
9Despite the presence of the preposition to, Bruening (2010:294) specifically labels the recipient phrase (to a
different person in (2.14)) as an NP in this structure he posits for the prepositional construction of double object
idioms. Indeed, he has to: If this recipient phrase were a PP headed by to, the recipient would not c-command the
theme; the point of Bruening’s analysis of the scope phenomena (as he sees them) is precisely that the recipient
always (and asymmetrically) c-commands the theme.
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(2.14) ApplP
Appl′
Appl VP
V NP
every kind of headache
NP
to a different person
Ormazabal and Romero (2012:459) show that this account is “unnecessarily complex and ad-
hoc”: the constraint that Bruening (2010) uses to limit overgeneralizations of the structure shown
in (2.14) is specific to this kind of structure and apparently does not explain or simplify anything
else; the preposition to has to be added to the recipient phrase by some unspecified process (a
fact that Bruening 2010:291 acknowledges without addressing it) while keeping the recipient
phrase an NP (so the recipient c-commands the theme; see Bruening 2010:294); and finally,
even with the constraints used, the account is not sufficiently constrained and therefore generates
both the non-idiomatic prepositional structure as in (2.12) and the idiom-derived structure as in
(2.14) for many prepositional sentences, thus (wrongly) predicting the reading shown in (2.15),
with his bound by every worker, to be available.
(2.15) ?? I gave hisi paycheck to every workeri that came in on Friday.
(after Ormazabal and Romero 2012:460, original judgment)
Thus, while he points out an interesting scope asymmetry, Bruening (2010)’s account of double
object idioms appearing in the prepositional construction is seriously flawed. There is no
compelling reason to consider the prepositional versions of double object idioms to be anything
other than prepositional dative constructions. As with the incomplete or interrupted transfer
event sentences in (2.2) and (2.3) above, these scope interactions are interesting, but they do not
support a conclusive transformational analysis of the dative alternation. There is little doubt that
there are two possible readings of (2.11b) but only one of (2.11a). However, other differences
seem to suggest a different analysis than the one given in Bruening (2010). In the absence of a
comprehensive account of the meaning differences and derivational paths, I can only assume that
there is no systematic difference in meaning between the two constructions. Properties of the
verb and the two objects appear to have stronger and more systematic effects, as will be shown
below. To avoid possible problems caused by any of the alleged meaning differences discussed
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here, this study only uses give, which does not allow interruption of the transfer event (see (2.2)
above), and there will be no quantifiers which could prompt different readings for adults and
children (see van der Ziel 2012).
According to Wasow (2002:8), the meaning difference discussed above was the central focus
of the work on the dative alternation until Hawkins (1994). The latter’s principle of Early
Immediate Constituents (EIC; Hawkins 1994:77) says that the heads of a phrase’s immediate
constituents will be kept as close as possible to the head of that larger phrase. In an SVO language
with prepositions and right-branching phrases such as English, this leads to the well-known law
of increasing constituents: placing a long head-initial phrase at the end means all the material
after the head of this phrase does not come between the head and subordinate phrase heads
(Hawkins 1994:211–212). For example, the subordinate heads her and to in (2.16a) are as
close as possible to the phrase head brought, with only one word (dog) intervening between the
three of them. The alternative ordering in (2.16b) sees as many as three10 words between the
three heads. Therefore, the EIC principle predicts (2.16a) to be the preferred ordering for this
combination of verb and postverbal elements.
(2.16) a. Liz [brought [her dog] [to the school reunion]].
b. Liz [brought [to the school reunion] [her dog]]. (both Bürkle 2011:52)
In a left-branching, verb-last language such as Korean, the same principle explains the preference
for longer phrases to be placed at the beginning: long-before-short ordering stops the non-head
material of a head-final phrase from coming between that head and other heads (Hawkins
1994:211–212). While the EIC principle does explain a lot of crosslinguistic data, Wasow
(2002:45–46) points out that it implicitly relies on utterances being planned out completely
before ordering decisions are made and that this is not supported by the data. The corpus
study in Bürkle (2011:34–50) shows that native speakers do in fact produce sentences violating
this principle, and the explicit grammaticality judgment experiment in Bürkle (2011:51–59)
shows that non-native speakers do not judge them as ungrammatical: the sentence in (2.17), for
example, was judged as grammatical by 83.3% of participants.
(2.17) Liz [brought [her trusty but old dog] [to the school]]. (Bürkle 2011:52)
Furthermore, unintuitive transformational accounts are required to allow the principle to account
for certain structures (Wasow 2002:44). While he does mention several derivational possibilities,
Hawkins (1994:212) merely assumes that the double object construction is derived from the
10The argument might be made that school reunion is one word, and there are thus only two non-head words
between the heads on (2.16b). This does not affect the EIC principle’s predictions here, as two intervening non-head
words (the and school-reunion) is still more than the uncontroversially single intervening word dog in (2.16a).
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prepositional construction in the English dative alternation. The opposite derivation has also
been proposed: in saying that the prepositional construction is used “when the indirect object
[the recipient, in the terminology used here] is significantly longer than the direct object [the
theme]”, Sinclair et al. (1990:160) are implying that the prepositional construction is applied to
a sentence where the ‘default’ double object construction is bad in some way (see also Berwick
1985:275–291). However, neither of these accounts is supported by conclusive evidence (Bürkle
2011:12–18), and including either derivational approach introduces inconsistencies into the
theory of the EIC principle: Hawkins (1994:181) argues that the EIC principle explains the
existence of particle verb constructions with the verb’s object before the particle (and thus a long
element before a very short one; see (2.18a) for an example) because this Verb–NPobject–Particle
ordering has become the basic construction for particle verbs, and the V–Prt–NP ordering (as in
(2.18b)) is derived from it (licensed by the EIC principle).
(2.18) a. Rick [turned [the lights in his apartment] [on]].
b. Rick [turned [on] [the lights in his apartment]].
This derivation obviously is consistent with the EIC principle: the verbal head turned and
the constituent heads on and the are much closer to each other in (2.18b) than in (2.18a).
Hawkins shows that the V–Prt–NP ordering is more likely with longer NPs, which would
support this derivational account since larger differences in constituent lengths (presumably)
make the the effect of the EIC principle ‘stronger’ (against the unchanging ‘strength’ of the
basic construction). However, Wasow (2002:44) dismisses the idea that the basic (non-derived)
ordering is automatically the preferred one and points out that Hawkins (1994) also explains
the basic, non-derived, ordering of other constructions with the EIC principle. Thus, this
derivational explanation using the EIC principle is internally inconsistent. Not including the
derivational specifics, however, makes the principle much less predictive: for two phrases of
equal length (30% of items in Bürkle 2011:36’s weight effect data from CHILDES corpora),
neither ordering would be predicted to be preferred; yet we do find ordering preferences in such
cases. Thus, while length differences do explain a lot of the dative alternation and similar weight
effect phenomena (Wasow 2002:2 found that 80 to 90% of his corpus data observe the rule of
“nondecreasing length”), they are not the only factor.
The particular verb used has been argued to be one of the other factors: most verbs that participate
in the dative alternation are much more commonly used with one of the constructions than
with the other. For example, it has been found that the majority of give sentences are double
object constructions (76% in Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004:106 and Bürkle 2011:39), while
the majority of sentences with directional take are prepositional constructions (84% in Gries
and Stefanowitsch 2004:106, 58% in Bürkle 2011:39). These verb biases could be idiosyncratic
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(Wasow 1997:101–102), or they could systematically reflect the meaning difference discussed
above (transfer of possession versus spatial transfer) (Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004:104–107).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the dative alternation (and other weight effects) are
epiphenomena of prosodic preferences (Zec and Inkelas 1990). Previous (recent) use of one
construction, even with different objects, has also been shown to increase the likelihood of that
construction. Apart from these, the factors that have been claimed to affect the dative alternation
are all features of the two objects: not only their length, as mentioned above, but also the animacy
of their referents, their grammatical number, grammatical person, pronominality, and ‘givenness’
in the context (Wasow 2002, Bresnan et al. 2007, Bresnan and Hay 2008, Bresnan and Ford
2010, de Marneffe et al. 2012). These features are not independent from each other, of course:
short words tend to be be more frequent and less morphologically complex, pronouns generally
refer to ‘given’ material and tend to be very short (McDonald et al. 1993), and animates are
more likely to be represented with pronouns. However, Bresnan et al. (2007) showed that these
correlations do not reduce to fewer features, which means that all of these individual features
are taken into account: speakers prefer the construction that allows them to place a shorter
object before a longer one, an animate object before an inanimate one, a plural object before a
singular one, a pronoun before a non-pronominal object, and a discourse-given object before a
discourse-nongiven one. I will discuss the effects of animacy, number, and length in separate
sections below and also give a brief overview of the other features mentioned here. Before that,
however, it is necessary to clarify how the dative alternation is defined in this study, particularly
in relation to other alternations and ‘weight’-related ordering phenomena in English.
2.2 Other alternations and reordering phenomena in English
One reordering phenomenon that is often considered together with the dative alternation as
defined above is the benefactive alternation (see for example Sinclair et al. 1990:160–161 and
407–408, Hawkins 1994:212, Whong-Barr and Schwartz 2002, Gries 2003, or Otsuka 2006;
Szabóné Papp 2003:2 also considers them together, but notices several systematic differences
(27–28, 32, and 65–68) and even splits up what she calls “TO-verbs” (87–131) and “FOR-verbs”
(131–148) for detailed discussion). This is intuitively appealing: except for the verb and the
preposition, the examples in (2.20) perfectly mirror those in (2.1) above, and the events described
are quite similar. As (2.21) shows, there is even a preference for short-before-long order in the
benefactive alternation, although it may be weaker than the preference in the dative alternation
shown in (2.19) (see also Theijssen et al. 2009).
(2.19) a. Rick gave Kate a grande skim latte with two pumps of sugar-free vanilla.
b. ? Rick gave a grande skim latte with two pumps of sugar-free vanilla to Kate.
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(2.20) a. Rick made Kate a coffee.
b. Rick made a coffee for Kate.
(2.21) a. Rick made Kate a grande skim latte with two pumps of sugar-free vanilla.
b. ? Rick made a grande skim latte with two pumps of sugar-free vanilla for Kate.
However, the dative and benefactive alternations cannot be considered to be totally equivalent,
because recipients (but not beneficiaries) are objects and because beneficiaries (but not recipients)
can be added to either dative alternation construction. As for the first of these points, beneficiaries
are not objects, at least not in the same way that dative recipients are (Nisbet 2005): beneficiaries
can be easily omitted, but recipients cannot.
(2.22) a. Rick made a coffee for Kate.
b. Rick made a coffee.
(2.23) a. Rick gave a coffee to Kate.
b. * Rick gave a coffee.
Beneficiaries can also be easily added; the only restriction is that the event described include
something being made available, created (in a broad meaning of the term), selected, or prepared
(Oehrle 1976:110 and Kurniasih 2009:580). A beneficiary for-PP11 can be added to intransitive
(2.24), monotransitive (2.25), and ditransitive sentences (2.26).
(2.24) a. Rick died.
b. Rick died for Kate.
(2.25) a. Rick made a coffee.
b. Rick made a coffee for Kate.
(2.26) a. Rick gave Kevin a coffee.
b. Rick gave Kevin a coffee for Kate.
The ditransitive with additional beneficiary in (2.26b) illustrates the second point against
equivalence for the dative and benefactive alternations: benefactives and datives can be combined
11I am aware that the beneficiary NP is much more restricted: it is really only acceptable when it is added to a
monotransitive, as in (ii). This is easily explained though, since the intransitive with beneficiary NP, as in (i), could
be misinterpreted as a (mono-)transitive; and the ditransitive with beneficiary NP, as in (iii), presumably violates a
rule against ‘tritransitivity’. The monotransitive thus is an exception, because the NP–NP frame that is compatible
with the benefactive meaning happens to exist.
i * Rick died Kate.
ii Rick made Kate a coffee.
iii * Rick gave Kate Kevin a coffee.
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in one and the same clause. This combination is limited in that it is only possible with the
beneficiary realized as a for-PP.12 However, the two dative constructions can never be ‘combined’
like that at all: while the sentences in (2.27) could potentially be understood to have a meaning
similar to that of (2.26b), they are clearly unacceptable.
(2.27) a. * Rick gave Kevin a coffee to Kate.
b. * Rick gave a coffee to Kevin to Kate.
While a benefactive construction can be combined with a dative construction, a dative construc-
tion can never be combined with another (see also Szabóné Papp 2003:47 and 52–53).
Thus, in some crucial respects, the benefactive constructions are not like the dative constructions,
and it follows that an in-depth study should not consider the benefactive alternation to be the
same as the dative alternation. In this study, I will therefore use the term ‘dative alternation’
only for the alternation that uses to in the prepositional alternative and that is exemplified by the
verb give.
While the dative alternation is thus defined more narrowly here than elsewhere, I do not approach
it as an isolated phenomenon. Some of the evidence used throughout this study comes from
work on other weight effect phenomena, such as the benefactive alternation or heavy noun phrase
shift (HNPS). ‘Heaviness’ or length serves as a good example: it is evident that the length
of the two objects has a noticeable effect on the choice of construction (see Section 2.5 for
details). The well-described length effect in the dative alternation could be seen as nothing
more than an instance of HNPS (Siewierska and Hollmann 2007), the effect of ‘newness’ of
information as nothing more than an instance of information structure constraints that specify a
given-before-new order (see Section 2.6 for details), and so on; the choice of construction would
then be separate from these ordering decisions. The existence of the ‘reverse’ prepositional
and double object constructions, as in (2.28), at first glance seems to support this idea: the
dative alternation is often seen as an ordering decision between two alternatives, one of which
(the double object construction) having recipient–theme order and the other (the prepositional
construction) having theme–recipient order (and a preposition that has to be explained somehow).
If, however, there are two recipient–theme orderings, one with the preposition (the ‘reversed’
prepositional as in (2.28a) below) and one without it (the canonical double object construction),
the choice between these two cannot be explained as an ordering decision alone.
12Of course, a pancake for Kate in (2.25b) and a coffee for Kate in (2.26b) can also be one constituent (each),
which makes them nothing more than complex theme arguments. In (2.26b), this reading means that the coffee itself
was intended for Kate and that Kevin is to pass it on to her. However, a coffee and for Kate can also be constituents
by themselves, and that reading of the sentence (to me) allows both the coffee being intended for Kate and the action
of giving the coffee to Kevin being for her benefit or on her behalf or request (see also Oehrle 1976:108 for the
distinction between the latter two readings). Thus, the for-PPs in (2.25b) and (2.26b) can be read as benefactives
exactly like the for-PP in (2.24b).
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(2.28) a. . . . gave to Anastasia’s face a humor she herself did not possess.
(Biber et al. 1999:929)
b. Rick gave to Kate a coffee ?(and to Kevin a a bagel).
c. Rick gave it her. (after Haspelmath 2007:79)
However, these ‘reversed’ constructions appear to be much more restricted and therefore much
rarer than the canonical prepositional and double object constructions (see also Siewierska and
Hollmann 2007). The example in (2.28a) illustrates Biber et al. (1999:929)’s point that this
construction is “very rare” and “characteristic of more formal writing” like academic prose or
some styles of fiction. The same example also suggests a length effect (like HNPS) that is distinct
from the (partially length-based) construction choice: the theme phrase a humor she herself did
not possess is longer (and more complex) than the recipient phrase, which may well have allowed
the rare reverse prepositional construction to occur here. In (2.28b), the parenthesis demonstrates
how the reverse prepositional construction is more felicitous with a contrastive reading or list
than without it. As for the reverse double object construction in (2.28c), Haspelmath (2007)
says it is only possible for (some) speakers of British English, and only when both objects are
pronouns (see also Sinclair et al. 1990:160 and Biber et al. 1999:929–930). Haspelmath explains
this with harmonic alignment of the recipient role with a pronoun and of the theme role with
a non-pronominal ‘full’ NP: recipients will typically be animate (or human) and given in the
context, meaning they can typically be referred to using pronouns; themes will typically be
inanimate and less specific, which makes full NPs necessary. The simple construction (which
is the double object construction, in Haspelmath’s analysis) is only possible with a range of
harmonic or near-harmonic alignments. Formany varieties of English, this includes only the fully
harmonic alignment and the near-harmonic full-NP recipient and full-NP theme combination;
for (some varieties of) British English, the range includes these as well as the combination of
pronominal recipient and pronominal theme. This applies to the double object construction in
both the canonical and the ‘reversed’ order: the entire paper has “nothing to say about word order”
(Haspelmath 2007:79, fn. 1). However, the examples he gives (repeated in (2.29) below) show
that he only considers two different orderings to be possible for the double object construction
with a pronominal theme—the reversed prepositional construction as in (2.28b) above is not
mentioned as either a grammatical or an ungrammatical example. Interestingly, including it
would not affect Haspelmath (2007)’s argument at all: the reordering of a possible construction
is not connected to the possibility of that construction.
(2.29) a. She gave me the book.
b. She gave the book to me.
c. She gave Kim the book.
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d. She gave the book to Kim.
e. % She gave me it./She gave it me.13
f. She gave it to me.
g. * She gave Kim it./She gave it Kim.
h. She gave it to Kim. (all Haspelmath 2007:79, emphasis removed)
This argument relies on the impossibility of the double object construction with a full-NP
recipient and a pronominal theme (see also Wasow 1997:84). However, a few Google searches
show that this combination is actually used (emphasis added in all examples).
(2.30) a. you want me to draw this and give Emma it from you?
(tinyurl.com/giveEmmait)
b. I did give George it back( honest, I did) (tinyurl.com/giveGeorgeit)
c. I gave my husband me. (tinyurl.com/gavemyhusband1)
d. . . . and that is why God gave my husband me as his wife.
(tinyurl.com/gavemyhusband2)
e. “I’m going to give John me for Christmas!”14 (tinyurl.com/giveJohnme)
f. . . . and give your wife yourself. . . 15 (tinyurl.com/giveyourwife)
g. . . . but I want to give the lady it so my mom can have it. . .
(tinyurl.com/givetheladyit)
It is interesting to note that all but one of these sentences have the pronominal theme as
the second postverbal element, but not the utterance-final one. Wasow 2002:8’s “prohibition
against unstressed pronouns as the second object in the double object construction” could be
amended to hold only if the second object is also the utterance-final element, so that an unstressed
utterance-final element (the theme object pronoun) can be avoided by introducing furthermaterial
(presumably with stress at the end). The one example above where the pronoun is utterance-final,
(2.30c), would even support this: the pronoun me arguably is stressed there, which obviously
means that this sentence could still occur even in the presence of a strict constraint against
13Haspelmath (2007) uses the percent symbol in (2.29e) to mean that these sentences are acceptable to some
speakers and quite unacceptable to others.
14It is clear from the context of (2.30e) that a sexual meaning is intended, and the same probably goes for (2.30c),
though there is less context there. This sexual undertone is not universal, but it could well mean that a sense of
impropriety gives rise to the rare construction here. In any case, these counterexamples to the claims of Haspelmath
(2007) and others evidently exist and must be accounted for. (Note also that Koster 1994 claims dative alternation
sentences with non-reflexive pronouns to be categorically ungrammatical, which cannot be maintained in light of
examples like (2.30c).)
15It appears that the reflexive theme pronoun is more common than the non-reflexive, particularly with the
prepositional construction. Either way, double object sentences with NP themes and pronominal recipients are
attested.
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unstressed utterance-final elements. Furthermore, all of the examples in (2.30) are certainly
somewhat rare, and many speakers may find them odd. However, none of these points affects the
fact that these examples do show that a full-NP recipient and a pronominal theme can be used
in the double object construction. Therefore, the argument of Haspelmath (2007) would have to
be modified: he argues that the unusualness of a full-NP recipient together with a pronominal
theme makes the double object construction with that alignment ungrammatical; all that can be
maintained in the face of the examples in (2.30) is that this unusualness makes this combination
of construction and alignment very rare and unusual.
Oehrle (1976:168)’s “surface filter” arguably has to be abandoned entirely in the face of (2.30).
Briefly, it says that a dative construction can only have two preposition-less NP objects if the
first one is not more ‘prominent’ than the second one, with the following scale of prominence:
cliticized/reduced pronouns <me and it < us and you < other pronouns < “everything else”. Thus,
(2.31a) is permitted because the first object, ’im (‘him’), is a reduced pronoun and therefore
less prominent than the second object, it; and (2.31b) is ungrammatical because the order is
reversed and thus a more prominent object precedes a less prominent one. Conversely, (2.32a)
is ungrammatical because the full pronoun him comes under “other pronouns” in the scale and
is thus more prominent that it; therefore, the theme-recipient order as in (2.32b) is grammatical
here.
(2.31) a. I gave ’im it.
b. * I gave it ’im.
(2.32) a. * I gave him it.
b. I gave it him. (judgments after Oehrle 1976)
Because not every example of a reduced form will be ‘marked’ as ’im, ’er, and so on, it is
hard to tell whether a pronoun is the full or the reduced form in writing or written speech, and
those are the modes of languages that a web search will overwhelmingly find. In other words,
examples like I gave him it would not be conclusive evidence against Oehrle (1976), since
the him might well be a reduced form. However, the “everything else” level on his scale of
prominence explicitly captures non-pronominal objects. This means that Oehrle is saying that
(2.33b) is grammatical (or at least acceptable to his surface filter) and (2.33a) is not. However,
(2.33a) is structurally equivalent to (2.30g) above, which is attested to occur.
(2.33) a. * I gave the lady it.
b. I gave it the lady. (judgments after Oehrle 1976)
There can be no confusion about reduced forms here—the predictions of Oehrle (1976) do not
match up with the data.
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Of course, Haspelmath’s and Oehrle’s approaches remain internally consistent, and they appear
to explain other (crosslinguistic) data; my point here is that neither explains the English dative
alternation well. No categorical restriction based on pronominality is apparent for the dative
alternation. Also, (2.28a) and (2.28b) suggest that the reverse prepositional construction is much
more likely in very specific situations where the prepositional construction is chosen, but other
considerations (length and focus, respectively) strongly favor the theme phrase to be in the final
position. It is therefore reasonable to go back to seeing the dative alternation as a choice between
two orderings (the canonical constructions). What must then be explained is why the reverse
constructions are found at all, but much more rarely than their canonical counterparts.
A general explanation for this is readily available: assuming the dative alternation is actually
just an alternation between the two canonical orderings, and that HNPS (defined broadly, such
that focus and properties other than length could also make a phrase ‘heavy’ and thus cause
it to shift) is distinct from the dative alternation, HNPS could simply occur after the dative
alternation choice is made.16 The two phenomena would follow the same general principles,
though obviously with some differences in features or their relative strengths. Most of the dative
alternation choices would then already be ‘optimal’ from the point of view of HNPS, so they
would be produced in the canonical orderings. Only in a few cases, HNPS would still reorder
the chosen dative construction, thus resulting in the rare reverse dative constructions (which
Branigan et al. 2008:183 call “a ‘heavy-shifted’ prepositional object form”, implying an analysis
much like this). Van der Beek (2004)’s analysis of the four-way dative alternation found in
Dutch divides that phenomenon into two binary alternations and thus assumes a theory like this
one (though she argues that the two alternations are governed by different features), and her
results show this approach to be fruitful.
This is a very rough explanation,17 obviously, but it is useful in explaining the approach to the
dative alternation phenomenon taken here. A lot of effort has been expended on determining
the exact rules that govern the grammaticality of the two dative alternation constructions, but
most of these rules have been overturned. The syntactic rule shown to be questionable with
(2.30) above demonstrates this, as do the phono-etymological categorization done in Berwick
(1985:275–291) or the morphological rule proposed by Oehrle (1976:124). The former is an
attempt to extend the well-known but inaccurate rule that English verbs of Germanic origin can
16Note that this is not an implicitly transformational account of the dative alternation—I am not saying that
there is some rule that transforms the basic dative alternation construction into the nonbasic one and that that rule
applies before the HNPS rule (which would go against Anderson 1977:158–160, for example). My proposal is that
whatever process decides the dative alternation choice, its output is subject to HNPS.
17Future studies that investigate this this rough dative-alternation-plus-HNPS analysis are easily imagined. That
analysis predicts that the reverse dative constructions are more likely to have a second object heavier than the first,
and that the reverse constructions would allow (less heavy) non-object phrases to occur between the first object and
the shifted second objects. These predictions could be tested with appropriate corpora.
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be used with both dative alternation constructions, while Latinate verbs can only be used in the
prepositional construction. Berwick (1985:289) adds Latinate verbs with initial stress to the
group that can be used with both, using promise and donate as examples. While he notes that
there are exceptions to this rule (say, which is not Latinate and so should be acceptable with
both constructions, but is not; design, assign, and award, which are Latinate with final stress
and so should not be acceptable with both constructions, but are), Berwick’s account does not
address these exceptions in any way. If this handful of verbs were the only exception, that might
be tolerable; they are not, however. Latinate verbs with non-initial stress like convey, return,
reveal, and so forth are in fact used in the supposedly ungrammatical double object construction,
as the examples in (2.34) show. If these (and all the other verbs like these, for which examples
are easily found with web searches along the lines of “(verb)ed her the”) are all exceptions
to the rule, there is hardly any rule left. Berwick (1985)’s theory, while elegant, is thus not
compatible with the data.
(2.34) a. . . . and that Appellant conveyed her the property in satisfaction thereof.
(tinyurl.com/conveyDO)
b. . . . so I returned them the item (tinyurl.com/returnDO)
c. . . . when I revealed him the truth (tinyurl.com/revealDO)
Oehrle (1976)’s morphological rule fares no better. According to that, the double object
construction is ungrammaticalwith verbs that contain Chomsky andHalle (1968:371)’s boundary
=, which is “introduced by special rules”.18 Among these are convey, return, and reveal, for
which double object examples are given in (2.34) above. Similar examples of the supposedly
unavailable double object construction can be found easily for the rest of Oehrle (1976:137)’s
ten alleged non-double object verbs as well. These verbs are probably much more frequently
used with the prepositional construction than the double object alternative, but the double
object alternative does not appear to be entirely ungrammatical. Even with the (erroneous)
rule, “[m]any cases remain which we have nothing to say about” (Oehrle 1976:138). Any
generalization about the ungrammaticality of one or the other dative construction with certain
patterns is likely to either fall prey to that problem of limited applicability, or to be easily
disproven (as above). Moreover, allegedly ungrammatical sentences may be perfectly parseable
to speakers, as Langendoen et al. (1973) showed: they studied (supposedly) ungrammatical
‘dative questions’ (DQs) that ask after the recipient using the double object construction, such
as (2.35).
18In a strong parallel to Berwick (1985), all the examples of the = boundary given by Chomsky and Halle
(1968:94–96 and 371) as well as Oehrle (1976:137) are Latinate verbs. Oehrle (1976:126) even introduces a specific
caveat to his constraint to “restrict the occurrence of the ‘=’ boundary to Latinate words with a prefix + stem
structure”.
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(2.35) Who(m) did you send the woman? (Langendoen et al. 1973:463)
Pilot studies showed them that “subjects had no objections at all to DQs of any sort” (Langendoen
et al. 1973:462), and only five of the 269 participants (1.9%) who saw the sentence in (2.35) in
their questionnaire studies did not understand it at all (Langendoen et al. 1973:465).
Thus, the approach exemplified by Bresnan et al. (2007) and also taken here is to not categorically
rule out any pattern and focus on the differences in usage instead. In that approach, it seems
most fruitful to view the dative alternation as one of several ‘weight’-based (re-)ordering
phenomena (like HNPS, particle verb ordering effects, and the like; see Hawkins 1994:214,
Wasow 2002:4–12, andAnttila et al. 2010:971–972). The same general factors (length, givenness,
animacy, and so on) affect all of them. This does suggest that there is a more basic underlying
aspect of language that the various phenomena are really epiphenomena of. However, since
there is little clear empirical evidence for that, this study will focus on the dative alternation
involving the prototypical dative verb give and recipient phrases headed by to in the prepositional
construction.
2.3 Animacy
It is common sense that the concept of animacy is important in linguistics as well as in learning
generally: the sentence The rock ran to the coffee shop is odd because rocks, as inanimates,
cannot run; and learning the names of different animals and telling them apart from other objects
is a common theme of early childhood picture-books. This section discusses the concept of
animacy and its linguistic effects. However, since the ‘animates’ and ‘inanimates’ categories
are not simple ones, it is necessary to present and discuss different theories of categorization
first.
In the classical view of categorization, each entity belongs to a category by virtue of its features
matching those that define the category—a tree is a tree because it has a trunk, leafy branches,
and a certain height, which agrees with the concept of trees also having a trunk, leafy branches,
and a certain (minimum) height. A bush is not a tree because it will never grow to the height of
trees, a lamppost is not a tree because it does not have branches or leaves, and so on. Categories
can be hierarchical and have subcategories: the ‘animals’ category, for example, has the ‘birds’
and ‘humans’ categories among its subcategories. This follows from the Platonic method of
division (Skemp 1952), which divides entities into categories by (recursively) grouping them
according to their ‘natural’ differences: for example, animals live in the water or on land, the
land-dwellers are quadru- or bipedal, and bipeds are feathered (birds) or featherless (humans).
It was of course noted that even the most ‘natural’ categories defined by division only last until
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a counterexample is found and thus are not actually natural or underlyingly true: the story of
Diogenes the Cynic’s plucked chicken running among the other featherless bipeds of the Platonic
academy illustrates the problem of defining categories by a list of necessary features (Yonge
1853, Desmond 2008). Nevertheless, this classical view of a category as being defined exactly
in terms of the common features of all its members was accepted as truth for centuries (Gries
2003:1–3, Qi et al. 2006:776, and Gabora et al. 2008).
One highly influential approach in another direction was Eleanor Rosch’s theory of categories
centered around prototypes (see for example Rosch et al. 1976), which has been applied in many
fields (like geography, see Qi et al. 2006). Considering that the original experimental materials
were lists of words for categories like furniture and vehicles (Rosch and Mervis 1975), it is
unsurprising that the idea of prototypes has had a strong influence in linguistics particularly.19
Prototype theory brings with it the idea of degrees or scales of category membership, which
shows what role category features play in this theory: the ability to fly is surely one feature of
the ‘birds’ category, and kakapo, penguins, and all other flightless birds are less prototypical
birds precisely because they are flightless. This example also shows that explicitly learned
(‘scientific’) knowledge can affect categorization: the fact that some bird species cannot fly
cannot possibly be a perceptually simple feature, but once it is learned, it undoubtedly affects
category membership. Thus, both categories and features are developing in children’s minds
(Taylor 1995:241).
Prototype theory is not easy to reconcile with the idea of complex categories though: as Fodor
(1998:93–108) points out, the prototypes for (most, if not all) complex or combined categories
are not simply the combined prototypes of their respective constituent categories, and some
complex categories (like ‘non-cats’) have no prototype at all. Proponents of prototype theory
have argued that combinatorial prototypes can in fact make sense, given a ‘syntax’ of prototypes
that takes all the features of the constituent categories, specifies relevant features of the complex
prototype, and defaults to the feature specification of the (constituent) simplex prototypes for
all non-specified features, but this does not work theoretically or practically (Connolly et al.
2007): at least in some contexts, a complex category has features which none of its constituent
categories is specified for. Further iterations of prototype- or stereotype-based theories continue
to address problems like these (Gabora et al. 2008), but the idea that categories (or prototypes, or
stereotypes, or whatever terminology is used) have features is common to them all. Therefore,
the above discussion of malleable categories and features is not affected by these more recent
advances, and the fact that categories and their features can develop over time remains. The
question then is this: how exactly do categories develop?20
19In linguistics, prototypicality has been applied not only to words, but also to causatives (Gilquin 2008) and
transitivity (Ibbotson and Tomasello 2009), for example.
20Lupyan and Rakison (2006)’s finding that a neural network simulation can learn to categorize animacy even
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Children’s non-adult-like use of prototype words is of particular interest to that question: “doggie
is typically used by the young child to refer . . . to all small four-legged animals . . . his word
roughly corresponds, in fact, to the superordinate term animal in adult language” (Taylor
1995:252). As Taylor argues, this suggests that children build (at least some) categories from
prototypes. Not all features of the prototype will matter for the category—even at the age when
cats are members of a ‘doggie’ category, young children will not expect them to bark. However,
it does mean that entities that resemble the prototype in many features will be easier for children
to categorize. Interestingly, this would be true for all prototype-based categories: while a large
part of the literature on prototype theory is centered on ‘noun-y’ object categories, and it has
been argued that infants’ first categories are of that type (Waxman 1999), it is crucial to note
that prototypes have not been posited for these object category concepts only. Constructions
may also have prototypes: to use an example that is relevant to this study, “the ditransitive
construction prototypically involves transfer of possession . . . [and] prototypically has the form
of NP1 + VERBditrans. + NP2 + NP3” (Ibbotson and Tomasello 2009:63).
However, it appears that children learn object/category labels of a certain level before they learn
the sub- and superordinate category terms (Hammer et al. 2009). Although this finding is not
absolutely inconsistent with prototype theory, some additional assumptions would be necessary
to reconcile the two—after all, in the above example, the child’s term for small mammals could
just as well be poodle or the name of the family dog.21 Doggie and other terms of this basic level
are in all likelihoodmore frequent in child-directed speech than poodle, small mammal, and other
sub- and superordinate terms, of course, but frequency and prototypicality do not necessarily
correlate (Ibbotson andTomasello 2009:65). Exemplar theory, on the other hand, readily explains
this fact: considering that categorization is easier for children when they are presented with many
similar examples of a category than with a comprehensive variety (Gentner and Namy 2006), the
important within-category similarities for doggie and the category differences between doggie
and car or tree (such as animacy, legs, barking, absence of wheels, or absence of leaves) are
generally perceptual (visual, mostly) and thus more salient and easier to learn than those for
poodle (versus dachshund and poplar) would be (Hammer et al. 2009).
The categorization experiment of Fisher (2009) supports this view: in that experiment, children
aged three to five were shown a picture of a common object and two pictures of ‘similar’ objects,
one of which being similar in appearance to the target but belonging to a different category
and the other looking different but belonging to the same category. One trial, for example,
had a white wall clock as the ‘pivot’ and a white dinner plate (similar appearance but different
with abstract, ‘meaningless’ features means that feat is computationally possible, but not necessarily that actual
human cognition does develop like that.
21The fact that children’s understanding of these basic-level categories also precedes their use of the correct
name for these categories is unproblematic (Taylor 1995:253).
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category) and a grandfather clock (different appearance but same category) as the ‘similar’
pictures (Fisher 2009:1332). Half of the participants were asked to pick the object that was
similar to the pivot in appearance, the other half the one that belonged to the same category.
Halfway through the experiment, the instructions were changed: participants who had been
asked to pick the similar-looking object were now asked to pick the category-matching one,
and vice-versa. Participants who had to switch from perceptual (visual) matching to category
matching did significantly worse in picking the correct choice after the switch than they had
been before. Four- and five-year-old participants who switched from category to perceptual
matching, however, did not show this drop in performance (Fisher 2009:1333). This suggests
that perceptual information is easier to attend to and process, at least in this relatively confusing
task—in other words, “perceptual information is more salient than conceptual information”
(Fisher 2009:1334). Based on this result, Sloutsky and Fisher (2011) argue that conceptualizing
and categorizing successfully means ignoring irrelevant features for more relevant ones, and
that this process of intelligent ignoring has to develop for adult-like categories to arise.
This capacity for ignoring or filtering is a prime candidate for Hammer et al. (2009:117)’s
cognitive limitations that prevent young children from learning subordinate categories: the
relevant features for the poodle category, for example, must surely be all relevant features of
dog(gie) plus some more, which makes poodle harder to learn when there is no filter to pick out
the important features from all the irrelevant ones. This can be extended to subordinate categories
in general. Lack of a filter would also explain why children under ten seem to learn categories
better from within-category similarities while children over ten (and adults) learn better from
between-category differences (Hammer et al. 2009:113), as well as why human categorization
seems to use rules in situations of low confusability and exemplars in high confusability (Rouder
and Ratcliff 2006). A given category has fewer possibilities for within-category similarities than
for differences to other categories: ‘has four legs’ and ‘breathes’ are easier to pick out from other
poodle similarities than ‘does not have leaves’ and ‘cannot fly’ are to pick out from the myriad
features that differentiate poodle from other categories, though all four of these are arguably
relevant for the category. Relying on within-category similarities thus is the economical thing to
do when categorization is difficult, regardless of the particular reason for that difficulty.
These radical differences between (young) children and adults might be argued to make research
into children’s concepts and particularly comparison with adults practically impossible—if
children do not even have the capabilities required for certain kinds of conceptualization, the
concepts that they do have could be very far removed from the corresponding adult concepts.
However, the existing literature suggests that at least the concept of animacy does not undergo
major restructuring from age four onward (Opfer and Gelman 2011:221–226). As four years
is the youngest age group in the present study, this means that the difference between young
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children’s and adults’ concepts of animacy is not a problem here.
One further possible cause for problems with research is the fact that children do not always
respond like adults would to explicit categorization questions, particularly to questions regarding
categories that have two possible applications: dolls, for example, can be used in “a play and
non-play mode” (Gelman et al. 1983:108), and children realize that they are agentive and
animate-like in the former but inanimate in the latter. What they do not always realize is which of
these modes the experimenter ‘wants’, whereas adults seem more aware of the different possible
interpretations (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003:365–366). Moreover, it is not always clear from just
the data in which mode a particular answer was given. If such ambiguous items are to be used
in research, the methodology must be designed and the results interpreted with particular care.
Not doing so can invalidate a whole study—or even a program of research, as has been argued
for Piagetian child psychology.
The Piagetian tradition of research into children’s cognitive development focused on the idea
of stages of development. In this view of development, a child is at one particular stage for a
time, until further development advances them to the next stage. The ages of child participants
who were found to be in a certain stage are then used to give an approximate age range for
that stage in typical development. The ages for the last stage according to Piagetian research
can be surprisingly high: for example, it has been claimed that children as old as nine fail to
understand domino chains (Piaget 1978:22) or the difference between animals and inanimate
objects (Laurendeau and Pinard 1962). This theory is relevant to linguistic studies since it
has been argued that children are unable to say what they cannot conceptualize (Johnston
1985:Section 2)—in other words, if nine-year-olds cannot distinguish between animates and
inanimates, their language use can hardly be affected by that distinction. However, Piagetian
research consists in part of asking children quite abstract questions about experimental set-
ups and comparing their answers to the physical facts: for example, Piaget (1978:196–210)’s
“Mirrors” task asks children to manipulate the position of a pencil representing a beam of light
reflected from a mirror, based on changes to a pencil representing the beam impinging on the
mirror. Children aged four to eight are not competent at this task. Piaget is certainly right in
concluding that these children do not know about the optical mechanism of reflection, but he
goes too far in assuming that a simple mental model of angles of reflection is the only cognitive
mechanism that allows intelligent use of mirrors (see Brown and DesForges 1979:51–52)—for
example, thinking of mirrors as ‘reversers’ would also allow for some competence in using
mirrors (wiping one’s right cheek to remove a stain seen on the left cheek of one’s mirror image,
moving to the right to shift one’s view in a stationary mirror to the left, and so on). It may be that
competent (adult-like) use of mirrors relies on a cognitive mechanism of calculating, estimating,
or visualizing angles of reflection, but it is not necessarily so. Piaget (1978), however, assumes
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that it is and therefore tests to it, which means he cannot find competence based on another
mechanism. Moreover, his method of testing for explicit knowledge means he may even miss
competence in accordance with his preconception: asking children where a beam of light comes
from, or asking them to use pencils as representations for beams of light, requires not only the
angles-of-reflection model of mirrors, but also the ability to use abstractions. Even a child who
knows about angles of reflection may not be able to express that knowledge in the confines of a
Piagetian methodology, and may thus incorrectly be seen to be ignorant.
Thus, the experimental support for Piaget’s theory relies on unvalidated preconceptions, and
other interpretations of it may be possible (Brown and DesForges 1979:Chapters 3 and 4). It has
even been argued “that no support for a stage view of cognitive development has been derived
from the Neo-Piagetian training literature” (Brainerd 1973:366, emphasis added). More recent
Neo-Piagetian theories have improved on certain aspects, based on new methods and data, but
they have not gone unchallenged either (for an overview of recent Neo-Piagetians see Morra
et al. 2008).
In conclusion, the literature suggests that studies of children’s concept of animacy as well as
comparisons with adult data are possible and possibly insightful, provided that methods are
carefully chosen to be appropriate to the possibilities that the state of scientific knowledge leaves
open as well as to participants’ cognitive and meta-cognitive skills.
What the above also shows is that all theories of concepts or categories, in one way or another,
incorporate the idea of concepts having features. It is therefore necessary to find the features of
the concept at hand here, animacy, regardless of which theory of categorization one subscribes
to. The features of the tree concept are fairly obvious, but animacy is less easily defined.
Nevertheless, a few features emerge from the literature on this subject quite clearly. Firstly,
animacy is of course connected to agentivity. Children’s speech is likely to have animate entities
as subjects or actors (Maratsos 1983). Infants as young as five weeks are more likely to produce
“neutral” and “negative vocalizations” when faced with a person who smiles but remains passive
and does not react to them, than when faced with the same person talking and reacting to them
(Legerstee et al. 1987:88). This negativity towards passivity disappears when infants are faced
with a doll: Legerstee et al. found no difference in vocalizations towards the doll depending on
whether the doll was passive or appeared to talk and react to the child. Furthermore, infants
smiled or vocalized less when faced with the doll than when faced with a person. This strongly
suggests that people as such appear more active or agentive and are therefore more ‘interesting’
perceptually than everything else. According to Gentner and Boroditsky (2001), this perceptual
bias (or ease of individuation in the perceptual stream) would also explain children’s early
lexicon being mostly made up of animate-referent nouns. One reason for humans and other
animates being easier to pick out from the visual input is that they move in a special way: their
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motion is goal-directed, autonomous, and irregular, while inanimate objects do not exhibit this
kind of movement. Motion has long been recognized as a central feature of animacy (Maratsos
1983, Rakison and Poulin-Dubois 2001), and children’s developing awareness of motion may
parallel their developing concept of animacy (Schwartz 1980). Computational work has shown
that motion and having legs are crucial for categorization according to animacy (Lupyan and
Rakison 2006:526). Using this simple metric allows for a crucial distinction: “[i]nfants seem to
know that animals are not inanimate (they can move themselves) and neither human (one cannot
communicate with them)” (Legerstee 2001:200). Communication or ‘talking’ (as opposed to
barking and the like) is thus another important feature for animacy, as it distinguishes two
important animate categories from each other (Gelman et al. 1983). However, both children and
adults will ascribe the ability to talk or communicate more often to non-human animates than to
inanimates (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003), which shows that communication is also used to define
animacy. Aspects of higher cognition (thought and memory, but also emotions) have also been
shown to be related to the concept of animacy (Gelman et al. 1983, Subrahmanyam et al. 2003),
and three- and four-year-old children seem to grasp this: they are almost adult-like in judging (as
‘OK’ or ‘silly’) sentences ascribing emotions and personality to animates or inanimates (Becker
2007). Finally, the scientific or biological features of animacy (such as breathing, having internal
organs, and so on) are the latest features to become reliable, probably as explicitly learned
knowledge (Gelman et al. 1983, Subrahmanyam et al. 2003, Leddon et al. 2009).
While the concept of animacy is multidimensional, as shown above, it is also gradient. This
gradience is expressed by the well-established animacy hierarchy: expressions fall on it according
to the animacy or sentience of their referents, and languages can reflect these hierarchical
differences in word order. Some Bantu languages, for example, order the objects of certain verbs
according to their position in the animacy hierarchy (Demuth et al. 2005): higher-ranked, ‘more
animate’ objects must be placed before less animate ones, and thematic roles are apparently
assigned using information from the context or world knowledge. When both objects are on the
same level of the animacy hierarchy, both orderings are possible, and both allow both meanings
(first object as theme and second as beneficiary, or vice-versa, for example). Demuth et al. (2005)
showed that even four-year-olds observe this animacy ordering rule, at least for a three-tiered
hierarchy of humans > animals > inanimates.22 In Jóola Banjal, the recipient and theme objects
of ditransitive verbs can be ordered freely only when the referent of the recipient is higher on
the animacy hierarchy than the referent of the theme. When the recipient is of the same grade
of animacy as the theme, or of a lower one, the recipient has to come after the theme (Bassène
2010). Arguably, Malchukov et al. (2010a)’s argument is in the same vein: they view animacy
as part of the prominence of an object and argue that highly animate objects are generally more
22More fine-grained hierarchies of animacy or potentiality-of-agency have been devised (Dixon 1979, Bowerman
2011), only the binary animate/inanimate distinction will be discussed and used here.
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prominent in speakers’ minds. Since it is based on common knowledge and human perception
and has been shown to have many different effects in many different languages, the animacy
hierarchy as such may very well be universal; for a study of animacy in a particular language,
however, it is crucial to bear in mind that languages can organize their hierarchies differently
(Gentner and Boroditsky 2001:229).
For the animacy hierarchy of English, it has been argued that there are the same three rungs as
above: humans > animals > inanimates (Ransom 1977). While Ransom (1977:421–423) also
shows that dative alternation choices tend to be made to ensure the object that is higher on that
hierarchy comes first, there is also some evidence for a simple binary hierarchy of [humans &
animals] > inanimates: this binary distinction has been shown to be active in adults (Paczynski
and Kuperberg 2011) and children (Dewart 1979).
At the same time, results of more recent research indicate that children have a more fine-
grained appreciation of animacy: even three-year-olds ascribe some features of animacy (such
as thinking, breathing, and even using language) more to humans than to other animals, but
also more to mammals (like dogs and elephants) than to worms (Saylor et al. 2010:837–838)
or insects (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003:357). In the same studies, these ‘lower’ animals were in
turn clearly differentiated from inanimates (like rocks and spoons), to whom children almost
never assigned features of animacy. Subrahmanyam et al.’s study also shows motion to be
relevant here: practically all participants described insects, dogs, and humans alike as being
able to move. However, motion was also ascribed to vehicles and other wheeled things (see
also Byrne and Davidson 1985). This was done by adults as well as children, and it is arguably
correct: a car can move, after all. It is crucial to note how other features show quite clearly that
children on the whole do not categorize moving machines with animals. While anthropomorphic
robots are granted some features of (human) animacy (such as thought and memory, Saylor et al.
2010:836–838), they are clearly distinguished from animals: young children know that robots
differ from animals in terms of “eating and growing” (Saylor et al. 2010:837), and they “are less
inclined than adults to attribute animate predicates to robots” (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003:365).
Children however also ascribe more machine features to these robots than to clearly inanimate
machines (Saylor et al. 2010:842), meaning the robots could simply be more interesting or
exciting to children and thus evoke more description overall. Thus, even three-year-old children
do not think of wheeled and otherwise mobile machines as animals, and focusing on just one
feature of animacy means obscuring the finely-graded animacy distinctions that children are
capable of.
Of course, not every animacy distinction is gradient: when presented with a novel word for
an (explicitly or implicitly) animate novel entity, children as young as three will extend that
word only to entities that match the exemplar in both shape and texture. When the exemplar is
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inanimate, the word is extended to all entities of the same shape, regardless of their texture or
other physical features (Booth and Waxman 2002, Colunga 2006). These experiments show a
clear animacy dichotomy: animals of a kind are expected to have the same shape and texture,
objects of a kind are only expected to have the same shape. There is no gradience or ‘middle
ground’ here. This is perfectly in line with the suggestion that different features of animacy
matter in different contexts (Gelman and Koenig 2001:699–700): when asked explicitly and
specifically about motion, to re-use the above examples, children as well as adults will treat
some inanimates (vehicles and the like) like most animals, and possibly some animals like
the majority of inanimates (such as rocks). To tease out a subcategory, it can be necessary to
draw on several features—again, “[i]nfants seem to know that animals are not inanimate (they
can move themselves) and neither human (one cannot communicate with them)” (Legerstee
2001:200). When there is an implicit (and ‘general’) distinction to be made, however, the various
features collapse onto a one-dimensional hierarchy with a clear division between animates and
inanimates.
This still leaves one question unanswered: when does child language start to show effects of an
animacy hierarchy? On the one hand, English-speaking six-year-olds seem to be sensitive to it:
Dewart (1979) showed that six- to eight-year-old children are more likely to change a passive
(monotransitive) sentence to an active one at recall when the agent is animate and the patient
inanimate, i.e. when the active sentence has animate-before-inanimate order, than when the agent
is inanimate and the patient animate. On the other hand, research in the Piagetian tradition places
the median age of arriving at a proper concept of animacy in the tenth year of life (Laurendeau
and Pinard 1962:141–159). The Piagetian methods are however unnecessarily complex (see the
discussion above; for another example, compare Laurendeau and Pinard 1962:67 and 265–266
with the criticism of Brainerd 1973) and only capture explicit knowledge about biology in any
case. This knowledge is presumably taught in science classes, and it is thus no surprise that
children as old as eight do not exhibit it (Schwartz 1980, Okita and Schwartz 2006, Leddon
et al. 2009). Because of these methodological and theoretical shortcomings, as well as the lack
of independent support for it, the figure of ten years can therefore be ruled out as the earliest
age for animacy effects. In fact, the true figure is most likely much lower than the initial figure
of six to eight years mentioned above: generally, other research (in the Piagetian tradition) has
shown that the attention of newborns is drawn to animates or humans (see for example Legerstee
2001:195–197). More specifically, linguistic tasks that use animacy implicitly show that children
between two and a half years and four years are sensitive to the animacy of referents (Lempert
1989, Au and Romo 1999, Rakison and Poulin-Dubois 2001, Thal and Flores 2001, Becker
2007, 2009, Leddon et al. 2009). Children begin to use truly transitive sentences at roughly
the same age (Ibbotson and Tomasello 2009:66–68), which means that there is no time when
children will reliably use transitives without also attending to the animacy of the objects—in
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other words, “animacy seems to be a prelinguistic concept that is appreciated by children at a
very young age” (Gelman and Koenig 2001:700).
That, however, raises another question: when exactly do children have the (cognitive, prelinguis-
tic) concept of animacy? This question again ties into the discussion about the structure of that
concept (see Rakison and Poulin-Dubois 2001 for review). As shown above, it is uncontroversial
that the concept of animacy is a complex one, meaning that it consists of several features. The
concept is surely also more removed from direct perceptual data than other concepts are; this
could mean that its constituent features themselves are also complex. It follows that “features
themselves might undergo development” (Taylor 1995:241). To recapitulate, there is evidence
that animacy depends on motion (Legerstee 2001) and communication (Subrahmanyam et al.
2003): infants expect animates to move irregularly and by themselves (Legerstee 2001). Consid-
ering that “infants initially associate animate properties with people rather than with animate
entities in general” (Rakison and Poulin-Dubois 2001:222, emphasis added), this is a good
expectation for them to have: the most salient property of humans in visual perception must be
their particular kind of motion, and animals share (this or a similar kind of) irregular motion.
This makes animates easier to individuate, which may be why the first words of children gen-
erally refer to animates (Gentner and Boroditsky 2001:231). The (early) importance of motion
also explains why legs seem to be particularly important for animacy categorization (Lupyan
and Rakison 2006:526): if the concept of animacy at that stage is little more than ‘moves by
itself’, then the parts that are associated with movement (or their functional cues, Rakison and
Poulin-Dubois 2001) are the best indicators of whether something is animate.
Language use, on the other hand, is not associated with easily identifiable functional cues in the
physical shape itself. The fact that it apparently begins to affect children’s concept of animacy
later than motion does is in all likelihood not only tied to this absence of a functional cue, but
also crucially depends on children having at least a simple understanding of others’ attention in
the first place, which may arise as late as 12 months (Tomasello 2003:25). In Subrahmanyam
et al. (2003:357)’s experiments, children aged four were roughly equally likely to ascribe the
ability to talk to dogs as to elephants, which suggests that these children by and large understand
what ‘talking’ means but are connecting it to animacy in general rather than to a (human) faculty
for language in particular. It is true that adults apparently are more ready than children to grant
‘talking’ to animals, which might be seen to suggest that not even adults know that (non-human)
animals do not use language; however, the “incorrect answers” (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003:358)
in particular suggest that child participants did indeed not know, while the adults were over-
thinking the question and thus allowing any intake of air as ‘(sort of) breathing’, any change of
shape as ‘moving’, and any noise as ‘talking’. One of the correct answers cited there indicates
that adults (or at least the adult participant(s) who gave that answer) do know that ‘talking’ in
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the narrower sense relies on a faculty for language that animals do not have: one participant
said a bug cannot talk because it has “no language” (Subrahmanyam et al. 2003:358). ‘Talking’
seems to be connected to the concept of animacy, but it may be ascribed to (language-less)
animals for several reasons: the subject may genuinely think that the animal in question uses
language. They may, however, also be taking the question in a ‘play/pretend mode’ (see Gelman
et al. 1983)—animal characters in picture books and the like do talk, after all. Finally, they may
assume that the term ‘talking’ is being used in a loose sense of the term, according to which
some animals do ‘talk’: they communicate (apes grunt and hoot, dolphins whistle) or at least
make noises purposefully (dogs can be trained and commanded to ‘speak’, whales have ‘songs’).
On the other hand, a subject may also ascribe talking only to humans, since only humans use
language. Thus, talking can be understood in several quite different ways, which means a study
of animacy that uses ‘talking’ without very specific explanation or control of what exactly is
meant will yield inconsistent and unreliable results. Experimental tasks for use with children
must be designed with children’s cognitive limitations in mind anyway. Even though dolls and
puppets are designed to resemble highly animate and agentive entities, children as young as
three will (correctly) treat them as inanimate if the study is designed carefully to ensure that
the children do not assume it to be in ‘play mode’ (Gelman et al. 1983). This even works for
“potentially ambiguous entities, such as computers and robots” (Opfer and Gelman 2011:229),
provided the task does not overwhelm children. Therefore, all that is necessary is a capability
of animals that distinguishes them from inanimates clearly and will not be misunderstood or
over-thought.
Luckily, there are some candidates for such a capability in the literature. Gelman et al. (1983:300)
used various “reciprocal actions”, asking participants whether they could, for example, hug or
play with a rock, and whether the rock could hug or play with them in return. Participants as
young as three years performed very well on these types of questions (Gelman et al. 1983:303–
304, 310, and 315). The crucial questions were the ones asking after the objects’ capabilities
for these actions: creative children might play with a rock just as well as with a cat, but Gelman
et al.’s participants seemed perfectly aware that only the cat could play with them. It is thus
the latter type of question (‘Can a (noun) play with you?’) that provides the most insight into
participants’ concept of animacy, which is why this question (along with one about motion) is
used in the present study (see Section 4.1).
2.4 Number
The case of children’s understanding of the plural is much clearer. Again, children may not be
able to produce markers for every concept they possess (see Zapf and Smith 2009); but studies
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of comprehension and production of plural markers (both canonical, like -s, and non-canonical,
like two with no plural morpheme on the noun) have shown that two-year-old children do
understand the idea of a plural (Clark and Nikitina 2009, Zapf and Smith 2009, Barner et al.
2012). These early concepts of plurality may indeed be as simple as ‘two or more’ (Clark and
Nikitina 2009:135), but at least for English this is unproblematic—that is the exact number
distinction of adult-like English, after all. There is evidence that two-year-olds need a complete
sentence (with redundant plural marking) to process plural nouns correctly, while three-year-olds
need only the plural marker on the noun itself (Kouider et al. 2006, Wood et al. 2009). Children
acquiring other languages may of course exhibit understanding and use of plural marking later
than this, as the language in question may have additional number categories (Kovačević et al.
2009) or mark the plural less obviously (compare the early acquisition of the clearly marked
Brazilian Portuguese plural shown in Corrêa et al. 2005 with the later acquisition and more
variable plural marking in Chilean Spanish shown in Miller and Schmitt 2012). Nevertheless,
the English data show that children in general can process and produce simple plural marking
by the age of three, if not earlier. Studies using simple plural markers can therefore elicit valid
results from quite young children, although data from two-year-olds will need to be treated
with caution when there is no redundant plural marking. The present study arguably lacks
redundant marking: where plurals are used, only the noun itself carries a plural marker (see
Sections 5.1 and 6.1)—the respective pictures showing more than one referent is not linguistic
plural marking. Therefore, the limited understanding of the plural that Kouider et al. (2006)
found in two-year-old children could affect their performance in this study. Since the participants
in the present study were four-and eight-year-olds, however, they can be assumed to understand
the plural marking as intended.
Children having some concept of grammatical number is necessary for number to have an effect
in child speech, but it does not guarantee such an effect. In the case of the dative alternation,
it is not entirely clear whether number affects the choice of construction even in the relatively
well-studied English of adults: in all of Bresnan et al. (2007:81, 83, and 87)’s models, there
is an effect of number (which can be summarized as a plural-before-singular preference), but
it always is one of the weakest. Subsequent studies did not include (or report on) the effect
of number (de Marneffe et al. 2012, Wolk et al. 2013). However, it is reasonable to assume
that number may affect the dative alternation—after all, the dative alternation can be viewed as
decision between the two orderings of objects (as I introduced it in Section 2.1 above, and as it
is commonly viewed in the Wasow/Bresnan et al. literature), and it is uncontroversial that word
order and number can interact. Lorimor (2007:137–152) shows that word order has an effect on
the processing of number in English: when the subject NP consists of two coordinated singular
nouns, polar questions are more likely than declaratives to be used with a (strictly speaking
incorrectly) singular-marked verb—for example, (2.36a) is more likely than (2.36b).
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(2.36) a. Was the bee and ant red?
b. The bee and ant was red. (both after Lorimor 2007:140)
It has been noted that singular-marked verbs are more likely with coordinations of singulars
than with plural-marked subjects (see the discussion in Lorimor Chapter 2 of 2007). However,
Lorimor (2007:143–144) took particular care to ensure that participants used the same words in
both types of sentences, and in the exact construction as in the examples in (2.36). This means
that the striking difference in singular agreement rates between the two types cannot be due to
the peculiar type of subject, since they shared that. Therefore, word (or constituent) order can
be seen as the relevant difference between questions and declaratives here.23 In this view, the
(incorrect) singular marking on the verb is more likely with postverbal subjects than preverbal
ones—in other words, word order affects number agreement (in English).
To return to ditransitives, Duranti (1979) argues that number is one of the features that determine
which orders of object clitics in two Bantu languages are grammatical at all. It is true that his
work focuses on topicality, and that topicality (or ‘givenness’) is certainly included in many
accounts of the English dative alternation. Nevertheless, it is possible that number has a distinct
effect: while Bresnan et al. make no strong claim regarding the independence of its effect, the fact
that removing number (and two other factors) slightly reduced the classification accuracy of their
models B and C (Bresnan et al. 2007:89) is suggestive. Of course, there are counterexamples
of phenomena where language processing is affected by features other than number, but not by
number: for example, reading time and comprehension in Basque are affected by NP case, but
not number (Laka and Erdocia 2012, Santesteban et al. 2013). However, this does not mean
that number categorically cannot affect word order. Thus, the effect of grammatical number on
the choice of construction in the dative alternation is worthy of further investigation, and it is
possible to do such work in the realm of child language.
23The literature on these types of agreement ‘errors’ abounds with theories on it (see for example den Dikken
2001 or Lorimor 2007 for an overview). Kayne (2003)’s approach to similar phenomena might be extended to cover
coordinations: he argues that an unpronounced auxiliary verb that agrees with the subject of a relative clause, as in
(i), explains noncanonical agreement patterns found with that construction.
i the people that Johni Auxi think should be invited (after Kayne 2003:262 and 264)
It may be possible to extend this to an ellipsis-based account of coordination, such that an unpronounced copula
(each) agrees with every conjunct but one, and the overt verbal element only agrees with that last conjunct:
ii The beei Auxi and the flyj Auxj and the antk wask red.
However, this would not explain why singular agreement is more common with questions than with declaratives,
which is what Lorimor (2007) found.
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2.5 Length
The length24 of the two objects of a dative alternation verb has long been seen to affect the
choice of construction. The more general law of increasing constituents (Cooper and Ross 1975,
Behaghel 1928) or “principle of end-weight” (Biber et al. 1999:898, also Wasow 2002) says that
longer constituents are to be placed after shorter ones, at least in languages like Sanskrit, English,
and German. Structures adhering to this law are very conspicuous as their purely structural
description can violate other rules of the language in question: compare the ungrammatical
(2.37a) with (2.37b), which is more acceptable only because it places a very long object after a
shorter adverbial.
(2.37) a. * I like very much [object NP apples]. (after Downing and Locke 2006)
b. ? I like very much [object NP apples that have been stored in a cool cellar and cut
into cubes with care].
To apply the law of increasing constituents to the English dative alternation is straightforward
even though ungrammaticality is not generally involved: apart from the preposition to that is
included in the prepositional construction but not the double object construction, these two
constructions are nothing more than the two possible orderings for two (immediately adjacent)
object phrases. The choice between constructions can thus also be understood as a choice
between orders, and (all else being equal, since other features also seem to have an effect) the
order that places a shorter object before a much longer one is preferred. To extend the above
example, while both (2.38a) and (2.38b) below are quite acceptable, (2.39b) is strongly preferred
to (2.39a).25 The only difference between (2.38) and (2.39) is the length of the theme object,
and so it must be this length that causes a construction and ordering preference in (2.39) where
there is none (or not a strong one) in (2.38).
(2.38) a. Kate handed an apple to Rick.
b. Kate handed Rick an apple.
(2.39) a. ? Kate handed an apple that had been stored in a cool cellar and cut into quarters
with care to Rick.
b. Kate handed Rick an apple that had been stored in a cool cellar and cut into
quarters with care.
24The term ‘weight’ is also used in the literature to describe this difference of quantity or complexity between
objects. However, it could also be seen to include other factors (see Wasow 1997:88), and for the sake of clarity,
the less confusing term ‘length’ will be used here.
25Biber et al. (1999:928) found the length effect to be much stronger in the double object construction than in
the prepositional construction; this could however just be an artifact of their corpus data and does not change the
basic fact that there is a length effect.
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These examples show that the effect of this law (or an effect very much like it) in the dative
alternation is also one of the more easily demonstrable ones, which explains why it has been
included in most (if not all) studies of the features that affect the English dative alternation.
Interestingly, this length effect emerged as statistically significant and strong in all studies (that
I know of) which included it. This strong and independent preference for the construction that
places shorter objects before longer ones has been found data from the (Canadian English)
Aligned-Hansard corpus (Arnold et al. 2000), the (American English) Switchboard corpus
(Bresnan et al. 2007 and Snider 2011), the (New Zealand English) ONZE corpus (Bresnan and
Hay 2008), the British English parts of the ICE corpus (Theijssen 2009), African American
English (Kendall et al. 2011), the historical ARCHER corpus (Wolk et al. 2013), the English-
speaking children in CHILDES (de Marneffe et al. 2012), the (Indian English) Kolhapur corpus
(de Cuypere and Verbeke 2013), and six South Asian varieties of English (Bernaisch et al.
2014).26 Clearly, it is established as firmly as the existence of the English dative alternation
itself.
The only point of contention is how to measure the lengths of the two objects, or the length
difference (see Wasow 2002:28–32 for a more detailed discussion and evaluation): following the
seminal Bresnan et al. (2007) study, the log-transformed number of graphemic words by which
the two objects differ in length appears to be the generally accepted measure (see for example
Bresnan and Hay 2008 or Jaeger and Snider 2013), though the non-transformed number of
(graphemic) words has also been used with reasonable success (see for example Bürkle 2011 or
de Marneffe et al. 2012). In a production experiment, Stallings and MacDonald (2011) showed
that it is the difference in length, not the length of one of the phrases by itself, that affects
reordering in heavy NP shift. As long as the length measure is consistent, it does not seem
to matter much which one is used: Hundt and Szmrecsányi (2012:248) report an informative
model of the genitive alternation (the choice between Kate’s desk and the desk of Kate) that
measured length by the number of orthographic characters. De Marneffe et al. (2012) used
the number of syllables as an alternative to the number of words, which takes up Akasaka and
Tateishi (2001)’s point regarding object phrases consisting of one long word: for example, both
Rick and watermelons in (2.40) have a length of 1 when length is counted by words, whereas a
syllable-counting method would value Rick at a length of 1 and watermelons at 4.
(2.40) a. Kate handed watermelons to Rick.
b. Kate handed Rick watermelons.
It is unsurprising that the de Marneffe et al. (2012:34) model was not significantly changed by
using syllable counts rather than word counts. Their study was based on corpus data, which is
26See Arnold et al. (2000) and Wasow (2002) for yet more references.
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not systematically varied. The (or a) general length effect emerges even from an uncontrolled
dataset such as that; the question of whether longer words are effectively ‘heavier’ can only be
answered by a carefully designed, controlled study. What de Marneffe et al. (2012) do show
is that both word and syllable counts are useful measures of length in the dative alternation,
and it is obvious that (graphemic) words are easier to count in corpus data. These points are
supported throughout the literature: in a study of small corpora of written and spoken English,
Szmrecsányi (2004:1034–1035) found that number of words, number of syntactic nodes, and a
very detailed “Index of Syntactic Complexity” correlate very strongly, particularly in speech data.
He also points out that number of words is by far the easiest of these to use. Similarly, Wasow
(1997:94) concludes that node and word counts, when applied to English weight phenomena, are
“essentially indistinguishable”. Anttila et al. (2010:974–976) use the log-transformed number of
primary stresses, since it emerges as the best measure in their dataset; however, they acknowledge
that only data with prosodic annotation even allows this measure to be used. Furthermore, the
log-transformed number of words is not very much worse in their data (Anttila et al. 2010:974),
and that measure can be used with almost any data. In conclusion, the number of graphemic
words can be considered a reasonable and useful count of object length.27 Wasow (2002:38–41)
shows that different measures of length are strongly correlated, and the strong effect of length in
the models of Bresnan et al. (2007), de Marneffe et al. (2012), and others demonstrates quite
clearly that object phrase length as measured by graphemic words does have an effect in the
dative alternation. The possible effect of word length (measured in syllables) will be one of the
objects of investigation in the present study (see Sections 3.3, 5.1 and 6.1).
There is some speculation as to the (psycholinguistic) cause of the preference for short objects
before long ones (see also the overview focused on information structure in Stephens 2010:34–
39). It might ease processing, as Hawkins (1994) argued for the dative alternation. Of course,
children’s cognitive capabilities are limited when compared to those of adults, as Bloom (1990)
shows using subject-less utterances produced by English-speaking children.28 For the dative
alternation, this might lead us to expect that the effect of object length on choice of construction
is at least as strong in children as it is in adults, but probably stronger.29 The short-before-long
preference might also be explained by a preference of the language faculty for committing to a
choice as late as possible: Wasow (2002:55–56) points out that some verbs that participate in
27I must stress that this discussion is only valid for English. The Danish dative alternation, for example, is
arguably better modeled using node counts: Kizach and Balling (2013) point out that graphemic word counting
would consider the indefinite en bil (‘a car’) to be twice as long as the definite bil-en (‘the car’), whereas node
counting assigns the same length to both. Having no obvious asymmetries like this, English data can be analyzed
using the simpler graphemic word count.
28Even those that disagree with Bloom (1990) on the interpretation of his data agree that there are limitations to
children’s cognitive resources when compared to those of adults, either in production (Hyams andWexler 1993:452;
see also Bloom 1993’s reply) or in learning (Freudenthal et al. 2007:86, with the apparent production limitations
being an epiphenomenon of this limited learning).
29Data that allow direct and valid comparison do not yet exist.
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the dative alternation can also be used in a double object-like construction with a CP theme, as
in (2.41b). He argues that speakers are more likely to use the double object construction with
these verbs because it gives them more time to decide whether to use an NP or a CP theme:
(2.42a) and (2.42b) diverge after Rick showed. . . , meaning the decision is made by the time his
or what are pronounced. Both (2.41a) and (2.41b), on the other hand, begin with Rick showed
Kate. . . , so the time taken up by Kate is extra time for decision-making.
(2.41) a. Rick showed Kate his book.
b. Rick showed Kate what he had written.
(2.42) a. Rick showed his book to Kate.
b. Rick showed [what he had written] [to Kate].
This “late commitment” (Wasow 2002:49) explanation thus assumes that the dative alternation
really results from a difference between two sub-classes of dative alternation verbs: the verbs
that also allow a CP theme are more likely to be used in the double object construction (because
it allows late commitment), and those that do not allow a CP theme are (roughly) equally likely
to be used in either construction. One might then argue that CP themes are typically longer
than NP themes, and that the average theme of a verb of the former type is therefore bound
to be longer. The apparent short-before-long preference could then be argued to be an artifact
of this late commitment preference and typical phrase lengths. However, this account in no
way explains the clear preferences for short-before-long ordering with verbs that only allow NP
themes, and Wasow (2002:56, fn. 32) concedes that it does not explain the apparent preference
for long-before-short orderings in languages like Korean.
An intriguing explanation from a different angle is that short-before-long combines well with
the prosody of the sentence as a whole. Zec and Inkelas (1990) describe and explain several
phenomena of syntactic ‘weight’ by claiming that the syntactic operations in question can only
apply to prosodically branching constituents. In the case of English heavy NP shift,30 they
present this phono-syntactic constraint as an explanation of the difference in grammaticality
between (2.43a) and (2.43b) as well as between (2.44a) and (2.44b).
(2.43) a. * Mark showed to Jane (some letters).31
30Zec and Inkelas (1990) apparently intend the narrow meaning of ‘heavy NP shift’, which excludes the dative
alternation. Their examples with show, a clear dative alternation verb, are carefully worded to just shift the
theme NP ‘past’ the recipient PP without changing the sentence to a double object construction. However, since
(narrowly-defined) heavy NP shift, the dative alternation, and particle verb ordering phenomena are affected by
the same features of objects or phrases, they can reasonably be viewed as examples of one and the same basic
phenomenon (see Section 2.2). Zec and Inkelas (1990)’s explanation of one of these weight effects would then
have to explain the others as well.
31The parentheses in (2.43) and (2.44) indicate prosodic phrases (following Zec and Inkelas 1990’s algorithm).
Everywhere else in this study, brackets indicate syntactic constituents.
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b. Mark showed to Jane (some letters) (from Paris).
(both after Zec and Inkelas 1990:377, original judgments)
(2.44) a. * Mark showed to Jane (that report on him).
b. Mark showed to Jane (that report) (on Dukakis).
(prosodic phrasing for both after Inkelas 1990:16, judgments for both following Zec and Inkelas 1990:377)
Enlarging the theme NP even by just a little (two words, three syllables, one stress) makes the
HNPS construction much more acceptable. It appears likely that most speakers of English would
agree with this judgment. Since Inkelas (1990) argues that English pronouns are not prosodic
words, the same difference in acceptability should be apparent in (2.44): the theme NP in (2.44a)
contains a pronoun, but no additional noun other than report, so the whole NP is parsed as
one phonological phrase under Zec and Inkelas (1990)’s Phonological Phrase Algorithm. The
theme in (2.44b), on the other hand, does contain another noun and thus another prosodic word.
Because of this, the same algorithm parses it as two phonological phrases, meaning the NP is
heavy. However, an informal survey of native speakers suggests that both (2.44a) and (2.44b)
are acceptable. While not a rigorously scientific finding, this directly contradicts a prediction
made by Inkelas (1990) and Zec and Inkelas (1990): the grammaticality difference in (2.44)
does not exist, at least not for all speakers of English. Furthermore, Zec and Inkelas (1990:377)
claim that a heavy shifted NP is “preceded by pause and associated with special intonational
effects”. The informal survey of native speakers mentioned above also revealed the same pattern
of intonation and pauses for (2.44a) as for (2.44b) (and this pattern was different from the one
found in a similar non-shifted sentence). Moreover, Selkirk (1995:440) argues that personal
pronouns can be phonological words (see also Selkirk 1980:32 and 130–133), which would
allow for on him to form a phonological phrase by itself under her analysis (Selkirk 1995:452).
As Inkelas (1990:16) also points out, the analysis as in (2.44a) above therefore only applies
to unstressed or weak pronouns. Thus, this prosodic approach to length in English reordering
phenomena does not seem to be able to account for all attested patterns.
More recently, Anttila et al. (2010) have proposed a more detailed prosodic theory of the dative
alternation and other weight effects. Their approach is founded on Optimality Theory (OT): it
tries to explain dative alternation choices and availabilities using constraints on the formation
of prosodic phrases and the location of stresses. Anttila et al. argue that some verbs with
two prosodic feet do not take the double object construction because the verb has to form a
prosodic phrase with the recipient in that construction. Since the recipient forms a sub-phrase
in that phrase, any verb of two feet (like for example donate, deliver, or transfer) makes this
verb-recipient phrase ternary, as shown in (2.45). This violates *Ternary, the constraint that
dictates “avoidance of ternary prosodic phrases” (Anttila et al. 2010:957) and thus rules out the
double object construction for these verbs.
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(2.45) a. * donate my sister the book (after Anttila et al. 2010:957, original judgment)
b. prosodic phrase
foot
do
foot
nate
prosodic phrase
my sister
This OT constraint against ternary prosodic phrases can be violated, of course, which Anttila
et al. (2010:956–957) mention in connection with two-foot verbs that do alternate (like catapult
or radio). Tableau (I)32 from Anttila et al. 2010:964 illustrates the violability of OT constraints:
the double object candidate (Ia) violates the constraint against stress clashes (the lexical stress
of give and the phrasal stress of my sister clash in the verb-recipient phrase) and the constraint
that demands that the recipient is placed in the utterance-final salient position. The prepositional
candidate (Ib) does not violate these two, but it does violate the constraint for focusing the theme
and the constraint against using the preposition to. Both fo them violate *Stress-to-stress, the
constraint against lexical stresses outsidethe prosodic phrase that carries sentence stress (see
Anttila et al. 2010:954–955 for details and justification), and *p-phrase, the constraint against
having prosodic phrases (intended to keep prosodic phrasing as simple as possible). Since all the
constraints given in (I) are unranked with respect to each other, neither of these two candidates
incurs a violation at a higher rank than the other, and both candidates are optimal.
give, my sister, the book *T
er
na
ry
*C
la
sh
St
re
ss
-t
o-
st
re
ss
*p
-p
hr
as
e
Fo
cu
s(
Th
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e)
Fo
cu
s(
Re
ci
pi
en
t)
*t
o
 a. (give my sister) (the book) ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
 b. (give) (the book) (to my sister) ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗
Tableau I: The dative alternation in OT (Anttila et al. 2010:964) (note that all constraints given
here are not ranked)
Although they do not give the equivalent tableau for donate themselves, Anttila et al. (2010:962)’s
constraints can be used to construct it as shown in (II). Since the *Ternary constraint is
introduced specifically to rule out the double object construction with two-foot verbs (see Anttila
32In the interest of clarity, I have left out irrelevant candidates as well as the three top-stratum constraints that
rule out the candidates with ill-formed phrases (see Anttila et al. 2010:964). The parentheses in the OT candidates
indicate prosodic phrases.
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et al. 2010:957), their intent must be for the violation of this constraint to rule out (IIa) and make
(IIb) the optimal candidate.33
donate, my sister, the book *T
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)
*t
o
a. (donate my sister) (the book) ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
 b. (donate) (the book) (to my sister) ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗
Tableau II: Non-alternating dative verbs in OT (following Anttila et al. 2010)
As with previously discussed constructions that were claimed to be unacceptable or ungrammat-
ical in the literature, sentences like the non-optimal (IIa) are actually attested:
(2.46) a. . . . a farmer living near their university donated them the trunk of a banana tree
(tinyurl.com/donatedthem)
b. Ross also donated the church the large brass bell that still calls people to worship.
(tinyurl.com/donatedchurch)
Again, these might be rarer than the corresponding prepositional construction, but it is easy to
see that they are used.34 Anttila et al. (2010:968–969) suggests that their analysis would allow
for less optimal candidates to be rare rather than impossible (particularly if the fatal constraint
violations is one in an unordered stratum, see Anttila et al. 2010:964). The constraints and
ranking as in (II) might allow for this gradient acceptability—the (supposedly rarer) double
object candidate violates more constraints than the (supposedly more frequent) prepositional
candidate, after all, and the number of violations of unranked constraints seems to be an obvious
candidate for a predictor of relative frequency in cases where several candidates are optimal.
Even so, *Ternary does nothing to explain the alleged difference between alternating and
non-alternating two-foot verbs (see Anttila et al. 2010:956–957): since both types of verbs
have two feet, they should be identical with respect to prosodic phrasing, and thus be equally
acceptable and frequent with the double object construction. Anttila et al. (2010) do not address
this critical point.
33It is apparent from Anttila et al. (2010:963–964) that the number of constraints violated is more important in
their analysis than the total number of violations, so the four violations of (IIb) make it optimal compared to (IIa)
with its five violations.
34The relevant search strings here are “conveyed/entrusted/dictated her/him/them the”.
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Furthermore, even the less controversial facts of the dative alternation are not explained well by
Anttila et al. (2010)’s theory. Their Stress-to-stress constraint is violated by every lexically
stressed word that is not part of the rightmost phonological phrase. In many cases, this makes
predictions that are much the same as those made by other length-based accounts: all other
things being equal, the construction that places a long object at the end will be optimal because
it has the most words in the rightmost phrase. For example, (2.47a) has more violations of
Stress-to-stress than (2.47b), and the latter is therefore preferred.
(2.47) a. ? not to give [children who have a peach allergy] [peaches]
b. not to give [peaches] to [children who have a peach allergy]
However, “the theory predicts that the weight effect should disappear if nuclear stress falls outside
the VP” (Anttila et al. 2010:955). The example sentences in (2.48a) illustrate this: as there is
another phrase after the VP, neither object of the verb can be the rightmost phrase. This makes
the constraint on stresses in the rightmost phrase irrelevant for the relative optimality. Therefore,
Anttila et al. (2010) predict that there should be no weight effect here. For one-word objects,
this appears to be perfectly true: (2.48b) does not seem to be any worse than (2.48a).35
(2.48) a. not to give [children] [peaches] to avoid possible allergic reactions
(after Anttila et al. 2010:955)
b. not to give [peaches] to [children] to avoid possible allergic reactions
(2.49) (People with a latex allergy may also be allergic to peaches.36 Parents are advised. . . )
a. ? . . . not to give [children who have a latex allergy] [peaches] to avoid possible
allergic reactions.
b. . . . not to give [peaches] to [children who have a latex allergy] to avoid possible
allergic reactions.
Weight effects do seem to appear when one object is very long, however, even when there is
material after the objects: in an informal survey of native speakers, (2.49a) was consistently
described as less comprehensible and less likely to be said than (2.49b). While not a rigorously
scientific finding, this preference goes against the predictions of Anttila et al. (2010). Therefore,
that theory makes correct but commonplace and unique but unsound predictions, and it is far
from offering a full account of the dative alternation. Also, based on several experiments, Bock
and Levelt (1994:969) argue that syntactic structure cannot be affected by prosodic information,
35I have replaced the theme it with peaches here in order to avoid any sentences being ruled out by the constraint
against lexically unstressed non-branching prosodic phrases (Anttila et al. 2010:950–953). It would form such a
phrase; peaches, being lexically stressed, does not.
36According to http://www.foodallergy.org/allergens/other-allergens, latex and peach allergies
sometimes cross-react.
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and the dative alternation is (at least partially) a syntactic phenomenon. In conclusion, there
is little to support the claim that the effect of phrase length on the dative alternation is really
an effect of prosody. This does not mean that prosody is ruled out, of course; rather, it means
that that this approach to length in the dative alternation can only be continued fruitfully once a
carefully designed study has found some unambiguous initial support for prosodic effects.
Accepting the idea that several ‘weight’ phenomena share the same cause means that this shared
cause should be investigated further in any case. The effect of phrase length in the dative
alternation and other phenomena is clearly established, and it is not unreasonable to assume that
this effect manifests itself in all length distinctions. There are some (albeit weak) indications
of such an effect for word differences as small as one syllable: in her study of the effect of
information structure on dative alternation choices, Stephens (2010:98) finds that children tend
to place given objects before new ones, but “cannot rule out the possibility that givenness
influenced construction choice indirectly, via pronominality (short-first)”. This is due to the fact
that virtually all given objects were also pronouns in her data from children participants. Stephens
is right to also consider length: her study 2B, which had adults as participants, showed a much
weaker correlation of givenness and pronominality (while all given recipients were pronouns,
about half of the given themes were ‘full’ NPs such as a/the hat, Stephens see 2010:112–117).
A strong givenness effect was evident only for give, show, and throw. The fourth verb used in
this study, read, was the only one that was used with a female recipient in one of the two trials
and a male recipient in the other, while the other verbs all had two female or two male recipients
(Stephens 2010:84 and 105): in the trials with show, for example,participants saw videos of a man
showing a shirt to a woman or a man showing a coat to a woman (see (2.50)37 and (2.51) below),
whereas the read trials had a woman reading a book to a man and a man reading a book to a
woman (see (2.52) and (2.53) below). The examples given by Stephens indicate that participants
in this study used a/the man/kid for full-NP male recipients and a/the woman for female ones.
Thus, the female full NPs were one syllable longer than the male ones. For give, show, and
throw, this is presumably unproblematic, as the recipients in both trials for each of these verbs
had the same gender and thus the same length. Analysis within these verbs (as in Stephens
2010:107–109) is therefore unaffected by the length difference between man/kid and woman: in
the given-theme condition, the preference for (2.50a) over (2.50b) is presumably just as strong
as the preference for (2.51a) over (2.51b), since the prepositional construction in both cases
fulfills the given-before-new and short-before-long preferences. The prepositional construction
would therefore be predicted to be favored more strongly in the given-theme condition than in
37For the sake of clarity, the examples here all use full NPs only. The actual responses that Stephens elicited
had pronominal agents, themes, and recipients as well (see Stephens 2010:113–114 for details). The crucial length
difference between woman and everything else could be preserved under the assumption that a/an and the do not
count for length (Anttila et al. 2010:974–975), which would mean that it, him, a/the book/shirt/. . . , and a/the man
all effectively have one syllable and that a/the woman has two.
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the control condition (where the agent was given, and both theme and recipient therefore new;
see Stephens 2010:106) across the show data, and the results (Stephens 2010:109) are consistent
with this prediction.
(2.50) (video stimulus: man shows shirt to woman)
a. The man showed the shirt to the woman.
b. The man showed the woman the shirt.
(2.51) (video stimulus: man shows coat to woman)
a. The man showed the coat to the woman.
b. The man showed the woman the coat.
For read, however, the length difference may pose a problem. In the given-theme condition, the
preference for (2.52a) over (2.52b) might be weaker that the preference for (2.53a) over (2.53b):
since the theme and recipients are of equal length in (2.52), the preference for (2.52a) would be
driven only by given-before-new, while the preference for (2.53a) would be driven by both given-
before-new and short-before-long. Assuming the strength of these preferences affects relative
frequencies, (2.53a) will therefore be relatively more frequent than (2.52a) (and, conversely,
(2.52b) will be realtively more frequent than (2.53b)). When lumping both trials together and
thereby averaging the frequencies of (2.52a) and (2.53a), the prepositional construction would
be predicted to be only slightly more frequent overall in the given-theme condition than in the
control condition. The results shown in Stephens (2010:109) are consistent with this prediction
as well.
(2.52) (scene: woman reads book to man)
a. The woman read the book to the man.
b. The woman read the man the book.
(2.53) (scene: man reads book to woman)
a. The man read the book to the woman.
b. The man read the woman the book.
This alternative analysis is obviously more than a little speculative. “[S]parsity of data” and
“semantic/pragmatic and or usage factors” (Stephens 2010:118 and fn. 13) are valid explanations
as well, but they are not inherently better: the effect of word length claimed above would be a
very small one, and therefore difficult to spot. The length difference in textbook examples of
the dative alternation (like (2.38) and (2.39) on page 38, for instance) illustrates the established
phrase length effect so well because it is immediately apparent, even when there are other effects
at work simultaneously, and the various studies of this length effect have been able to establish
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it so strongly because it is so apparent even in large and messy datasets. As mentioned above,
de Marneffe et al. (2012:34) found no significant improvement by switching from number of
words to number of syllables, but that only shows that the number of syllables is no better and no
worse than the number of words in their data. Corpus data does have many advantages, a lot of
them because of the large size of corpora, but the one major disadvantage of corpus data is that
it is messy: transcriptions are often somewhat idealized, which is a particular problem when the
transcripts are based on the more variable speech of children. This is further compounded by
the fact that different transcribers will use different standards, and it is practically impossible to
check inter-transcriber accuracy with large collaborative corpora (like CHILDES). Moreover,
the context of a corpus item is hard or even impossible to establish in some cases. Thus, if
there was an effect of word length, it might easily be buried by the noise inherent in corpus
data. A controlled study is therefore necessary to establish or disprove this possible word length
effect.
2.6 Other features
The previous sections have laid out the three features of objects in the dative alternation that this
study focuses on: animacy, grammatical number, and length. There is good evidence that other
features of the objects, the verbs, and the context also affect the choice of construction in the
dative alternation, but these will not be investigated in this study. This section will very briefly
discuss the well-supported ones, namely prosody, ‘givenness’, pronominality, grammatical
person, definiteness, priming or structural persistence, and the strong tendencies of certain verbs
to occur in one construction much more frequently than the other. The terms used here are
mostly those used by Bresnan et al. (2007) rather than, for example, those of Malchukov et al.
(2010a), but the overlapping terms will be mentioned where appropriate.
The prosodic approaches of Zec and Inkelas (1990) and Anttila et al. (2010) have already been
discussed in Section 2.5 above, and the problems mentioned there and in Wasow (2002:20–21)
apply: these accounts fail to explain a lot of the data, and there is some evidence against them.
Metrical prosody affecting syntactic structure or word order is not generally ruled out, of course
(see Erteschik-Shir and Rochman 2010 and Section 2.5 above), but (to the best of my knowledge)
there is no explicit and substantiated theory of the English dative alternation as an operation that
generates optimal meter. Therefore, meter is not included as one of the factors to be tested in
this study.
In the context of the dative alternation, ‘givenness’ and ‘newness’ are used as terms for whether
a particular object has been mentioned previously in the same utterance context, meaning
whether it can be assumed to be given or new. Malchukov et al. (2010a:20) combine givenness
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with animacy and pronominality in their measure of “prominence”. Givenness has repeatedly
been found to be among the predictive factors for the choice of dative alternation construction:
generally speaking, constructions that place given objects before new ones are more frequent
(see for example Wasow 2002:68-82, Bresnan et al. 2007, or Bresnan and Hay 2008). Brown
et al. (2012) found that new-before-given sentences like (2.54a) are read more slowly than
given-before-new ones like (2.54b), but only when both use the double object construction.
No significant reading time difference was observed between the corresponding prepositional
construction sentences like (2.54c) and (2.54d), and the prepositional sentences were also read
faster than the double object sentences overall (Brown et al. 2012:202–203).
(2.54) (A biologist discovered an owl that seemed to belong to a new species.)
a. The biologist showed [a rat] [the owl] to gauge their reactions.
b. The biologist showed [the owl] [a rat] to gauge their reactions.
c. The biologist showed [a rat] to [the owl] to gauge their reactions.
d. The biologist showed [the owl] to [a rat] to gauge their reactions.
(all Brown et al. 2012:208)
They argue that this shows the supposed given-before-new preference to be a restriction on the
use of the marked double object construction; however, as shown in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above,
there is no conclusive evidence for the hypothesis that one construction is more marked than,
or derived from, the other.38 The only justified assumption is therefore that givenness has some
effect in the dative alternation and other (re-)ordering phenomena. Though he discusses it in the
context of length and stress, Oehrle (1976:259–260)’s HNPS example (xxii), repeated here as
(2.55), also shows an effect of newness.
(2.55) We found in the barn, a stick. (Oehrle 1976:260)
As Oehrle points out, the ordering can not be due to a length effect here. The sentence seems
to be most felicitous when the barn has been previously mentioned (or can be inferred from
mention of the farm or the like) and a stick is new. Thus, this example supports the preference for
ordering given phrases before new ones. Malchukov et al. (2010a) include this feature in their
term ‘prominence’: animate, given, pronominal objects are more prominent, and (in the English
dative alternation) the construction that places the more prominent object first is preferred.
38Kizach andBalling (2013)’s replication of the Brown et al. (2012) study does not provide additional support here,
since it concerns only Danish. The Danish dative alternation is different at least in regard to length: as mentioned
in Section 2.5, Danish definite NPs would be counted as one word shorter than their indefinite counterparts by
certain length measures (definite bilen versus indefinite en bil). As there are relatively few studies of the Danish
dative alternation, we cannot assume that it corresponds well to the English dative alternation, and evidence from
the Danish one is therefore not good support of any arguments regarding the English one just yet.
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For child language, the effect of givenness appears to be much weaker, although the cognitive
prerequisites seem to be present very early (de Cat 2011). Stephens (2010:92–98) showed
experimentally that children tend to choose the dative alternation construction that places a
previously mentioned object first, and Bürkle (2011:42) found statistically significant effects for
givenness of both objects that are in line with the given-before-new preference: to use examples
from the CHILDES data used there, (2.56a) has the given recipient the – this prince guy before
the new theme the – the claw, and (2.56b) has the given theme my – my cold before the new
recipient Marcia.
(2.56) a. he was trying to give [the – this prince guy] [the – the claw]
(Eng-US-MOR/Carterette/fifth.cha, line 9181)
b. I won’t give [my – my cold] to [Marcia] (Eng-UK-MOR/Wells/olivia08.cha, line 420)
De Marneffe et al. (2012:38 and 42–43), on the other hand, did not find significant givenness
effects in a similar corpus study, but they did find an effect approaching significance in child-
directed speech (de Marneffe et al. 2012:48). This led them to conclude that children do mirror
the givenness effect that they see in their linguistic input but are initially unable to assign the
effect strength that produces adult-like output.39 Stephens (2010:148–154) found that children
produce fewer uhs, ums, and pauses in all given objects as well as in whole dative alternation
utterances that have given-before-new order. This finding arguably supports that conclusion:
given objects and given-before-new utterances being easier for children to produce is good
evidence that givenness does have some effect in children’s speech after all. Moreover, children
as young as three years tend to act out both given-before-new and new-before-given instruction
sentences in the given-before-new order of actions, suggesting that given-before-new is the
preferred ordering (Junge et al. 2015). Bringing givenness to bear on the dative alternation
decision and setting the target effect strength may require additional learning, as de Marneffe
et al. (2012) argue. The present study was designed to ensure that givenness would not have an
effect (see Sections 5.1 and 6.1 for details).
The discussion in Section 2.2 shows how important it is in the dative alternation whether an
object is a pronoun or not. This binary distinction has been called that object’s pronominality.
Haspelmath (2004 and 2007) claims that the double object construction(s) can only be used
with certain combinations of pronominality; as shown above, this strong claim is not borne out
by speaker data. The weaker version, however, can be maintained: there is little doubt that the
double object construction is much less acceptable and frequent with nonpronominal recipient
and pronominal theme than with other combinations of pronominality (compare (2.57a) with
39This difficulty, de Marneffe et al. (2012) argue, stems from the strong correlation of givenness with pronomi-
nality, which itself has an effect in the dative alternation (see below).
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the other examples below). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that pronominality has an effect
on the choice of dative alternation construction.
(2.57) a. Rick gave Kate it.
b. Rick gave her the coffee.
c. Rick gave her it.
d. Rick gave Kate the coffee. (after Haspelmath 2007)
Scholes (1981) found that children are significantly above chance in comprehending sentences
with two personal pronouns only by the age of five or six. For sentences with one personal
pronoun, other studies (such as Charney 1980, Loveland 1984, Valian 1986, Girouard et al. 1997,
and Tomasello 2000) show accurate understanding and production as early as the third or even
second year of life. It is therefore also reasonable to expect a pronominality effect in children’s
choice of dative alternation constructions, at least when only one object is pronominal. Such
effects are significant in de Marneffe et al. (2012:39–40)’s model, which shows that children
choose the construction that orders pronouns before full NPs. Pronominality is obviously
connected to length and givenness—pronouns are short and typically require a given or at least
accessible antecedent—but the connection is far from being a perfect correlation, since short
‘full’ NPs can have given referents as well. Accordingly, Gries (2003), Bresnan et al. (2007), and
Snider (2011) find similar effects of the pronominality of theme and recipient in adult language,
along with, but independent of, effects of length and givenness. As this was found in several
studies, pronominality can be argued to have a distinct and independent effect in the dative
alternation, at least in adult language. The pronominality effect is also considered as part of the
objects’ prominence by Malchukov et al. (2010a): pronouns are more prominent than full NPs
(see also Aissen 2003 and Branigan et al. 2008). The experiments in the present thesis will not
use pronominal objects, meaning the feature of pronominality is kept constant.
Bresnan and Nikitina (2003) and Bresnan et al. (2007) found a minor effect of grammatical
person: recipients of nonlocal person (meaning third person as opposed to first or second person,
following Aissen 1999:679) somewhat favor the prepositional construction. Both papers use this
to imply a preference for a local-before-nonlocal ordering preference. Bresnan et al. (2007:78)
removed the person of the theme from consideration because of data sparsity: it is intuitive that
themes of dative alternation verbs would mostly and indeed prototypically be nonlocal, since
“local person pronouns are . . . animate” (Bresnan and Nikitina 2003:25) and the prototypical
theme is inanimate. The prototypical double object construction can therefore be expected
to observe local-before-nonlocal ordering: it has the prototypically local recipient before the
prototypically nonlocal theme, after all. The prototypical prepositional construction violates
this supposed ordering preference: (2.58) has a nonlocal object before a local one, yet it is not
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unacceptable.
(2.58) Give that cup to me, will you?
(2.59) Give that cup to Kate when you see her.
However, not all constructions are prototypical—(2.59) has two nonlocal objects and thus is
not inconsistent with any locality- or person-based ordering preference. Furthermore, assuming
that the double object construction is more frequent than the prepositional construction (see for
example Cook 1976:436, Gropen et al. 1989:219, Bresnan et al. 2007:79, or Bürkle 2011:44),
the prototypical double object construction is more frequent overall than the prototypical
prepositional construction. Since the more frequent one happens to have local-before-nonlocal
order, a spurious locality effect could arise in a model of the dative alternation. As with
pronominality, Bresnan et al. (2007) argue that the effect of (the recipient’s) person is independent
of the effects of other features. Be that as it may, this person effect is statistically weak and
therefore of lesser concern than the effects of the features discussed in detail above. To rule out
any person effect, the stimuli used in this study were designed so that all objects are third person
(and thus nonlocal) throughout.
The grammatical definiteness was investigated as a potential factor of influence by Wasow
(2002:65–67). He found no effect of definiteness in HNPS, but highlighted the fact that his
methodology was not ideally suited to finding it. Indeed, later studies (Gries 2003, Bresnan
et al. 2007, and Snider 2011) do show effects of definiteness in the dative alternation. As with
other features discussed here, these effects can be summed up in a simple ordering preference:
definite-before-indefinite order, as in the examples in (2.60), seems to be preferred.
(2.60) a. the man gives the little boy a green balloon
(Eng-UK-MOR/Fletcher/7/hnclap.cha, line 821)
b. giving the eggs to someone (Eng-UK-MOR/Fletcher/5/hnmich.cha, line 602)
These studies are aware that definite objects are often, but crucially not always, given (see for
example Gries 2003:12–13 or Bresnan et al. 2007:77–78). What is generally done is accounting
for definiteness by including it in statistical models of the data, which are supposed to ensure no
two strongly correlated variables both emerge as significant. The fact that both definiteness and
givenness are found to be significant is then taken to mean that they cannot be strongly correlated.
Stephens (2010:168) found “some [direct] evidence that givenness has an independent influence
on the choice of construction”, but the connection between the two in the context of the dative
alternation still has not been investigated fully.
As for child language, the literature shows that two- and three-year-olds are above chance in
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tasks regarding definiteness and that the understanding of definiteness improves quickly with
age (Maratsos 1974, Warden 1976, Zehler and Brewer 1980, Rozendaal and Baker 2008, and
Stephens 2010:21–22). Malchukov et al. (2010a) also mentions the objects’ definiteness as one
of the factors influencing the dative alternation choice. As with grammatical person, the effects
of definiteness appear to be less important than others. Nevertheless, the present study keeps all
objects definite.
In the context of the dative alternation, the terms “syntactic persistence” (Bock 1986:359),
“syntactic priming” (Gries 2005:365), or “structural parallelism” (Bresnan et al. 2007:77) all
mean the same: it appears that the double object construction is a little more likely following
a recent double object construction, and the prepositional construction is a little more likely
after a prepositional construction. Gries (2005), Bresnan et al. (2007), and Snider (2011) found
such effects in their adult corpus data; de Marneffe et al. (2012) found them in child speech
and child-directed speech; and Shimpi et al. (2007) showed experimentally that three- and four-
year-old children are more likely to describe depictions of transfer events40 using the primed
dative construction than with the non-primed alternative. Bock (1986) discusses priming in
general as the activation of syntactic structures, whereas Wasow (2002:105–106) speculates that
the preposition to alone may be enough to prime the prepositional dative construction. Jaeger
and Snider (2013) show that speakers are primed more strongly towards a given structure if the
utterance that primed them for this structure was unexpected, which they explain by speakers
constantly trying to reduce prediction error in their own production. Whatever its exact cause, the
effect of syntactic priming in the dative alternation is certainly established. This study therefore
does not investigate it in detail—it is not manipulated, though it is controlled (see Sections 5.1
and 6.1 for details) so that a priming effect can be investigated if it arises unexpectedly.
Following Stallings et al. (1998)’s work on what they call the disposition of individual verbs
to use the HNPS order (or structure) over the canonical one, Biber et al. (1999:928), Wasow
(2002), Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004), Bresnan et al. (2007), and others have observed that
some verbs are used with one dative alternation construction much more often than with the
other. While these individual verb biases can be quantified very exactly (see for example Gries
and Stefanowitsch 2004:106 or Bürkle 2011:40 and 42), the proposed explanations for these
biases are much less exact. Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004) argue that the verbs with a bias for
the double object construction prototypically encode primarily transfer of possession, while the
40Strictly speaking, two of the ten verbs used by Shimpi et al. (2007), namely buy and bake, participate in the
benefactive alternation rather than the dative alternation as defined in Section 2.2 above. (The other eight verbs
are dative alternation verbs in the stricter sense; Shimpi et al. see 2007:1346.) However, I see no reason to assume
that priming has no effect in the benefactive alternation or that benefactive priming is substantially different from
dative priming. Shimpi et al. (2007) do not report different patterns for buy and bake versus the other verbs, most
likely because there were no significant differences. Therefore, it seems reasonable to treat the results of Shimpi
et al. (2007) as relevant here.
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verbs biased towards the prepositional construction prototypically encode physical transfer or
movement without a necessary change of possession (following Gropen et al. 1989; compare
the discussion regarding interruptibility in Section 2.1 above). This does explain the biases
of the two most distinctive verbs (Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004:106): give, which is strongly
biased towards the double object construction, is the prototypical transfer-of-possession verb;
bring, strongly biased towards the prepositional construction, does specify the (accompanied)
motion without specifying possession at all. However, Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004:107) also
point out the shortcomings of their proposed explanation: sell, supply, and pay intrinsically
specify transfer of possession, yet they are biased towards the prepositional construction. Gries
and Stefanowitsch’s proposed explanation is that these verbs prototypically describe physical
transfer of goods or money. This allows them to be consistent with their example of the sale of
a house as well as with the example in (2.61), but the fact remains that these examples and all
other selling, supplying, and paying events always include transfer of possession.
(2.61) I sold him my car two weeks ago, and he still hasn’t come by to pick it up.
(2.62) These Girl Scout cookies cost me only three dollars!
The above examples show another problems with this proposed explanation: the assumption
that cost “never involves motion” (Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004:107) is invalidated by any
specifically cash-based transaction like (2.62), where money literally moves from buyer to seller.
Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004)’s account of verb bias in the dative alternation thus fails to
explain all the data and describes at best a tendency.
Szabóné Papp (2003) proposes a pragmatics-based approach: she says that two different
construals of transfer events can account for the acceptability patterns of the two dative alternation
constructions with different verbs. In this view, the double object construction represents a
construal that places the pragmatic focus on the theme and thus emphasizes the transfer of
possession of that theme (Szabóné Papp 2003:93, Fig. 11). The prepositional construction, on
the other hand, represents the construal that focuses on the recipient, thus making it a “Transfer-
Caused-Motion Construction” (Szabóné Papp 2003:91, Fig. 10). According to Szabóné Papp
(2003), these two construals explain, for example, why whisper is not used in the double object
construction and why deny is not used in the prepositional construction: as forwhisper, it focuses
on the way in which the message is conveyed41 and thus on the ‘motion’ of the message from
speaker to hearer. The substance of the message is less important in a sentence using whisper,
and it may even be lost: according to Szabóné Papp (2003:151), manner-of-communication
verbs lexically “imply the existence of some kind of obstacle on the communication channel
41I should point out here that this is my interpretation of the phrase “the exact formulating” (Szabóné Papp
2003:106), but it is consistent with Szabóné Papp’s argument as a whole and therefore reasonable.
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. . . , which puts the success of the transfer of message and the affectedness of the recipient
at risk”. As for deny as well as refuse and spare, the two construals explain why they are
not used in the prepositional construction: a theme of any of these three verbs never actually
moves in the event described, so the motion construal and thus the prepositional construction are
ruled out; and using the double object construction means that the theme and recipient are (or
can be) placed immediately adjacent without an intervening preposition, which highlights “the
personal loss of opportunity suffered” by the recipient (Szabóné Papp 2003:127). However, this
pragmatic account fundamentally disagrees with data: the examples in (2.63) show that whisper
and other manner-of-communication verbs are in fact used in the double object construction.42
The examples in (2.64) show that deny, refuse, and spare are in fact used in the prepositional
construction.
(2.63) a. . . . a kind few . . . whispered me the answer.
b. The shepherd-dogs-dogs . . . barked him a welcome
c. You just mumble him an answer. (all Bresnan and Nikitina 2003:7–8, emphasis removed)
(2.64) a. . . . why it previously denied entry to Mr. Deripaska (tinyurl.com/deniedentry)
b. the worker or workers who denied food to these kids should be fired
(tinyurl.com/deniedfood)
c. . . . the Venetians, who . . . refused the support to the army on land which they had
given to their naval expedition (Oliphant 1893:240)
d. Henry Gladwin . . . refused the help to the Indians (tinyurl.com/refusedhelp)
e. she spared that to her watchers. (tinyurl.com/sparedthat)
f. and she would have spared all the suffering to her younger cousin Lillie
(tinyurl.com/sparedsuffering)
Thus, as with the proposed pronominal patterns in Section 2.2, all that can be concluded is
that these verbs are rare or dispreferred with one construction (Ford and Bresnan 2013). The
meaning-based explanations for verb bias make predictions that turn out to be insufficient by
themselves, and thus they fail to explain verb bias. It may be that the double object construction
tends to be used in a sentence that emphasizes transfer of possession and that the prepositional
construction tends to be used “to focus on the indirect object [meaning the recipient]” (Sinclair
et al. 1990:160), but these tendencies do not appear enough to form a fully explanative theory.
Therefore, individual verb bias is to be accepted as an empirical fact. This study only uses the
verb give for independent reasons (see the discussion in Section 5.1.4), and thus verb bias is kept
constant.43
42Note that the five double object examples ofBresnan andNikitina (2003:7–8) all use verbs listed as prepositional-
only in Szabóné Papp (2003:151).
43Interestingly, a verb with a strong bias apparently “resists priming” (Gries 2005:379). In the case of give, this
56
2.7 First language acquisition
The aim of the present study is to document how speakers of English process and produce the two
dative alternation constructions during their acquisition of English and to discover any patterns
or paths of acquisition in that processing and production. This section contrasts the nativist,
generative approach to first language acquisition with the frequentist or empiricist usage-based
framework. After discussing these theories of first language acquisition, this section will also
lay out how they relate to the dative alternation in particular.
Nativist theories argue from the “poverty of the stimulus” (Chomsky 1980:34): in their view,
the sum of all the language input received by a child is logically insufficient for the linguistic
generalizations that the child will later make; it follows that there must be another component to
language acquisition beside the input, and nativists argue that some innate biological endowment
is the obvious candidate. Furthermore, since all adult speakers of one language community have
(more or less) the same grammar, language acquisition must stop at some point and thus yield a
steady adult grammar. The innate component or “initial state of the mind might be regarded as
a function . . . that maps experience into the steady state” (Chomsky 1980:187; see also Pinker
2004). This process of mapping is then specified in the Principles and Parameters approach
(Chomsky and Lasnik 1993): all stages of language acquisition, including the final steady one,
adhere to certain principles, and the differences between stages and between different adult
steady stages, or languages, are entirely due to parameters being set to one value or another (see
Hyams 1998 for crosslinguistic evidence).
Although a comprehensive and uncontroversial list of parameters has not yet been produced, it is
generally agreed (and indeed obvious) that setting a parameter value requires a trigger or cue in
the input. If the triggers for one parameter value are too infrequent (or absent) in the input, that
value is not set (in a diachronic view, the value is lost; see Niyogi 2004). In effect, Principles
and Parameters theory assumes that there is a cognitive system that uses the currently best
grammar (or combination of parameter values) while also evaluating this and other grammars
against the input. Parameters are mostly seen as binary; the value that has fewer formal features
can be seen as the unmarked, ‘default’ one (Roberts 2007). Like values, entire parameters
can also be more marked or complex than others. This is used to explain why parameters are
apparently set successively, even though a simple sentence can arguably contain triggers for
many different parameter values: at such a stage, it may be the case that “the overall system
has not matured sufficiently . . . to permit certain parameters or parameter values to be attained”
means that the double object construction is more likely even after a prepositional prime (Gries 2005:376). It should
be noted, however, that Gries (2005) is a corpus-based study, whereas the priming in this study is systematically
varied. The present study is therefore better suited for investigating the existence of a priming effect and any
resistance of that from verb bias.
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(Roberts 2007:211).
The same point is also recognized in Lightfoot (2010)’s cue-based variant of nativist acquisition
theory. This approach does not use parameters, but instead restricts the learner’s cognitive
operations on linguistic representations to those that are innate and those that the input contains
enough evidence or cues for. In this view, complex operations will often operate on the output
of simpler ones. Therefore, the cues for the simple operations have to be recognized before the
more complex cues can even be found (Lightfoot 2003:7), moving from simpler to more complex
operations and from core to periphery. This theory also offers an account of how language can
change in a strongly nativist approach: the nativist argument is an answer to the question how
language acquisition can so consistently yield a system that is the best model for the input. A
priori, this assumption would also lead us to expect that the output of that system would in effect
mirror the input (for an infinitely large sample) and thus that there is no language change; yet there
is. If, however, the input changes (for whatever reason), then the cues expressed by it would of
course also change, as would the system learned from them—in other words, “grammatical shifts
are to be explained only by a prior change in the trigger experience” (Lightfoot 2003:18, original
emphasis). To summarize, nativist theories of language acquisition posit innate language-specific
cognitive mechanisms in order to explain the apparent contradiction between the limited input
and the unlimited generative capacity and changeability.
Frequentist or empiricist theories, on the other hand, argue that it is pointless to find explanations
for such apparent contradictions because the nativist generative approach is inherently flawed
in several respects: it assumes psychologically real generalizations about (or rules of) grammar
without having any evidence for them (Bowerman and Croft 2008:287–292), it fails to explain
children’s use of learned expressions as wholes (Abbot-Smith and Tomasello 2006), and it
ignores the flexibility of adults’ grammars (Bybee 2010:112–114).
The nativist argument from the poverty of the stimulus can be simplified into the following
form: innate domain-specific language learning mechanisms are necessary to infer general
grammatical rules from limited input. This formulation makes more apparent the fact that this
necessity would not exist if there were no categorical rules at the end of the acquisition process:
if there are no psychologically real grammatical generalizations, then no specialist cognitive
mechanism is needed to infer them. Bowerman and Croft (2008) argue that the absence of
evidence for psychologically real rules of grammar is enough to reject the premise that such
rules exist. This is perfectly parsimonious, of course, but stronger evidence for this absence
of categorical grammatical rules is naturally difficult to find. For example, Bowerman (1994)
shows that it is not the case that all children use one and the same innate set of motion categories,
even at a very early age, and argues that this is evidence against innate categories at least in the
domain of motion. However, it may be that all newborn children have the same set of motion
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categories (and other linguistic mechanisms) and that they have subsequently learned enough
to deviate according to language by age two.44 Therefore, Bowerman (1994)’s findings do not
constitute unequivocal evidence against grammatical rules.
The case against psychologically real grammatical rules is also made by Paul (1880). It is
axiomatic in linguistics that speakers form some categories of, or associations between, stored
forms in their minds. Paul points out that this fact does not mean that these associations are
identical with grammatical concepts, “even though they usually coincide with them” (Paul
1880:31, my translation).45 In other words, his argument is that the fact that a language can
be described using concepts like ‘verb’, ‘case’, and ‘collocation’ does not automatically mean
that these concepts have psychological reality.46 Thus, Bowerman and Croft (2008)’s argument
against the poverty of the stimulus is sound—if one accepts the premise that there are no
psychologically real grammatical rules.
Generative nativist theories assume that learners analyze input and (re-)generate output based on
what their innate language processing system has been able to extract from the input. Empiricist
theories recognize the importance of direct imitation in early language acquisition: in the view
of Abbot-Smith and Tomasello (2006), generalizations are formed slowly out of many single
items that ‘overlap’ in one way or another. The elements that are shared by all these items (for
example, do in second position in When do you want to eat?, Why do we think that?, Where
do they come from?, and so on) are retained in the generalization, whereas the differences
‘blur’ and thus leave only their common features behind (wh-word before the do and VP after
it, in the previous example). This process, however, requires many examples and is therefore
slow. Abbot-Smith and Tomasello (2006:283) argue that much of children’s early speech must
therefore be made up of exemplars that are very frequent as a whole in the input (What’s that?
orWhat do you want?, to continue the example). Support for this comes from Da˛browska and
Lieven (2005)’s study of questions in early speech, which shows that most of them are in fact
imitations of previously heard questions (as much as 75% in one case; Da˛browska and Lieven
2005:450), and from Lieven et al. (2009)’s corpus study of early child language in general,
which shows that the majority of two-year-olds’ utterances (as much as 92% in one case; Lieven
et al. 2009:492–493) are either exact imitations of a previous utterance or can be reduced to a
previous utterance with no more than one simple substitution or addition. These findings thus
44This is of course one of the difficulties in showing the absence of innate grammatical rules: people who have
only the innate mechanisms without the benefit of any subsequent learning—newborn children—do not make good
subjects of linguistic studies, and therefore older children are often chosen as subjects.
45In Paul (1880:31)’s original words: “. . . wenn sie sich auch gewöhnlich mit diesen decken”.
46Psychological reality of linguistic structures, processes, or rules is frequently assumed tacitly. There are some
explicit claims of empirical evidence for it, for example with CPs in some Semitic languages (Friedmann 2001),
NP traces (McElree and Bever 1989), and rules concerning theta attachment and center-embedding (Sadeh-Leicht
2007). It is important to note that such evidence is a matter of interpretation, at least to some degree. For one
argument against psychological reality of linguists’ constructs, see Barrios (2012).
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provide empirical support for the above argument against grammatical rules: at least for young
children’s speech production (if not their internal representations), generative rules seem largely
unnecessary.
Finally, some empiricist approaches like Yang (2004) and Bybee (2010) discuss the notion of
‘grammatical rules’ more intensively. The original argument from the poverty of the stimulus
assumes that innate language-specific mechanisms or knowledge are needed to explain how all
speakers of one language at one time converge on the same grammar when there logically are
many grammars that can analyze and generate the same data equally well (Berwick 1985:235–
238). These empiricists argue that there is no evidence for all speakers in a language community
actually sharing the very same grammar (see Kayne 2012:Section 2). Yang (2004:51), for
example, argues that “adults speakers, at the terminal state of language acquisition, may retain
multiple grammars, or more precisely, alternate parameter values”. Bybee (2010:112–114)
goes further than that: in her view, adult grammars are not “discrete and unchanging” (Bybee
2010:114), but rather statistical and flexible. Yang (2004) combines statistical learning with
Principles and Parameters: his theory of acquisition uses different parameter settings to create
different (competing) grammars in a learner’s mind. Those grammars that do not allow for an
item of input are penalized, which over time leaves only a few ‘surviving’ grammars. The adult
speaker then has access to these grammars only. Bybee (2010:64–66)’s theory of acquisition
is also statistical (or exemplar-based), with abstract patterns emerging from the repetition and
modification of stored exemplars. These patterns are not above the variations of them, however:
“the same factors operate to produce both regular patterns and the deviations” (Bybee 2010:6). In
this theory, variation is constrained by how it spreads: since exemplars are associated with each
other in a rich network, language change tends to affect all forms that are similar in a relevant way.
That means that the variation has to make sense, as it were, for all those forms. In first language
acquisition, variation appears to be limited to “consistently” replicating variation in the input
(Bybee 2010:117). However, because she does not assume fixed adult grammars, she can explain
variability in adult speech with just one (flexible) grammar as the end result of acquisition. Of
course, a flexible grammar does not have to change dramatically to be flexible, and dramatic
changes are intuitively unlikely in adult grammar. This important point is also realized by the
more fleshed-out theories of Batali (2002) and Bod (2006), which will be discussed below.
It is worth pointing out that Batali (2002) technically describes an exemplar-based modeling
and simulation system for the negotiation of a shared language, not a theory of the evolution
of language or its subsequent acquisition by following generations. This system is nevertheless
deserving of discussion because it is quite detailed and because, through that level of detail, it
reveals a fact about exemplar-based approaches that is central to the discussion here.
In Batali (2002)’s modeling system, two simulated agents are picked out of a larger population
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at random. One is given a message to transmit to the other and has to use its stored message-
to-signal formulae to find the signal that will best express the message to the other agent. This
receiving agent then uses its own formulae to find the most likely meaning for that signal. Batali
demonstrates in some detail how this gives rise to a stable but flexible language over time even
if the agents are given no ‘words’ at all to begin with: through random string generation and
imitation, words spread; given enough time, even reflexive and passive markers as well as phrase
or clause delimiters and complementizers arise spontaneously in simulations of this system. One
might argue that giving the receiving agent both the signal and the intended message in 90% of
simulated interactions (Batali 2002:138, 166) invalidates the system as a whole, since hearers
of natural language utterances need to infer the message from the signal. However, the 10%
of interactions where only the signal was given to the receiving agent were explicitly used as
testing interactions; and the intended message may well be inferable from non-linguistic clues
in many cases, at least in early language evolution (and acquisition). The relevant point is a
different one: this exemplar-theoretic system is nativist.
Although the agents are not given words to start with, they do start out with a full understanding
of the messages that they have to express in the simulation. This includes not only the simple
words, but also the two-place predicates (verbs, in effect). The simulated agents know how
these message segments combine to form tree-like structures. In other words, the agents have
an ideal and shared innate grammar of meanings and negotiate a grammar of strings based on
that. Furthermore, they all share the same operations for combining the strings of the language
they are to create. Though Batali (2002) does not say so, it can be inferred from his use of these
innate operations that they are necessary for the simulation to work. This is not an argument
against his simulation system, of course, but it supports nativist approaches. The arguments
against this system being nativist are not strong enough to remove this support: firstly, while
it is arguably true that the innate operations are “similar to those proposed in the domains
of perception, analogical reasoning, and planning” (Batali 2002:128), there is no proof that
they are identical. To dispel domain-specific nativism, this identity of operations is crucial,
however. Secondly, the fact that these operations “might occur as solutions to the problem of
encoding complex meanings into linear sequences” (Batali 2002:129) does not mean that they
do for each real-world agent (speaker) individually. Finally, the argument that “deficiencies
of the model might be fixed by modifying the agents’ system of internal representations, the
algorithms and data-structures underlying their communicative behavior, and/or their learning
mechanisms” (Batali 2002:169) only if these changes “seem biologically plausible, or of general
cognitive utility” (Batali 2002:169, emphasis added) is obviously not an argument against this
exemplar-based system being nativist, but rather for that.
The Data-Oriented Parsing model of Bod (2006:307–315) is based on Lexical Functional
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Grammar (LFG), but it exhibits the same inconsistency. Briefly, it assumes that language
acquisition and processing are cognitively realized by representations being disassembled
(partially or completely) and reassembled from these fragments. This is achieved by strict
“decomposition” and “composition operations” (both Bod 2006:295). Bod shows that acquisition
based on this can be statistical or exemplar-based. However, this model relies on “grammatical
functions and semantic roles” (Bod 2006:317) pre-existing in the learner’s mind. These are
called “Universal Representation” (UR) by Bod (2006:318), and he argues that this differs from
the idea of Universal Grammar in the result: a UR-based grammar can be statistical, whereas
a UG-based grammar is restricted to categorical principles. Thus, the difference between
nativist and empiricist theories of language acquisition is in the (possibly psychologically real)
representation of grammatical knowledge. The mechanisms or operations that give rise to and
apply to this knowledge apparently have to be somewhat specific to language, and they have to
exist in the learner’s mind before acquisition begins. Thus, Pinker (2004)’s conclusion that most
(if not all) linguistic frameworks are ‘innatist’ to some degree is borne out:
“For the behaviourists, the innate constraints reside in the generalization gradients
and response classes. For the connectionists, they reside in the features defining
the units and the topology of the networks. For Chomskyans, they reside in
categories, operations, and principles. For MacWhinney, they reside in the cues,
items, alternatives pitted in competition, and categories whose absence constitutes
‘indirect negative evidence.’” (Pinker 2004:949)
To summarize this discussion, there is evidence for statistical or item-based learning as well as a
theoretical need for some component of the human language facility to be innate. ‘Compromise’
theories that incorporate this have been proposed: those discussed above obviously fit the
description, but Yang (2004), for example, also arrives at a compromise theory after starting
with a Principles and Parameters approach. He does theorize that learners maintain several
grammars and use the input to constantly evaluate them, but the system allows for statistical
rather than categorical learning. Abbot-Smith and Tomasello (2006) argue that the human
language faculty can turn exemplar-based frames or constructions into more abstract categorical
rules once they are frequent enough to allow the necessary generalizations. A similar model
of item-based learning that leads to generalized rules is described in Bowerman and Croft
(2008:293–296).
The rest of this section will briefly explain how different acquisition theories relate to the dative
alternation. As shown in Sections 2.3 to 2.6, the current best view of the dative alternation
approaches it as a choice between two constructions that is guided by an interaction of many
factors of varying strengths. Thus, all that is necessary to embed the acquisition of the dative
alternation into an acquisitional framework is to explain how these factors come to influence the
62
dative alternation and how their strengths can change over time.
Logically, there are two possibilities for how the factors start to have their effect: either they
are innately effective, or they are added over the course of acquisition. As shown above, the
factors that are relevant for the dative alternation are known to have other effects in the language
of quite young children. Therefore, they could in principle also have their effects on the dative
alternation from as soon as children produce ditransitive utterances. If the language faculty
comes pre-equipped with these factors affecting the dative alternation, this is of course trivial;
if the factors are added on the basis of evidence in the input, it appears that there is enough
evidence for them before ditransitives become productively used. Thus, the data in principle
does not seem to allow a distinction between these two possibilities. Although de Marneffe et al.
(2012:42) explain the absence of an animacy effect in their child language model as an effect
of certain verbs being overrepresented in their corpus, the results of Bresnan et al. (2007) and
de Marneffe et al. (2012) might be used to support the notion of the animacy effect only coming
into existence later during acquisition. The strongly innatist view of the effects in the dative
alternation could, however, even explain that: it only says that the factor is available immediately,
not that it has a non-zero effect strength immediately.
This shifts the burden of explanation to the changing effect strengths: on the basis of existing
data, both possible explanations can be made to agree with the idea that “child speech only
differs from the speech of their adult interlocutors in degree, not in kind” (de Marneffe et al.
2012:54). For an empiricist, change in effect strengths is unproblematic: it arises naturally
from children making statistical generalizations based on the input. After hearing many dative
constructions with the shorter object before the longer one, for example, a frame that contains
this ordering preference would be more likely to be used in constructing dative utterances. For
a nativist, change in effect strengths is less easy to explain. One possibility would of course be
to locate one of the dative alternation constructions in the core grammar and remove the other
construction to the periphery, and then let the (peripheral) choice between them be susceptible
to change. Hinterhölzl (2004) argues that this is enough to account for diachronic changes in
constituent order based on information structure. The dative alternation can easily be viewed
as an information-structural constituent order alternation, of course, but it is not at all clear that
it is an epiphenomenon of some current diachronic change from one construction to the other.
Moreover, while minor variation in effect strengths could be reformulated in this approach as
changes in thresholds (see Hinterhölzl 2004:145), not all features that appear to affect the dative
alternation are discrete enough to allow for a threshold to be formulated: for animacy, it could
be a certain level on the animacy hierarchy; but what could a threshold for pronominality or
givenness be? Postulating a very large number of mental grammars would be another possibility
for a nativist explanation of changing effect strengths, where each possible combination of effect
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strengths is realized in one grammar. However, considering the fact that there are many other
(unrelated) parameters or cues to be acquired at the same time, this mass of grammars would
have to be further multiplied to yield one grammar for each combination of dative alternation
effect strengths and all possible values of unrelated parameters. This profusion of grammars is
intuitively unlikely.
A more reasonable possibility would be to reduce the myriad combinations of effect strengths
to a ranking of effects: the effects that are based on features of the objects can be reduced to
simple ordering preferences, which could then be ordered as in Optimality Theory. Bresnan
and Hay (2008)’s finding that speakers of New Zealand English are more likely than speakers
of American English to use the double object construction with inanimate recipients could thus
be rephrased to say that the constraint *Inanimate-before-Animate is ranked lower in New
Zealand English. Existing OT approaches to acquisition and change (see for example Hendriks
and van Rij 2011) could then be used to account for the development of constraint rankings in
acquisition and diachrony, and the same constraints could even be useful in accounting for HNPS,
the benefactive alternation, and other reordering phenomena (see Section 2.2 and Wasow 2002).
Even the variability of the (fully learned) dative alternation could be modeled if Stochastic OT
were used, and Lin (2005) shows with computational learning simulations that Stochastic OT
is theoretically learnable. However, OT only aims at descriptive power and is specifically not
claimed to have any psychological reality (Prince and Smolensky 2004:232–233). Thus, while
it is in principle possible to account for the dative alternation and its acquisition in OT, there is
no justification for doing so, and no explanatory power is gained. Therefore, the best way for a
nativist to account for changing effect strengths is not OT or some other way of implementing
a large number of mental grammars, but rather a ‘compromise’ theory that includes statistical
learning and variability as described above.
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3 Research questions
Following Chapter 2’s review of the extensive literature investigating the dative alternation,
this chapter presents the five main research questions of this thesis. The first three concern the
effects of specific features on the dative alternation as an ordering choice, the fourth is about the
order of acquisition or emergence of these effects, and the fifth arises out of the methodology
for investigating the other four questions (described in detail in Section 5.1.2). These research
questions were addressed with a categorization experiment (experiment 1, Chapter 4), an
interactive visual world presented on a touchscreen (experiment 2, Chapter 5), and an elicited
production task (experiment 3, Chapter 6). All three experiments were combined into a single
experimental session (each lasting around 45 minutes), in the order as they are presented here:
participants completed experiment 1 before moving on to experiment 2 and finished with
experiment 3. This means that all three experiments were administered to the same participants,
and each participant was presented with all three experiments in a single session.
3.1 Is there any evidence for an animacy ordering preference?
Previous studies have found that adult speakers produce more dative alternation sentences
with an animate object before an inanimate one than sentences with an inanimate object
before an animate one (Bresnan et al. 2007, Bresnan and Hay 2008). In other words, an
animate-before-inanimate preference is apparent in the dative alternation. This preference
has not been attested in child language, but this may simply be due to limitations of the data
(de Marneffe et al. 2012:42). Experiment 1 of the present study establishes children’s and
adults’ concept of animacy. Experiment 2 is aimed at determining whether children and adults
expect animate-before-inanimate order in the dative alternation and whether they conform to this
animate-before-inanimate order when filling gaps in dative alternation sentences. Experiment 3
tests for this preference in production by investigating whether speakers can bemade to reproduce
inanimate-before-animate sentences just as easily as animate-before-inanimate sentences.
3.2 Is there any evidence for a number ordering preference?
The same recent literature indicates that adult speakers appear to prefer placing a plural object
before a singular one over the reverse ordering. No study has attempted to show this ordering
preference in child language. Therefore, experiment 2 of this study is also aimed at determining
whether children and adults expect plural-before-singular order and whether they conform to
plural-before-singular order when filling gaps in dative alternation sentences. Experiment 3 tests
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for this preference in production by investigating whether speakers can be made to reproduce
singular-before-plural sentences just as easily as plural-before-singular ones.
3.3 Is there any evidence for a length ordering preference with a minimal
length difference?
The preference for shorter objects before longer one is attested so well that it is taken as a given
in most recent studies of the dative alternation: length is either treated as a factor that affects
speakers’ choices (see for example de Cuypere and Verbeke 2013), or it is kept constant by
experimental design to rule out its influence (see for example Stephens 2010:45). The length
effect is generally seen as a monotonic effect: smaller length differences between the two objects
lead to a weak preference for the shorter-before-longer order, larger length differences cause a
stronger shorter-before-longer preference. However, we do not know the smallest amount of
linguistic material that has to be added to one object to make it ‘longer’ in the eyes of this length
effect. Experiment 2 of the present study therefore also tests whether the difference between
monosyllabic and bisyllabic words is large enough for speakers to expect objects in monosyllabic-
before-bisyllabic order and whether they conform to monosyllabic-before-bisyllabic order when
filling gaps in dative alternation sentences.
3.4 Do these preferences emerge in a particular order?
Viewed as a construction choice that is governed largely by ordering preferences relating to
the features of the objects (Bresnan et al. 2007:81), the dative alternation is a complex system.
Its acquisitional trajectory has not been mapped yet—we do not know whether children start
by using some of these features and add others into the system gradually, or whether even
their earliest expectations and choices are influenced by the same features that influence adults’
expectations and choices. All three experiments in this study were completed by participants
from three different age groups (four-year-olds, eight-year-olds, and adults—see Section 4.1.1
for details), which means the results can be compared across (apparent) developmental time.
The age of four years was chosen because four-year-olds can be expected to be able to use give
and both dative alternation constructions (see Gropen et al. 1989:213–216), and the age of eight
years was chosen because it and the age of four bracket many developmental milestones. Thus,
if there is an acquisitional trajectory for dative alternation, these two age groups can be expected
to show it.
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3.5 Does touchscreen input reflect attention?
It is an axiom of eyetracking methodology that gaze reflects attention—people will generally
look at what they are currently attending to (reading, processing, and so forth). This correlation
between gaze and attention extends to interaction. When interacting with an ‘intelligent’ home
or office, people overwhelmingly look at the specific device they are trying to interact with
at the time (Brumitt and Cadiz 2000, Maglio et al. 2000). Pressing a specific button on a
smartphone touchscreen also requires looking at the screen, whereas performing touch-input
gestures (such as a curly ‘pigtail’ shape to delete an item) does not (Bragdon et al. 2011). For
touchscreens specifically, a close correlation between touch location and gaze target point is
commonly assumed: the patents of Kawalkar (2011) and Sukumar (2012) unobtrusively filter out
unintentional touch inputs by accepting input only when both touch and gaze are on (or near) the
same touchscreen button. In other words, they are based on the assumption that the (intentional)
touch of a target point will be accompanied by a gaze at the same target. Similarly, Hagiya
and Kato (2014) show that asking people to touch one target while gazing at another, distant
on-screen target leads to larger variance in the gap between touch target and touch input—in
other words, when people cannot look at what they are touching, they are more likely to miss
it (and miss it by more). This reflects the everyday intuition that finer motor control (which
most touchscreen input will be) requires closer visual attention for hand-eye coordination. The
success of these patents and inventions shows that touch and gaze are closely correlated, without
any need for training users to look where they touch.
However, these findings and implementations are based on general, common-sense assumptions.
I am not aware of any quantitative studies of the distance between simultaneous gaze and touch
during touchscreen use. As the interactive task in the present study records eye gaze during
touchscreen interaction (see Sections 5.1.2, 5.2.1, and 5.2.2 for details), it will supply such data
in addition to addressing the linguistic research questions. This data will show whether the above
assumptions are justified. If they are, future technical designs can rely more robustly on touch
and gaze being close, and researchers in the cognitive sciences can use touchscreen input as an
alternative attention measure. If they are not, further research into gaze during touchscreen use
will be necessary in order to replace these common-sense assumptions.
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4 Experiment 1: Categorization
The aim of this first experiment is not to answer any of the five research questions (Chapter 3)
directly. Rather, it tests how participants categorize the animals and inanimate objects used in
experiment 2 (Chapter 5) by asking whether these animals and objects are capable of moving and
playing. One of the features of interest in experiment 2 is animacy, but it would be presumptuous
to use the simple a priori categories of animals and inanimate objects without checking whether
participants (especially children) have those same categories.
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 Participants
Adult participants (N = 22; 18 female and 4 male;47 age range 18 to 41 years, median age
21 years) were recruited through notices posted on campus and on the online course platform
Learn at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch (New Zealand). Their participation was
incentivized with a NZD 10 shopping voucher.48 These adult participant were analyzed as one
age group. The children formed two age groups: four-year-olds (N = 20, 10 female and 10 male,
mean age 4;3) and eight-year-olds (N = 20, 10 female and 10 male, mean age 8;4). They were
recruited through Christchurch kindergartens, schools and after-school programs as well as home
education networks, the New Zealand Institute of Language, Brain and Behavior’s participant
pool “Team Tamariki”, notices posted on campus and on the online learning platform, and word
of mouth. Child participants were incentivized with their choice of one item from a ‘box of
treasures’ (containing things like toy cars, bags of balloons, and sheets of stickers; monetary
value less than NZD 5 each); since parents or caregivers had to accompany the child participants
to the experiment at the university because of ethical and legal considerations, they received a
NZD 10 fuel voucher.
All participants were being or had been raised in New Zealand. All participants named English
or New Zealand English as their first and home language, and the impression of the experimenter,
herself a native speaker of New Zealand English, was that all participants did indeed speak
New Zealand English. Adult participants consented to participate; for child participants, their
assent (where possible) and their caregivers’ consent was obtained before the experiment. No
47The adult participant group was not balanced for gender. Among the studies of the dative alternation that I
am aware of (see Chapter 2), none report a gender difference within the realm of the dative alternation. Therefore,
none was expected here.
48These vouchers were funded by the University of Canterbury’s School of Social and Political Sciences (since
reorganized and renamed).
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information or data apart from that on these forms and participants’ categorizations, touchscreen
input and eye gaze, and sentence reproductions (see Sections 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1 for details) was
recorded.
Participants and parents were given directions to the room where the experiment was con-
ducted when they scheduled an experiment session. On their arrival, they were greeted by
the experimenter, a female native speaker of New Zealand English experienced in talking to
and working with children. Child participants in particular were given time to get used to the
room and equipment. Seats and reading material (magazines and university publications) were
available for parents and other accompanying persons. Some parents brought other children
beside the participant along; toys as well as picture and coloring books were available for these
children, who were encouraged not to disturb the participant. Participants and parents were given
information sheets to read49 as well as the opportunity to ask questions about the experiment.
Once they had read them and their questions had been answered, participants and parents signed
consent or assent forms. These sheets and forms are reproduced in Appendix F.
4.1.2 Procedure
This experiment was the first in the experimental session for all participants. It was designed
to test their concept of animacy. Participants were asked to take a seat and shown a succession
of laminated print-outs of all the images that were used to represent objects and animals in
experiment 2 (see Chapter 5 for a description of that experiment, and Appendix C for the pictures
used). Only the pictures for singulars were used in experiment 1, since no animacy distinction
between one dog and three dogs, or between one key and three keys, was expected. For each
image, participants were asked “Could this one move towards you?”, and the images were sorted
into piles according to participant categorization. The same task was then repeated with another
set of laminated printouts of the same pictures, this time with the question “Could this one play
with you?”. Thus, participants made a second, separate set of piles for this second question.
These ‘yes’ and ‘no’ piles (four in total) were kept separate, and lists of the images in each one
were made after the end of the session. The printouts were then shuffled (in two stacks, one for
each question) again to randomize the order of presentation for the next participant. To avoid
giving phonetic cues, which might have led to categorization based on similar-sounding names,
the pictures had no labels on them and were not named by the experimenter. Color photographs
were used instead of the actual household objects and stuffed animal toys in order to rule out
the possibility of some participants treating the stuffed animals as inanimate objects and others
treating them as (representations of) animals. This categorization task was used instead of a
49The information sheets and assent forms for child participants were kept very simple and were printed in a
slightly larger size, since that helps with comprehension in children as old as eight (Katzir et al. 2013).
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more usual experimental procedure (such as a Likert scale with several options from ‘absolutely
able to move towards me’ to ‘absolutely unable to move towards me’) because I expected the
youngest participants would have problems with those (unfamilar) procedures, but would easily
be able to stack pictures.
This experiment was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury
(reference number HEC 2013/166).
4.1.3 Limitations
The methods of participant recruitment could be argued to limit the possible pool of participants
in unwanted ways. The adult participants were all recruited on campus. While the campus is
open to the public, and data about participants’ enrolment status and educational history were
not collected, this method of recruitment together with their shared language background (as
speakers of New Zealand English) and ages (young adults on a university campus are most likely
university students, andmost university students will be from a relatively narrow age range) make
it entirely reasonable to assume that all the adult participants were in fact university students of
a Western background. This population is not typical for humankind, which creates problems
when results based on it are generalized (Henrich et al. 2010). However, the study was by
necessity limited to speakers of New Zealand English, and the adult participants are a reasonable
sample of that particular population (considering that in 2006, 40% of New Zealanders aged
fifteen and over held a post-secondary qualification). Most of the adult participants in the present
study were female, but gender was not expected to have an effect, as argued above. Therefore,
this gender imbalance in the sample was not expected to negatively affect its representativeness
for the phenomena under investigation. The criticisms in Henrich et al. (2010) are also more
applicable to behavioral patterns in psychology than to (sub-conscious) linguistic effects of
animacy, number, and length.
The recruitment of child participants through schools and research participants pools also had
the potential of creating a biased sample: as parents had to take some initiative in responding to
the recruitment letter, all participants could conceivably share a background that is more open to
science than the population average, which could in turn affect behavior. However, as with the
adult participants, it is important to note that the measured behavior was unlikely to be strongly
and directly affected by affinity to science. This experiment was designed specifically to measure
participants’ concept of animacy without assuming a target or ‘correct’ answer based on the
biological definition of life, which of course would be affected by affinity to and knowledge of
science.
70
4.2 Results
Participants’ answers to the two questions asked in this experiment (“Could this one move
towards you?” and “Could this one play with you?”) are shown in Fig. 4.1, where each dot is
one of the 28 images (or nouns). The x-axis shows the percentage of responses to the question
“Could this one move towards you?”, and the y-axis shows the percentage of responses to the
question “Could this one play with you?”. To use the most striking noun, ball, as an example, 12
four-year-olds (of 20 total, or 60%) answered “yes” to “Could this one move towards you?”, and
11 (55%) answered “yes” to “Could this one play with you?”. It is clear why ball in particular
(being a toy or sporting implement designed to roll) would get this response. Apart from this
special case, this categorization experiment distinguishes animals (orange dots in Fig. 4.1) from
inanimate objects (blue dots) very clearly. Table 4.1 gives the answer counts together with Yule’s
coefficient of association Q (which ranges from −1 for perfect negative association to 1 for
perfect positive association) for each age group. The association between the two categorizations
is strong and positive.
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Figure 4.1: Categorizations by age group (each dot represents one noun; more solid dots represent
several nouns with the same percentages for both categorization questions)
The question “Could this one move towards you?” by itself divides the nouns very cleanly, and
this clean split replicates the a priori distinction between animals and inanimate objects (in fact,
no animal got a single “no”-response to this question from eight-year-olds and adults, as is
apparent in Fig. 4.1). Table 4.2 shows that there are very few cases of inanimates being labelled
as capable of motion, or of animates as incapable, and the Q coefficients confirm that this is a
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cannot
move
can
move
cannot play 266 142
can play 10 142
(a) Four-year-olds (Q = 0.93)
cannot
move
can
move
cannot play 254 153
can play 6 144
(b) Eight-year-olds (Q = 0.95)
cannot
move
can
move
cannot play 231 164
can play 17 204
(c) Adults (Q = 0.89)
Table 4.1: Categorization answers to both questions, and Yule’s coefficient of association Q
perfect positive association within empirical variation.
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 250 26
yes 30 254
(a) Four-year-olds (Q = 0.98)
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 261 0
yes 18 280
(b) Eight-year-olds (Q = 1)
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 248 0
yes 60 308
(c) Adults (Q = 1)
Table 4.2: Categorization answers to “Could this one move towards you?” by a priori animacy,
and Yule’s coefficient of association Q
The answers to “Could this one play with you?”, on the other hand, are more varied. Apart
from ball, the a priori inanimates (inanimate objects like ball and lemon) also received mostly
“no” answers to this question, but the animates are much more divided (see Table 4.3). While
there is an association between these responses and the a priori categorization, it is weaker
for this question (Q coefficients around 0.9). The association is mostly driven by the a priori
inanimates, which overwhelmingly received “no” answers, while the a priori animates received
almost exactly as many “no” as “yes” answers from four- and eight-year-olds.
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 265 143
yes 15 137
(a) Four-year-olds (Q = 0.89)
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 267 140
yes 12 139
(b) Eight-year-olds (Q = 0.91)
a priori
inanimate
a priori
animate
no 282 113
yes 26 195
(c) Adults (Q = 0.90)
Table 4.3: Categorization answers to “Could this one play with you?” by a priori animacy, and
Yule’s coefficient of association Q
4.3 Summary
This categorization experiment revealed that children and adults will categorize animates and
inanimates fairly predictably with regard to motion and much less predictably with regard to
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ability to play. This may be due to the fact that motion is fairly limited in its interpretation while
the questions about the ability to play afforded more interpretations. The question about the
ability to play is one of Gelman et al. (1983)’s reciprocal action questions. Their four-year-old
participants replicated the a priori animate–inanimate distinction about as well with reciprocal
action questions as with simple action questions (like “Can this one move?”). The results of
experiment 1 paint a different picture: across all age groups, answers to this reciprocal question
were more varied than answers to the simple motion question, with no clear binary split between
animates and inanimates emerging from just the answers to the reciprocal question.
The answers to these two questions taken together, however, do show that all three participant
groups categorize the animals and inanimate objects used in experiment 2 into two distinct
groups. This supports the argument that animacy-related differences found in that experiment
are really due to a categorical difference between animate and inanimate. For studies of gradual
animacy phenomena (involving for example an animacy hierarchy), measuring participants’
animacy conception with several questions is recommended, as it will result in more fine-grained
animacy values than simple a priori categories would.
73
5 Experiment 2: Reaction and completion
This chapter presents an experiment that addresses all five of the research questions given in
Chapter 3. Participants’ choices for filling gaps in the instruction sentences of an act-out task
were elicited to measure their expectations and preferences for animacy, grammatical number,
and length of the words in these positions depending on the animacy, grammatical number, and
length of the other (non-gapped, explicit) object and the order of the two objects. Their eye
gaze was also recorded to provide an online measure of expectations and preferences. As this
experiment uses a touchscreen and an eyetracker at the same time, it also provides data to assess
the usefulness of touchscreens as attention-measure devices.
Section 5.1 describes the methodology used in this experiment, and Section 5.2 introduces and
discusses the statistical methods used to analyze the results in Section 5.3.
5.1 Methodology
5.1.1 Participants
The participants of experiment 1 (22 adults, 20 eight-year-olds, and 20 four-year-olds) all
participated in this experiment as well.
5.1.2 Procedure
This experiment followed immediately after experiment 1 in the same session. Participants
were seated at a desk with a HP EliteBook 2740p 12.1-inch touchscreen computer (displaying
1280 by 800 pixels) and a Tobii X120 head-free eyetracker. The experimenter explained to
them that they would be moving images on the touchscreen by simple touching and dragging.
The experimenter also explained that the eyetracker would be recording their eye gaze. After
eyetracker calibration, the task (run in PsychoPy, version 1.80.00;50 see Peirce 2007 and 2009)
was this: after a fixation dot (presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms), three images were
shown on a black background in a horizontal row, either near the top of the screen (as ‘themes’)
or near the bottom (as ‘recipients’). Their relative positions were randomized per participant.
To reinforce that they were intended as recipients, the ‘recipient’ image or images were near
50The timing errors that Garaizar et al. (2014) and Garaizar and Vadillo (2014) report with PsychoPy were only
present with stimuli presented for a much shorter time than any of the stimuli presented in the present study, and
with non-optimal programming (Garaizar et al. 2014 did not use the more exact frame timing; Garaizar and Vadillo
2014, which found fewer problems, and the present study did). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect no timing errors
here.
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the bottom of the screen, had a white frame around each of them, and were not moveable (see
Figs. 5.2 and 5.3). When one of the three images was first touched, a sound recording of the
respective noun spoken by a female New Zealand English speaker was played over headphones
(Moshi VLH for participants with smaller heads, Panasonic RT-HT 161 for participants with
larger heads)—in the three-themes trial shown in Figure 5.1a, a recording of the word baskets
was played the first time the image of three baskets was touched, a recording of the word camel
was played the first time the image of the camel was touched, and a recording of the word lock
was played the first time the image of the lock was touched. In the three-recipients trial shown in
Figure 5.1b, crab was played when the image of a crab was touched for the first time, letter was
played when the image of a letter was touched for the first time, and squirrels was played when
the image of three squirrels was touched for the first time. (This was independent of the order of
these first touches.) This was done to ensure that participants registered all three objects and to
prime the intended nouns (so that participants thought of the rabbit as a rabbit instead of, for
example, a bunny-wabbit).
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Initial state of trials
After all three of these images had been touched and the corresponding recordings had played,
the larger image appeared. This image was centered horizontally and positioned near the bottom
of the screen (as a ‘recipient’) if the three smaller images were ‘themes’, or near the top (as
a ‘theme’) if the smaller images were ‘recipients’. An instruction including the appropriate
noun for the larger image and a gap in the place of the smaller images was then played: Once a
participant had touched the baskets, the camel, and the lock in the trial shown in Figure 5.1a,
an image of three dogs appeared (see Figure 5.2a) and the instruction sentence Now give the
to the dogs. was played. Similarly, once a participant had touched the crab, the letter,
and the squirrels in the trial shown in Figure 5.1b, an image of three keys appeared (see Figure
5.2b) and the instruction Now give the the keys. was played. The gap (in place of the
theme noun in this example) represents 500 ms of Brownian noise (generated with Audacity,
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version 2.0.2). Brownian (or ‘brown’) noise was chosen because Shirakawa (2013) showed that
it is not distracting or irritating for participants, particularly children.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.2: State of trials during instruction sentence
Once this instruction had finished playing, the theme image(s) could be moved by dragging them
on the touchscreen (see Figure 5.3). Once a theme image was moved inside the white frame of
a recipient image, orange and white stars were shown over that recipient accompanied by the
sound of a trumpet fanfare, chimes, or drums as a reward stimulus. This reward stimulus was
shown regardless of the choice that was made, and concluded the trial.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Interactive state of trials
Thus, participants made a series of choices to fill the gaps in the instructions in this experiment.
Their touchscreen input (touches and dragging paths) and eye gaze during each trial were also
recorded, and they were analyzed according to order of touching, the gaze percentages for each
of the four images in that trial, the sequences of dragging and gaze, and the correlation between
the two.
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There were 64 trials, presented in four blocks of 16 (see Appendix C for the images used, and
Appendix B for a list of trials). Since the four audio stimuli (three names and one instruction
sentence) were always played successively and never allowed to overlap, the shortest possible
duration for one trial was about 3 seconds, depending on the lengths of the particular stimuli.
Participants took longer than that, of course, with the average time per trial being more than 7
seconds (see Section 5.3 for details)
All trials within one block had the same type of instruction.
Block 1: prepositional construction with gap in place of the theme (as in the dogs example
above)
Now give the to the dogs.
Block 2: double object construction with gap in place of the recipient (as in the keys example
above)
Now give the the keys.
Block 3: double object construction with gap in place of the theme
Now give the hammer the .
Block 4: prepositional construction with gap in place of the recipient
Now give the monkey to the .
There was a non-interactive automatic demonstration51 followed by a practice phase of four trials
at the start of the first two blocks. As the illustrated examples and the list of blocks show, there
were only two different types of trials, in that either the theme or the recipient was replaced by a
gap and participants thus had to choose either between three themes or between three recipients.
Since the first two blocks presented both of these types of trials, further training in the third and
fourth block was deemed unnecessary. Participants were given the opportunity to rest between
the blocks, and the eyetracker was re-calibrated after such a break if necessary.
5.1.3 Stimuli
The same order of blocks was used with all participants: the first block had prepositional dative
instructions with a noise gap in place of the theme (Now give the to the dog.), the second
block had double object instructions with the recipient gapped (Now give the the bone.),
51This demonstration presented one trial with an image of a finger apparently ‘clicking’ and ‘dragging’; all
participant input was ignored during this. An image of a finger appeared over the three images sequentially, as if
touching them, and the corresponding recordings of the nouns were played as this finger ‘touched’ them. Then, the
fourth image appeared and the instruction was played (as described above), after which the finger moved with one
‘theme’ image to the ‘recipient’, or with the ‘theme’ to one of the ‘recipients’, as if dragging it there. On reaching
the/a recipient, the reward stimulus was presented.
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the third had double object instructions with the theme gapped (Now give the dog the .),
and the fourth had prepositional instructions with the recipient gapped (Now give the bone to
the .). The order of items within each block was randomized for each participant. The
four images of one trial always covered the four possible combinations of animacy and number:
there was always one animate singular (the camel in Figure 5.2a), one animate plural (the dogs
in Figure 5.2a), one inanimate singular (the lock in Figure 5.2a), and one inanimate plural (the
baskets in Figure 5.2a). Table 5.1 gives the different combinations of animacy and length used
to design trials for this experiment (see Appendices B and C for full details).
explicit object choices
animate monosyllabic animate bisyllabic inanimate monosyllabic inanimate bisyllabic
inanimate monosyllabic inanimate bisyllabic animate monosyllabic animate bisyllabic
animate bisyllabic animate monosyllabic inanimate bisyllabic inanimate monosyllabic
inanimate bisyllabic inanimate monosyllabic animate bisyllabic animate monosyllabic
Table 5.1: Combinations of animacy and length used in trial design
Additionally, grammatical number was manipulated such that the choice that was different from
the explicit object in the instruction in both animacy and length always had the same number
as that object, whereas the other two choices had the other number. To rule out possible effects
of different amounts being more or less prototypically plural, all images representing plurals
showed a group of exactly three animals or objects. To take the first row of Table 5.1 as an
example, whichever object was the one that was mentioned explicitly in the instruction sentence
for that trial (the dogs in Figure 5.2a), there always was one choice that matched this explicit
object in animacy (but not length or number; the camel in Figure 5.2a) as well as one length-
matching (but animacy- and number-mismatching; the lock in Figure 5.2a; the length difference
in this experiment is mono- versus bisyllabic) and one number-matching (but animacy- and
length-mismatching; the baskets in Figure 5.2a) choice. In the pool of 16 nouns used as explicit
objects (pronounced in the instruction), there were four nouns for each combination of (binary)
animacy and length. Each of these 16 nouns appeared only once per block, whether it was a
recipient or theme; the nouns for the smaller images that participants chose between to fill the
gap in the instruction were taken from a pool of 12 different nouns, each of which was shown
four times per block (see Appendix C for all of these images).
5.1.4 Limitations
Using the verb give is problematic because it is probably not as syntactically productive in early
childhood as corpus data might suggest and because it appears much more often in a double
object construction (V—NP—NP) than in the prepositional counterpart. As for the first of
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these problems, while give utterances are attested before the second birthday for some children
(Gropen et al. 1989:214), these may not constitute a truly productive use of that verb: in my
study of parts of the CHILDES corpus (Bürkle 2011), 379 of the 815 give tokens (46.5%) were
double object constructions with pronominal first person singular recipients—in other words,
give me (some item X). The transcripts in CHILDES (and elsewhere) are always an orthographic
abstraction of the actual speech produced, and it is reasonable to assume that at least some
children first use not the ditransitive verb give, but rather a monotransitive gimme.52 Transcription
guidelines and practices can then lead to this being transcribed as give me, which can give rise
to spurious conclusions. Similarly, the general preference for the double object construction
with give might cause misinterpretations of variables and effects: it is well documented that
give, on the whole, is found much more often with the double object construction than with
the prepositional construction (Bürkle 2011:32 and 38–40). Therefore, a study using only give
may attribute some double object uses to a feature that happens to be common in the particular
dataset, when they merely reflect the verb’s inherent bias.
However, these two problems are not insurmountable, and using give also has some benefits. The
false identification of gimme as adult-like give will not be a problem in the present study, as the
processing part will not contain me as a recipient and the full audio recordings of the production
part will allow identification of any verbs or predicates not found in standard adult speech.
Furthermore, even if children do start with monotransitive gimme early on, they also start to use
give productively and as clearly ditransitive earlier than other verbs (at least most of them do;
Gropen et al. 1989:212–216). Therefore, using give in this study means minimizing possibilities
for confusion or misunderstanding on the child participants’ part. And even if give shows a bias
for one dative alternation construction over the other, all other verbs do as well (see Section 2.6).
Keeping this particular bias in mind will allow for a clear analysis of the data. Additionally, using
give means benefiting from its status as “a ‘canonical’ ditransitive verb” (Lambert 2010:13,53
see also Gries 2003:12 and Ibbotson and Tomasello 2009:60–61 and 65), which reflects its
high frequency (in English as well as in other languages, see Haspelmath 2004:33, fn. 15). As
pointed out by Wasow (2002:68–72), give also shows virtually no meaning difference between
the two dative alternation constructions. Finally, give is simply the most (and perhaps only)
natural verb to use for this experiment: unlike show, for example, give has a recipient party
in a very real sense. This means that the action of ‘giving’ one image to another is obviously
only completed once it has been ‘physically’ moved there—participants might instinctively do
‘showing’ only by pointing or vague movements, making a reliable interpretation of all responses
difficult. Thus, using give does introduce some challenges, but the benefits clearly outweigh the
52Interestingly, French seems to have a parallel to this monotransitive verb in young children’s “donnemoi X”
(Bruyn et al. 1999:361).
53It should be noted here that Lambert even goes as far as defining the dative, which is the central phenomenon in
her crosslinguistic study, as the marking on the recipient object of a language’s give-equivalent (Lambert 2010:12).
79
drawbacks.
The verb give also imposes certain restrictions on the animacy of its two objects, or at least
there is a prototypical or preferred pattern: typically, we give inanimate themes to animate
(or even human) recipients. Other patterns, particularly the ‘reversed’ pattern of giving an
animate theme to an inanimate recipient, are intuitively less acceptable and less frequent. This
may affect participants’ choices in experiment 2: in the trials with three theme options and the
noise-gap in place of the theme noun in the instruction sentence (such as Fig. 5.1a), inanimate
options may be chosen more frequently not for reasons of ordering preferences, but to fulfil the
preferred animacy pattern. The same is true of animate choices in trials with three recipient
options and recipient-gap instructions. However, because children as young as 5 years have
given animate themes to inanimate recipients in act-out tasks elsewhere (see Cook 1976), this
possible preference was expected to be at most a tendency, and statistical analysis by animacy
was expected to reveal it if it does arise.
While there is some evidence that the prepositional construction is easier to process, at least
for children, no interaction between this processing advantage and the prototypical animacy
pattern is expected. This is despite Cook (1976)’s finding of just such an interaction. With a
simple act-out task, Cook (1976:437) showed that “the child of five is as ready to give a man
to a car as a car to a man” when instructed to do so with a prepositional construction. This
suggests that even reversing the prototypical animacy of the two objects of give does not affect
comprehension. When the instruction sentence used the double object construction, however,
participants produced the intended act-out response more often in trials with the prototypical
animacy pattern (inanimate theme and animate recipient) than in trials with the reverse pattern
(animate theme and inanimate recipient). These reverse-pattern trials in turn elicited the intended
response more often than trials with two inanimate objects (both theme and recipient) did. These
results suggest that children are sensitive to the prototypical animacy pattern, but this prototypical
account does not explain the difference between the reverse and and two-inanimate conditions.
Moreover, there is some doubt regarding the statistical validity of these results: Cook (1976)
reports p-values of the rank tests for these comparisons, but does not mention any adjustment
for the multiple comparisons problem: if every result that is less than 5% likely under the null
hypothesis is judged to be evidence against the null hypothesis, some cases where the null
hypothesis is true anyway will be wrongly analyzed as cases where the null hypothesis is false.
This is normally acceptable, and perfect certainty is impossible. When one performs many such
hypothesis tests, such false positives become more and more likely (just as the chance to win
the lottery increases with every lottery ticket one buys). It is possible to ameliorate this problem
by performing certain adjustments to the p-values (see Section 5.2.6), but Cook does not report
having performed any. In other words, some of the supposedly significant differences in Cook
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(1976) may be much less significant under standard assumptions than what they are presented as.
Also, the items used to represent the animate objects for the act-out task were dolls. As discussed
in Chapter 2, participants may understand dolls to be less animate than intended, particularly
if the somewhat strict instructions given by Cook (1976:436) put some participants into what
Gelman et al. (1983:108) calls “non-play mode” (where dolls and the like are inanimate objects).
For these two reasons, the animacy-related results of Cook (1976) cannot be assumed to be
strongly supported (though children’s general capability of giving inanimates to animates is of
course proven, and the advantage of the prepositional construction appears to be statistically
strong).
In experiment 1 (Chapter 4), participants had to access their explicit knowledge about which of
the entities shown in the pictures are capable of motion; and in experiment 2, participants were
asked to move these same images. Using motion as a criterion for animacy here certainly brought
the idea of motion to participants’ attention, and therefore it is possible that their behavior in
experiment 2 was not guided by the linguistic features under investigation, but by the idea
of motion—for example, after identifying a dog as being able to move and a lemon as being
immobile, participants could conceivably be more inclined to move a (picture of a) dog rather
than a lemon. This, however, may just as well be turned on its head, with participants being
more inclined to move a lemon precisely because it cannot move by itself and thus needs their
‘help’ to do so. The fact that this potential problem is consistent with two opposite outcomes
suggests that this is unlikely to be a systematic problem.
Motion had to be used because motion is considered to be central to children’s (and probably
adults’) concept of animacy, as discussed in Section 2.3 above. Directly asking participants “Is
this one an animal?” would not provide an insight into their concept of animacy either: the finding
that “infants [as young as 12 to 14 months] commence the process of acquisition equipped with
an initially general expectation linking words to object categories” (Waxman 1999:253) does
not mean that all children will link all words to categories in an exact or adult-like way. Children
may understand and categorize for a feature without using the word for that category correctly
or at all, and conversely their adult-like use and understanding of the word for a category may
be accidental and not a result of correct categorization (Taylor 1995, Waxman 1999, Sandhofer
2001). In a study of animacy, merely asking child participants whether one stimulus object is an
animal will therefore not get at whatever concept of animacy or ‘animal’ the children actually
have at the time. Using just one feature of animacy (like motion) in experiment 1 would not get
at the concept of animacy either, but only at the concept of that particular feature. To see which
underlying features of animacy are at work for participants, it is necessary to test for features
instead of testing for animacy itself, and to test for more than one feature. Gelman et al. (1983)
found that animals’ capability for simple as well as reciprocal actions work well as a test of
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young children’s concept of animacy, and so (goal-directed, following Opfer and Gelman 2011)
motion and play were used here to cover both of these categories and thus get a clearer view of
participants’ concept of animacy.
Furthermore, it should be noted that experiment 2 asks participants to give, rather than move,
one image to another, which further reduces the possibility of an unwanted effect here. Also, the
images are all static, so the fact that the animals depicted can move and the inanimate objects
depicted cannot is not brought to the conscious attention of the participants who are asked
to make them move. The entire experiment rather depends on the fact that “young children
readily distinguish between what an object looks like and what it truly is” (Booth and Waxman
2002:B20), which could be seen to negate the above point: if children are aware of the difference
between picture and depicted, the fact that all pictures used are static cannot affect children’s
awareness of the depicted animals’ ability of motion. However, following Opfer and Gelman
(2011), children’s concept of animals’ motion is best expressed as the capability for autonomous
goal-directedmotion. Experiment 1 accessed that. Moving images on a touchscreen is a different
kind of motion, and so should not be confused with autonomous motion: when dragging an
image of a dog on a touchscreen, it looks like the dog is moving, but it is not truly moving (as
in walking). Moreover, the pilot studies tested all the combinations of images for any strong
effects of factors (like the knowledge of animals’ ability to move), and found only a general
preference for animates to go with animates and inanimates to go with inanimates. Not even the
broad type of locomotion that an animal uses had an effect: pilot trials with dolphins showed
animacy-matching just like trials with dogs, cows, and other four-legged walking animals.
While the experimental session as a whole was structured in a way that maintained attention and
minimized confusion, the random order of trials within each block of experiment 2 might be
considered a bad choice in that it could have unwanted and hard-to-spot confounding effects on the
results. For example, one participant may randomly see several successive trials that all contain
the ‘lemon’ or ‘lemons’ images as a choice (as one of the three smaller images). This participant
may then be influenced by this reoccurrence to choose the lemon(s) more, or conversely to avoid
this choice. Similarly, an imaginative participant could potentially have started out making the
choices that the animacy, number, and length of the choice images suggested for the particular
instruction, but then built a ‘story’ from these and subsequently chosen images based on what
fitted best into that story. In the obvious alternative to randomization, the trials could have been
pre-randomized into one order and presented in this same order to all participants. However,
this set order would then have needed to be tested first, to see whether there are any effects of
one trial on another. This would have been prohibitively time-consuming and expensive even for
just one such order, and presumably several orders would have been evaluated against each other.
Per-participant randomization of trials within blocks coupled with data analysis per group, on
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the other hand, can be expected to cancel out any such effects, should they arise. Therefore, the
random order of trials within each block for each participant was the most economical way of
ordering trials as well as the one most likely to produce valid, usable data.
Order of blocks has been reported to have a ‘carry-over’ effect on young children’s behavior
in experiments (Gelman and Koenig 2001:693–695 and Sloutsky and Fisher 2011), but the
order of blocks in experiment 2 varied in two relevant factors (construction and gapped object)
and was therefore not expected to cause a similar strong effect on participant behavior. As
discussed in Section 2.6, recent constructions are likely to reoccur (in the dative alternation and
in other phenomena). Experiment 2 does not suffer from this problem, as production was not its
aim.
The above description of this experiment may create the impression that this is too complex a
task for young children, particularly since it involves a touchscreen as the only computer input
device—although many children may have experience with touchscreens, not all of them can
reliably be expected to be ‘proficient’ touchscreen users. Touchscreens have not been widely
used in research involving young children, but based on the studies that did use them, it was
reasonable to assume that children can generally use touchscreens competently (Sutton 2006).
The only common problem seems to be that the touchscreens failed to register children’s clear
and intentional touch input (see for example Luciana and Nelson 2002:610). This problem
is eliminated by simply using touchscreens based on newer technology (capacitive or optical,
for example) rather than the resistive touchscreen Luciana and Nelson (seem to have) used.
The problem of initial unfamiliarity still has to be considered, of course, but it is easily dealt
with by giving participants “a period of time” to learn how to use the touchscreen (Romeo
et al. 2003:334)—the practice phases described above, in other words. Thus, the mere use of
touchscreen technology could not be reasonably expected to present a major problem to the
research, and indeed it did not (see Section 5.3.3 for details). Participants only interacted with
the touchscreen by pointing and dragging, and the pointing gesture is used frequently and with
different intentions by children as young as 1 year (see for example Liszkowski et al. 2006). This
form of touchscreen use thus builds on a very early gesture and was therefore not expected to be
difficult or confusing to participants (see also Colombo et al. 2003). No such problems occurred
during the experiment.
Although an eyetracker is most likely unfamiliar to children (and parents or caregivers), I did
not expect this fact to present a problem in and of itself. The Tobii X120 eyetracking hardware
is a head-free table-mounted device. As used in the present experiment, it appears as a (wired)
box sitting on a stand on the desk, behind the touchscreen computer, and it was introduced
and explained to participants (and parents or caregivers) in that way. Boot et al. (2012), using
a screen with built-in eyetracking hardware, report no problems due to unfamiliarity or other
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negative reactions to the technology itself. Therefore, no such effects were expected here, and
indeed no participant showed any.
The rationale behind the eyetracking methodology is that people focus their gaze on the current
focus of their attention. This requires some control over eye gaze. Children aged 10 to 12 are
capable of fixations that cover as little as 0.65 degrees of visual angle Eden et al. (1994:1350),
and typical adults are capable of fixations with around 0.6 degrees of variance (Russo et al.
2003:1840). Oculomotor control and executive control over gaze direction continue to develop
well into the second decade of life (Paus et al. 1990, Fischer et al. 1997, Munoz et al. 1998,
Fukushima et al. 2000, Bucci and Kapoula 2006). The children in the two younger age groups
in the present study are younger than that, however, and so may not be able to control their gaze
as well as the adult participants. However, children’s gaze is not entirely random: while it may
be less exact than in adults, children (as young as three years!) have reasonably good control
over the direction of their eye gaze (Scerif et al. 2005). Eyetracking studies with children as
participants have to be interpreted with this development in mind, but the underlying rationale
that gaze location indicates attention or processing with high temporal resolution is sound.
Finally, if the differences in animacy, length, and number do indeed affect the choices that children
make in filling gaps, these differences can be expected to be quite subtle. Any confounding
factors must therefore be eliminated where possible, and controlled for elsewhere. The largest
concern here is whether any of the combinations of four pictures to be shown together contain two
pictures that are strongly associated semantically or through other non-linguistic knowledge—for
example, with an instruction of give the to the dog, a choice of bone would be so strong
as to overpower and overshadow any linguistic ordering preferences. This obvious example
is easily avoided, of course, but less obvious associations could still cause bias regardless of
instructions. However, these associations would then also be evident in a similar task with no
instructions at all. Therefore, a pilot study with just such a task was carried out.
5.1.4.1 Pilot study
There were two age groups of participants in this pilot: 19 children (age range 5;11 to 11;0, mean
age 8;6) who were recruited through a contributing primary school in the Canterbury region of
New Zealand and given their choice of small item from a ‘box of treasures’ as a reward, and
20 adults (age range 18 to 39 years, median age 20) who were recruited with no incentive on
campus at the University of Canterbury.
This pilot was programmed and run in PsychoPy, version 1.76.00, on the same touchscreen laptop
as experiments 2 and 3. Participants were presented with a succession of screens consisting
of one larger ‘recipient’ image, centered near the bottom of the screen, and three smaller and
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drag-able ‘theme’ images next to each other near the top of the screen. A pre-programmed
demonstration showed them that dragging one of the smaller images to the large one caused
stars to appear and a fanfare to play (the ‘reward’ stimuli), and a short practice period showed
that any of the three theme images could be dragged and would lead to the same ‘reward’. These
practice trials went from ones with a very strong association between the recipient and one
theme to being more like the trials to be tested later, as shown in Table 5.2. This was intended
to encourage participants to look for semantic associations like this in order to increase the
likelihood of any such association being revealed in the results.
recipient associated theme other themes
key lock camel dog
pencil ruler crab snake
fox duck cherry cup
pig apple camel lock
Table 5.2: Training trials in the pilot study
This practice phase was followed by 64 individual trials (four for each of the 16 recipient images
which were to be used in the later experiment). In other words, the task in this pilot study was
very similar to the trials with noise replacing the theme in experiment 2, but without an auditory
stimulus sentence.54 This pilot study was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the
University of Canterbury (reference numbers HEC 2012/172 and HEC 2013/31/LR-PS).
Two of the combinations of four images were ruled out after this pilot because participants
appeared to have strong preferences for one particular ‘theme’ image, presumably based on
functional connections between it and the ‘recipient’: with a key as the recipient, participants
strongly preferred the basket choice over the dolphin and fox options; for a pencil as the recipient,
participants preferred the lock over the duck and the squirrel. I make no claims regarding the
specific functional connections in these combinations. The other combinations of nouns did not
show similarly strong preferences and were therefore assumed to be free of any strong individual
connections between the nouns. 16 of them were chosen for use in the main experiment.
More interestingly, the results of this pilot study showeda strong preference for animacy-matching:
both children and adults were much more likely than chance to pick the one smaller image that
expressed the same value for animacy as the recipient image did—in other words, participants
preferred animate choices for animate recipients and inanimate choices for inanimate recipients.
Some adult participants specifically mentioned using this strategy after the experiment. The pilot
54It is true that the omission of pre-recorded speech from the pilot made it different from the later experiment, but
the recordings were in that experiment only to elicit ordering-based preferences and to control for length. Neither
of these considerations is relevant to the aims of the pilot. Furthermore, it could be argued that the absence of
speech stimuli made the pilot less processing-intensive and therefore easier.
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study had no per-trial instruction sentences and indeed no instruction beside the pre-programmed
demonstration. Animacy-matching was taken to be an explicit strategy adopted in the absence
of specific instructions, and therefore less likely in the full experiment, where each trial had an
instruction sentence.
5.2 Analysis
Getting from the raw data collected in this experiment to meaningful results is far from straight-
forward. This section describes the issues in more detail, starting with an overview of different
touchscreen technologies and the specific setup of the touchscreen and eyetracker used in exper-
iment 2. Statistical methods for eye gaze data are then introduced and evaluated. The chapter
also provides an introduction regression modelling, containing an overview of the modelling
strategy adopted for this study, and a brief discussion of the multiple comparisons problem and
the steps taken to address it in this thesis.
5.2.1 Touchscreens
Resistive touchscreens have two panes of electrically conductive material behind the screen, and
the user’s touch input makes a connection between the two. Capacitive touchscreens set up an
electrical field covering the screen and measure the deviations caused by a finger entering that
field. Finally, there are technologies that emit waves of light or sound (outside of the spectra that
are visible or audible to humans, of course) across the screen surface and measure the turbulence
that a finger (or any other solid object) touching the screen causes in these waves.
The touchscreen in the HP EliteBook 2740p used in this study is a capacitive model. This strikes
a good balance between useability and screen response time: Luciana and Nelson (2002) found
that children aged four had trouble using a resistive touchscreen device,55 meaning capacitive
or wave-based touchscreens are more suited for studies with young children as participants.
However, wave-based technologies tend to be slower to record touch input (Holzinger 2003:392),
making them less intuitive to use as well as reducing the rate at which touchscreen data can be
collected. Therefore, a capacitive screen was judged ideal for the present study.56 The screen
was calibrated before the first experiment session.
55Some of this trouble can be attributed to young children’s developing motor skills, as Romeo et al. (2003:333)
note. Nevertheless, capacitive touchscreens eliminate at least the problem of having to press the screen quite hard,
and are thus relatively better suited for child research than resistive touchscreens.
56Holzinger (2003:391) notes that non-conductive objects like gloved hands do not cause deviations in electrical
fields, and can therefore not be used as input devices on capacitive touchscreens. As the experimental sessions in
the present study were conducted in an enclosed room, participants did not wear gloves, so this was not a problem.
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Eyetrackers like the one used here (see Section 5.2.2 for details) work out the direction of a
participant’s gaze from the position and shape of the pupils. To know what this gaze was directed
at, it is necessary to either record the scene in front of the participant with a separate camera,
or (as here) to use a computer screen. If the eyetracker is successfully tracking a participant’s
eyes, it obviously knows the position of the participant’s head and the direction of their gaze. To
compute where on the screen this gaze was directed, the position and orientation of the screen
relative to the eyetracker also needs to be known. I constructed a simple wooden stand for the
screen and eyetracker and configured the eyetracker with the distances and angles that this stand
enforced. The stand (including touchscreen and eyetracker) could be tilted up and down by
adding or removing blocks underneath the back. This allowed the whole setup to be adjusted for
participants of different heights and for mitigating the “gorilla arm” problem (see for example
Way and Paradiso 2014:138): holding out one arm to interact with a vertical screen for a longer
time period is fatiguing and painful. A tilted and lowered screen is more comfortable to use.
As the eyetracker and screen were fixed on the stand, the relative distances and angles between
them were not affected by these adjustments.
5.2.2 Eyetracker setups
The eyetracker used in this study is a Tobii X120, a head-free model that relies on near-infrared
light. Head-free eyetrackers are the obvious choice for studies with young children as participants
because do not constrain the head or place some unfamiliar apparatus on the head or face, which
would be distracting at best and scary at worst for children. Near-infrared eyetracking makes
use of the fact that the inside of the human eye reflects near-infrared light very well: the pupil,
being the opening that lets light into and back out of the inside of the eye, shows up very
well in near-infrared light (Morimoto et al. 2000).57 The direction of the eye gaze can then be
extrapolated from the pupil’s relative position within the eye, and the point where the gaze ‘line’
intersects with the display area is the point where the participant’s gaze is currently centered.
This requires only that the location of the display area is known, which is trivial when, as in
this study, the display area is a computer screen in a fixed position and angle relative to the
eyetracker.
It is normal procedure with the Tobii X120 and similar eyetrackers to position the eyetracker
below the display area (see Morgante et al. 2012). The eyetracker is angled upwards towards the
participant’s eyes and the cameras inside the eyetracker are also angled upwards relative to the
case itself. With an interactive display like the task in experiment 2, this position is not practical:
57The user manual of the Tobii X120 certifies the infrared light to be safe for exposure to the eyes within industry
standards (Tobii Technology AB 2008:2). The dangers of near-infrared diodes in immediate skin contact (Bozkurt
and Onaral 2004) are obviously of no concern for an eyetracker.
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×
Figure 5.4: Schematic view of different positions of a head-free eyetracker (grey boxes) in a
touchscreen experiment
as Fig.5.4 shows, the participant’s hand and arm would be between the eyetracker and the eyes
during any interaction, which would make it impossible for the eyetracker to collect gaze data.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s recommendation as well as apparent general practice in this kind
of study (see for example Biedert et al. 2012) is to place the eyetracker above the display area.
With the Tobii X120 in particular, it is also necessary to turn the eyetracker upside-down: as
mentioned above, the cameras inside the eyetracker are angled upwards relative to the eytracker
casing, which is helpful in the normal below-the-screen setup. When the eyetracker is above
the screen, however, this would mean that the cameras view an area high above the participant’s
head (see Fig. 5.5a). Inverting the eyetracker solves this problem, as Fig. 5.5b shows.
It is true that “the incoming gaze data needs then to be post-processed to match the flipped order
of axes” (Biedert et al. 2012:385), but this is in fact trivial: defining the center of the display
area as the coordinates (0, 0), while making initial stimulus design somewhat less intuitive,58
means that all the ‘post-processing’ that is necessary is multiplying both coordinates of all gaze
points by −1 (to change their signs). This changes the incorrect coordinates in Fig. 5.6b to the
correct ones as in Fig. 5.6a.
The major drawback of head-free eyetrackers (particularly in the inverted above-the-screen
setup) is that it does not yield as much data as other kinds of eyetrackers. Firstly, since a
58Choosing a corner of the screen to be (0, 0) is arguably more intuitive because it means a coordinate pair is can
be very easily understood: with (0, 0) as the lop left corner (the standard in E-Prime, for example; see Schneider
et al. 2002:20 and Hudson 2011:17), a coordinate pair (x, y) is simply “x across, y down”. Also, (0, 0) as the top
left (or really any) corner means that there can only be positive screen coordinates, while (0, 0) as the center makes
the left half of the screen have negative x coordinates and the bottom half have negative y.
88
×(a) Eyetracker not inverted

(b) Eyetracker inverted
Figure 5.5: Schematic view of the orientation of the Tobii X120 eyetracker camera (solid grey
rectangle) within the eyetracker casing (larger grey box)
× (0, 0)
(−300,+200)
(a) What the participant sees
× (0, 0)
(+300,−200)
(b) What the eyetracker records
Figure 5.6: Schematic views of a possible time point, with hypothetical gaze (round orange dot).
Numbers in parentheses are (x, y) coordinates.
head-free eyetracker allows participants to move their heads freely, many of them do (particularly
young children and particularly in a longer experimental session). Although the eyetrackers are
programmed to continually search for eye-like near-infrared reflections in a ‘tracking box’ in
the space before them (36 × 22 × 30 cm at 70 cm distance from the eyetracker and a data rate
of 60 Hz in the case of the Tobii X120, see Tobii Technology AB 2008:21), it is easy for the
participant’s head to leave this relatively small area, especially by slow drift over the course
of a longer session. Stopping the experiment every time this happens would mean losing the
advantage of unobtrusive eyetracking; letting the experiment continue means losing some data.
Secondly, the near-infrared light can be partially obstructed by eyelashes (Tobii Technology AB
2011:5) or glasses (Morimoto et al. 2000:334), and the eye/pupil detection algorithms cannot
always recover from this. Thirdly, near-infrared eyetracking seems to just not work with some
people’s eyes, for idiosyncratic reasons. On this point, I can only agree with Morgante et al.
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(2012:29): “We have no concrete explanation for these effects—in our experience, we simply
cannot get much data from some participants”. These three problems together make for a ‘lossy’
data collection method, with data for only part of the session for almost all participants. Mulak
et al. (2013:2072) achieved an average yield of 72.5% with 15- and 19-month-old participants.
Even with cooperative and motivated adults in studies as short as two minutes, Morgante et al.
(2012) got data for more than 80% of those two minutes from only about half of their participants.
In the present study, there was no (0 data points in the experimental period) or effectively no
(less than 60 data points, which at 60 Hz would be 1 second) gaze data from eight of the 62
participants (four four-year-olds, three eight-year-olds, and one adult).
5.2.3 Correcting systematic errors in eye gaze data
While setting up the eyetracker above the screen and inverted is recommended practice for studies
using touchscreen devices with the Tobii X120, it means that some participants’ eyes will not be
recognized at all, and that eye detection will be very spotty for some others (Tobii Technology
AB 2011:5). This can be reduced somewhat by calibrating the eyetracker carefully at the start
of an experimental session and asking the participant to try and maintain the calibrated position,
as well as having the option to re-calibrate at several points during the session. Even so, the
raw eyetracking data gathered in this study often appeared to have a consistent and obvious
per-participant error that was easily corrected. This section explains why these errors were
obvious and how they were corrected.59
Although their gaze was not constrained, it is reasonable to expect that participants would look
at pictures more than at the black background behind them; and although the pictures could
(and indeed had to) be moved, it is reasonable to expect that the time before any pictures were
moved was a significant portion of the total time taken in each trial. It follows from these two
assumptions that a large portion of gazes in a particular trial will fall into the regions where the
images first appeared in that trial. Since there were only two distinct layouts of pictures in the
whole experiment (three smaller pictures near the top and one larger picture near the bottom,
or the reverse; see Fig. 5.2), this means that a large portion of gaze data collected throughout
the experiment should fall into these clearly-defined regions. The grey rectangles in Fig. 5.7
schematically show these regions of the screen.
Some participants’ data bears this out fully—Fig. 5.8, for example, is a heatmap of the raw gaze
59I do not know what caused these errors, and I will not speculate here. Curiously, Morgante et al. (2012:28,
emphasis added) found that “most deviations were downward from the calibration points” in their evaluation of
a similar Tobii eyetracker, while most of the errors corrected for here were effectively upward from the expected
pattern (while this section discusses adjusting eye gaze data from apparent downward errors, remember that this was
applied after all eye gaze data was ‘flipped’ to correct for the inverted eyetracker setup described in Section 5.2.2
above).
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(a) Theme-gap blocks (b) Goal-gap blocks
Figure 5.7: Locations of pictures at beginning of trial in experiment 2
data from one participant’s session (areas shown in darker shades had more gaze data) overlaid
onto Fig. 5.7. The pattern of the picture starting positions, as based on the above assumptions,
is reflected strikingly well in this participant’s eye gaze data.
20 40 60 80count
(a) Theme-gap blocks
10 20 30 40count
(b) Goal-gap blocks
Figure 5.8: Density of gaze data from one participant, by block type
Other participants’ data had the same very apparent pattern, but offset by a constant amount:
most of the data points in Fig. 5.9a and Fig. 5.9b fall into four rectangles with the same relative
positions to each other as those in Fig. 5.7, but in a different absolute position (most of them
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even off the screen in Fig. 5.9b). It is apparent that a simple correction of subtracting a certain
value from the x-coordinate and adding another value to the y-coordinate of each gaze data
point would bring that pattern in line with the expected pattern. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to apply this correction: since the same constant value is added to all data points from this
participant, there is no overzealous and possibly dishonest maximizing of “useful” data points.
The correction values (−887.833 pixels in the x-coordinate and+202.1 pixels in the y-coordinate
in this example) were determined algorithmically by finding the peaks in the density plot for
the two coordinates separately (three peaks for x, corresponding to the left, middle, and right
pictures’ starting position; two peaks for y, corresponding to the upper and lower rows/positions)
and checking their distances. The mean value of the three or two peaks was then applied as the
correction value, and the output was checked manually.60 Note that noise in the data as well
as apparent rotation, expansion or contraction (relative to the expected pattern) is retained, as
the corrected heat map in Fig. 5.9d shows—the only thing that is removed is the fairly obvious
bias.
This correction was not necessary for all participants (see Fig. 5.8 above), and was not effective
for some others: in cases where the expected pattern was not obvious, such as Fig. 5.10, no
correction value was found or applied.
In summary, the simple per-participant correction vector was applied only to the data of
participants where the expected pattern was obvious, but offset. Furthermore, the same correction
vector was applied to all of one participant’s data, which still left many data points outside of
the expected pattern and even outside the screen area. For these two reasons, this method of
correcting for errors did not zealously over-correct data into a preconceived pattern, but only
removed some obvious errors. Correction as described in this section was applied to eye gaze
data from 38 of the 54 participants who provided more than one second of eye gaze data each
(12 four-year-olds, 12 eight-year-olds, and 14 adults).
5.2.4 Analyzing eye gaze data
Raw eye gaze data is little more than (x, y) coordinate pairs with time codes: the coordinate
pair defines the participant’s point of gaze at the time defined by the time code. Studies of
reading see this data as a path of fixations and forward or backward rapid directed eye movements
(saccades) over time. Visual world studies like the present one usually define areas of interest on
screen (typically the locations of text, images, or video) and check for each data point whether
it fell into one of those areas (and into which, if there is more than one). Instead of analysing
60Manually validating the output of this automatic process was necessary because the algorithm was quite simple
and used any set of three or two peaks it could find—even moving the data points away from the expected patterns
in some cases with very scattered data.
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50 100 150count
(a) Raw data, theme-gap blocks
20 40 60count
(b) Raw data, goal-gap blocks
50 100 150count
(c) Corrected data, theme-gap blocks
20 40 60count
(d) Corrected data, goal-gap blocks
Figure 5.9: Density of gaze data from another participant, by block type, before and after
correcting
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1 2 3 4count
(a) Theme-gap blocks
1count
(b) Goal-gap blocks
Figure 5.10: Density of gaze data from yet another participant, by block type, deemed un-
correct-able
it millisecond-by-millisecond, the data is often binned by time: for example, 50 ms-long bins
mean that all data points with time codes between 0 and 50 ms (from the start of the trial or any
other fixed time point of interest) are assigned the binned time code 1, all data points between
50 and 100 ms get the binned time code 2, and so forth. Often, all the data from all participants
in all trials of an experimental condition is combined. This is particularly beneficial if, as in
the present study, the eyetracking method used is not guaranteed to provide a continuous stream
of data for each participant: if, for example, there are 20 participants, but only 19 data points
at a given time points (due to missing data), the average of those 19 points will not be greatly
different from the average of the 20 points at the previous and following time points, meaning
the overall smooth pattern of the data is preserved.61
These steps allow for a more stable and interpretable metric, namely the percentage of gaze
points or fixations on each area of interest for a time bin. If this percentage for one area of interest
rises during a certain period of time relative to the percentages for the other areas, this suggests
that participants looked at that area more during that time, meaning that it drew more attention
and interest. Averaging works particularly well for this type of data, since the percentage for a
given area is unlikely to change immensely from one time point to the next. Other aspects of
eyetracking data are not suited for averaging: the average gaze point at a given time point is not
an interesting measure in visual world studies, where the areas of interest are often not individual
61Averaging over data from different participants or trials to mitigate the problem of missing data assumes the
time points where data is missing are random, meaning there is no systematic problem such as the eyetracker not
recording between 500 and 700 ms into a trial, for example.
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images, but rather types of images as defined by the experimental design (for example, the ‘target’
image that is named in an instruction sentence played over headphones versus a ‘distractor’
image of a different object with the same color as the ‘target’). Percentages or proportions of
gazes on an area, distances between gaze and type of area, and other data defined with reference
to the experimental design can reveal interesting patterns of gaze behavior when averaged.
As mentioned above, it is very common in these studies to find that the percentages change
only by a small amount from one bin to the immediately following bin, particularly if the bins
are small. This is not surprising: a sharp increase or drop in one area’s percentage would
mean that all participants in all trials suddenly changed their gaze behavior at the exact same
time with sub-second precision, which is highly unlikely. However, this smoothness of the
percentages over time gives rise to a major problem for statistical analysis: the percentages for
one time bin depend to a large extent on the percentages in the preceding bin(s). Therefore, it
is statistically unsound to compare the percentages within each bin in isolation. This section
presents three ways of dealing with this problem (averaging across larger time windows, growth
curve analysis, and smoothing spline analysis of variance) and compares their performance on
simulated datasets. This discussion will show that smoothing splines are both well-suited for
the analysis of eye gaze data in this study and conservative with regards to rejecting the null
hypothesis.
5.2.4.1 Time windows
The authors of many eyetracking studies choose to pool all the gaze data for a certain time
window (hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds, generally) and then perform common
statistical tests (analysis of variance, t-tests) on that averaged data. For example, Huettig and
McQueen (2007) perform t-tests for each of eight successive time windows of 100 ms each to
find significant differences between the gaze percentages for four different areas of interest, Ito
and Speer (2008) use the F-statistic (and p-values derived from it) of data in 300 ms windows,
and Mulak et al. (2013) investigate the mean fixation time averaged across a 4-second window.
At first glance, this seems like little more than binning with very long bins, with the added benefit
of using well-known and easily interpreted statistics. However, as the three examples just given
show, there is no standard value for time windows, which is troubling in light of the fact that
“different size windows can produce very different results” (Mirman et al. 2008:477)—spurious
differences can emerge as significant, or true effects be lost in the noise, simply due to a bad
arbitrary choice of window length (be that choice accidental or deliberate). The examples of
Barr (2008:458–460; see there for details and graphs) make these possibilities more clear: if, in
a study with just two areas of interest, participants looked at one of them more than the other
(for unrelated reasons) before the beginning of the time window under analysis, this preference
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would ‘spill over’ into the time window because the gaze percentages are ‘smooth’ and thus
highly unlikely to drop to the level of the other area immediately. When pooling all the gaze data
from the time window, it would appear that participants were more likely to look at that first area,
which would lead researchers to assume that this area (or its content) drew attention in the context
under investigation—when, in fact, the difference is due entirely to an unrelated preference
before the time window and the nature of eye gaze percentages. Similarly, if participants started
out preferring one area over the other but switched this preference to the other area during the
time window, the average percentages would end up at the same level, leading researchers to
conclude there is no interesting difference here when, in fact, there is.
Of course, if there are well-founded a priori reasons for a particular study to investigate only
a particular time window, it can hardly be called arbitrary. This is the case in Kurumada et al.
(2014), for example: they investigate whether the prosody of looks in sentences like It looks
like a monkey had an effect on the interpretation of those sentences (‘It merely appears to be a
monkey.’ versus ‘All signs point to it being a monkey.’). Since they manipulated the prosody
of the verb, it is reasonable to assume (as they do) that differences in gaze percentages will
manifest once the verb has been processed. Under the standard assumption that it takes about
200 ms between stimulus and eye movement response, their choice of a time window starting
200 ms after the onset of the verb in the stimulus and ending 200 ms after the onset of the
target noun is reasonable. However, this particular window is reasonable only for this particular
study—different designs mean different critical time windows. Moreover, some designs (like
this study) do not have just one critical time window of interest where a significant difference
in average gaze percentages would be interesting, but rather are interested in several changes in
gaze percentages over time. Averaging within time windows cannot possibly handle time with
enough detail for such studies, and it does not account for the continuous nature of time when
comparing several successive time windows (Barr 2008:460).
5.2.4.2 Growth curve analysis (GCA)
Mirman et al. (2008)’s growth curve analysis (GCA)62 does manage time with a high level of
detail andwith controls for its continuous correlated nature. Themethod is based onmixed-effects
regression models (see for example Barr et al. 2013), which, due to the popularity of mixed-effect
models in linguistics, makes it relatively easy for an expert linguistic audience to understand
the results of GCA. GCA models the percentage of gaze using time and the area of interest
as fixed effects (predictors) and participants as random effects (intercepts and slopes). This
allows for fine detail with regard to time and does not limit the analysis to averages in arbitrary
62This section only gives a brief overview of GCA; for a more detailed introduction as well as worked examples
in R, see Mirman et al. (2008) and Mirman (2014).
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time windows. (It would also be trivial to include other predictors—different conditions of the
same experiment, for example.) Regression modelling finds the best estimate for a predictor’s
parameter (βn), which is the amount of change in the response variable for every unit change
in that predictor. This obviously allows only for linear changes that are constant over the whole
range of predictor variables. Eye gaze percentages are often more complicated, with curved
patterns of increases followed by decreases. These patterns can be approximated by using not
bare time codes, but polynomials of the time codes (up to a given order). For example, the first-,
second-, and third-order polynomials in (5.1) by themselves describe the lines and curves in
Fig. 5.11.
(5.1) a. y1 = 20 × x
b. y2 = −200 + x + (10 × x2)
c. y3 = (−50 × x) + x2 + x3
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0
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x
y
order first second third
Figure 5.11: First-, second-, and third-order polynomials
The y-values of these polynomials can be multiplied by constants and added together. This
operation is ‘blind’, so to speak, to how the y-values were calculated. If there are no exponents
in this operation (no y31 , for example), the result is a linear combination of these y-values, even
though the y-values themselves were calculated with exponentiation. A linear combination like
this can approximate a curve with at most one peak and one curve: the dashed curve in Fig. 5.12
is described by the formula (5.2) in terms of the y-values from (5.1).
(5.2) ycurve = (−0.92 × y1) + (0.47 × y2) + (0.71 × y3))
97
−300
0
300
600
−10 −5 0 5 10
x
y
Figure 5.12: Linear combination of first- to third-order polynomials
This is fine for small values of x (10 to 10 here), where the y-values of the different polynomials
are not correlated and the shapes of the curves are very different. At large values of x, however,
the y-values are correlated and the curves look very similar: Fig. 5.13 shows the y-values for
the same polynomials as in (5.1) and Fig. 5.11 above, but for x from 50 to 100.
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Figure 5.13: The same first-, second-, and third-order polynomials for larger x
Because the curves have reasonably similar shapes in this range, a linear combination of them
cannot approximate a curve with peaks or troughs in this range. Furthermore, correlated
predictors (which would be the ultimate use for the y-values of these polynomials) are highly
problematic in regression modelling.
Orthogonal polynomials are designed to have the ‘interesting’ and useful shapes like in Fig. 5.11
over a specific range. The ‘orthogonal’ aspect of orthogonal polynomials means, briefly, that the
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polynomials of different orders are not correlated for the given range. The lines toward the left
side in Fig. 5.14 are the orthogonal polynomials up to third order for the range of −10 to 10, and
the lines toward the right are the orthogonal polynomials for the range of 50 to 100. Of course,
the polynomials for different ranges have different formulae: the ones used here were calculated
by the poly() function in R and are given in (5.3) and (5.4) (with numbers rounded to three
decimal places63, and in normalized form where appropriate). For details on how orthogonal
polynomials are calculated, see Kennedy and Gentle (1980:343–344).
(5.3) Orthogonal polynomial formulae for the range −10 to 10 (left-hand lines in Fig. 5.14)
a. y = 0.036 × x
b. y = −0.245 + (−5.920 × x) + (0.007 × x2)
c. y = (−6.830 × 10−17) + (−0.083 × x) + (7.391 × 10−19 × x2) + (0.001 × x3)
(5.4) Orthogonal polynomial formulae for the range 50 to 100 (right-hand lines of Fig. 5.14)
a. y = −0.713 + (0.010 × x)
b. y = 3.910 + (−0.108 × x) + (0.001 × x2)
c. y = −21.991 + (0.923 × x) + (−0.017 × x2) + (5.601 × 10−5 × x3)
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Figure 5.14: Orthogonal polynomials for two different ranges
In GCA, the y-values of orthogonal polynomials up to a given order are calculated from time
codes, and these orthogonalized time values, but not the bare time codes themselves, are then
entered as predictor variables into a linear model. I will refer to orthogonalized time values of
63The R commands print(poly.orth(-10:+10,3), digits=16) and print(poly.orth(50:100,3),
digits=16), using the poly.orth() function from the PolynomF package (Venables 2010), return the exact
values for these formulae.
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order n as tn in the interest of brevity: it allows the rather long function in (5.5) (where β2o1 is the
coefficient for the first-order term in the formula for the second-order orthogonalized polynomial,
so for example −5.920 in (5.3b) above) to be expressed as the less confusing (5.6). In both
formulae, a is used as a stand-in for some predictor not related to time (area of interest/image,
for example), which is of course constant over time, and  is the error term.
(5.5) percentage = β0+ (β1× (β1o0+ β1o1× t))+ (β2× (β2o0+ β2o1× t+ β2o2× t2))+ (β3×
(β3o0+ β3o1× t+ β3o2× t2+ β3o3× t3))+ (β4×a)+ (β5× (a× (β1o0+ β1o1× t)))+ (β6×
(a× (β2o0+ β2o1×t+ β2o2×t2)))+ (β7× (a× (β3o0+ β3o1×t+ β3o2×t2+ β3o3×t3)))+
(5.6) percentage = β0 + (β1 × t1) + (β2 × t2) + (β3 × t3) + (β4 × a) + (β5 × (a × t1)) +
(β6 × (a × t2)) + (β7 × (a × t3)) + 
With the best estimates for the coefficients β (which is a solved problem in mixed-effects mod-
elling) and a high enough order of polynomial, this polynomial decomposition can approximate
curves with very complex shapes. This makes it ideal for GCA, which thus can control for
time very closely and make use of the continuous nature of both time and eye gaze percentages
without suffering from the problems that collinear predictors cause. Of course, outside of the
range that a particular set of orthogonal polynomials is designed to be ‘interesting’ in, the
values are correlated and the curves are fairly similar. This means that a GCA analysis must
specify that range when computing the polynomials, and that GCAmodels cannot be generalized
outside of that range. The former is easy (in R), and the latter is not a problem since GCA
is not intended to make generalizations outside of the range. With the well-known tools of
mixed-effects modelling, GCA can include random effects for individual participants, and the
resulting model of the underlying curves can be analyzed and compared.
The following examples show how well a regression model using orthogonalized polynomial
predictor variables can model any appropriate curve shape (given a high enough order) without
overfitting. Fig. 5.15 shows two examples of simple (non-orthogonalized!) third-order polyno-
mials (grey lines), data points generated from them by adding random noise (black dots), and
the linear models (orange lines) of those data points based on orthogonal polynomials of up to
third order. It is immediately apparent how close the orange model lines get to the ‘true’ grey
lines.
The first random dataset (Fig. 5.15a) consists of 100 data points based on y = −7 + (0.01 × t),
with uniform random noise added. The coefficients of model of that data, shown in Table 5.3a,
show clearly that it did not find the second- and third-order orthogonal polynomial values (t2 and
t3) to be significant (vanishingly small coefficient estimates and p > 0.1), and indeed a model
without those terms (not shown here) is virtually identical to this one. The model fit on the
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(a) Data generated by first-order orthogonal
polynomial
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(b) Data generated by first- and third-order or-
thogonal polynomials
Figure 5.15: Third-order orthogonal polynomial-based linear models (orange lines) for data
(black dots) generated by polynomials (grey lines)
second random dataset (201 points based on −7 + (−2 × t) + (0.1 × t3), with uniform random
noise) performs equally well: Table 5.3b shows that it correctly identifies the contributions of
the first- and third-order orthogonal polynomials t1 and t3 and correctly finds the second-order
polynomial t2 to be insignificant (small coefficient estimate compared to the standard error, and
thus p > 0.1).
estimate standard error t p
intercept -6.49 0.01 -1186.10 < 0.0001
t1 2.87 0.05 52.41 < 0.0001
t2 0.03 0.05 0.60 0.55
t3 -0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.94
(a) Non-zero parameter for first-order orthogonal polynomial
estimate standard error t p
intercept 3902.04 3820.40 1.02 0.31
t1 505089.39 54163.56 9.33 < 0.0001
t2 60129.12 54163.56 1.11 0.27
t3 232423.17 54163.56 4.29 < 0.0001
(b) Non-zero parameters for first- and third-order orthogonal polynomials
Table 5.3: Coefficients of linear models based on orthogonal polynomials
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These examples show how one can model any curve shape that approximates a third-order
polynomial using the three exponential components from orthogonal third-order polynomials
instead of the simple time variable as predictors in a linear regression model. Furthermore,
the regression model correctly finds insignificant exponential components to be insignificant,
even in the presence of considerable noise. With the right random effects structure (see Barr
et al. 2013) and the right order of polynomial (see Mirman 2014), GCA, which makes use of
orthogonal polynomials, is an appropriate method for modelling and comparing smooth but
complex curves, such as eye gaze percentages.
5.2.4.3 Smoothing spline analysis of variance (SSANOVA)
This section uses the eyetrack dataset provided as part of the R package gss (Gu 2014) to
briefly introduce smoothing splines and SSANOVA.64 To make this introduction more clear,
this first paragraph describes that dataset. The dataset contains the number of gazes that fell on
each of three images for several trials and six participants, over a time window of 2.3 seconds.
The three images are a target image, an object-matching distractor (of a different color), and a
color-matching distractor (different object). As this dataset does not appear to have gaps like
those discussed in Section 5.2.2, the percentages of gazes on each image for a given time point
are easily calculated. Fig. 5.16 shows the averaged proportions for each of the three images and
the implicit ‘elsewhere’ percentage (for gazes on empty regions of the screen), averaged across
all trials and participants.
Smoothing splines are curves, not regression lines. Thus, they work best when there is only one
data point for each value of x. Time series fit this definition very naturally: for each time point,
there is only one value of the variable of interest. This variable of interest can in principle be
anything that can be operationalized and that changes over time. Some linguistic examples are
frequency values of formants (Derrick and Schultz 2013), distance between tongue and alveolar
ridge (Ardestani 2013), and pitch (Zhang et al. 2014), but proportions of eye gazes for different
images on screen can also be analyzed using smoothing splines. For example, Fig. 5.17 shows
the proportion of the color-matching distractor image in the eyetrack data (in other words,
Fig. 5.17 is just the blue line from Fig. 5.16, with a different scale on the y-axis for clarity).
It is obvious that this curve is ‘jittery’. If one assumes there is an underlying smooth pattern
or function here (caused by the gaze being attracted to this distractor image before being more
strongly attracted by another image), this means that there is some noise in the data. Nevertheless,
the overall pattern over time is immediately apparent even from this noisy data. One might be
64For a much more comprehensive and mathematically rigorous introduction to smoothing splines, see de Boor
(2001). For a comprehensive and rigorous introduction to SSANOVA, see Gu (2013). Finally, Davidson (2006)
was the paper that introduced SSANOVA to linguistics.
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Figure 5.16: Average proportions of gazes on four different regions of the screen over time (in
milliseconds)
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Figure 5.17: Average proportion of gazes on the color-matching distractor image over time (in
ms)
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interested in representing the pattern more abstractly, without the need to list every single data
point and with some reduction in noise. Smoothing splines do this by splitting the range of x
(time, here) at a number of points called ‘knots’ and finding the best-fitting polynomial curve of
no higher than a set order, usually third, for each interval between two successive knots. These
curves are constrained to result in a curve that is ‘smooth’ by requiring that a certain derivative
(often the second-order derivative) of the whole curve be continuous.
‘Continuous’ here means that no gaps are allowed: there must be a y-value for each x-value. If a
curve has gaps in it, it is not continuous. The derivative function of a curve calculates the slope
of that curve at all of its points. If a curve has gaps in it, its derivative also has gaps in it, as
the area where the gap is cannot have a slope. If a curve has kinks (abrupt transitions from one
straight line to another straight line) in it, there is no slope at the precise point of the kink: at
that point, the curve does ‘no longer’ have whatever slope it has just before that point, but it does
‘not yet’ have the slope it has just after that point. Any other choice of value for the slope at the
kink would be arbitrary. Therefore, there is no slope here. This means the derivative function
does not have a y-value for that x-value. Thinking of the derivative function as a curve itself,
this means it has a gap at that precise x-value—it is not continuous. If the derivative function
can be thought of as a curve, it too has a slope, of course. The function that calculates this slope
of the derivative is the second-order derivative (and the derivative of the ‘original’ curve is the
first-order derivative). A curve with a transition between a straight line and a parabolic curve
(described by x2) is continuous itself, and its first-order derivative is also continuous. However,
the first-order derivative has a kink in it, and so the second-order derivative (the slope of the
first-order derivative curve) is not continuous. In this way, requiring derivatives up to a certain
order to be continuous imposes requirements of gaplessness and smoothness on the ‘original’
curve, which is why this requirement is enforced on smoothing splines.
The number of knots is crucial, of course, but quite complex curve shapes can be approximated
even with a relatively low number. Fig. 5.18 shows three smoothing splines fit to the data
shown in Fig. 5.17 (and repeated here as a dotted line). The blue spline, fit with only five knots,
matches the general shape of the data curve, but is not very accurate at most time points and
makes curious fitting errors around 1000 ms. The orange spline, fit with 10 knots, is much more
accurate. The grey spline, fit with 20 knots, captures some peaks and troughs that the orange
one missed, but it does not appear to be a big improvement in accuracy.
The inherent smoothness of smoothing splines may seem like a drawback, considering how
hard this makes it for the spline to capture extreme peaks or troughs in the data. In practical
use, however, it turns out to be an advantage, as it makes spline-based methods conservative,
or less likely to overfit the data. Smoothing splines are unsuitable for data where sudden and
extreme spikes can be expected, because such spikes are obviously not smooth and thus hard to
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Figure 5.18: Average proportion of gazes on the color-matching distractor (dotted line), and
smoothing splines with five (blue line), ten (orange line) and twenty (grey line) knots
approximate with a smoothing spline. Data without such spikes, however, is easily simplified
into a smoothing spline—and, as I have argued in Section 5.2.4, eyetracking percentage data
fits that description. Their inherent smoothness makes smoothing splines less likely to model
a spike even when there does appear to be one due to missing data, which is possible in the
present study due to the lossy eyetracking method (see Section 5.2.2).
Several smoothing splines can be fit to different datasets and compared easily, and SSANOVA is
a method of making these comparisons in a rigorous way. A smoothing spline is fit for each of the
different groups in the data: one spline of gaze percentages for each image in the eyetrack data
(and in the present study), one spline of formant frequencies for each phonological environment
in Derrick and Schultz (2013), and so on. Then, the 95% confidence interval around each spline
is computed (Gu 2013:75–79). Unlike more usual ANOVAs, SSANOVA does not lend itself
to F-tests (Davidson 2006:411). Rather, the current best practice for SSANOVA appears to be
visual analysis: “A more precise technique for determining where the differences . . . lie is to
construct 95% Bayesian confidence intervals around the smoothing splines. The two curves
are significantly different where the confidence intervals are not overlapping” (Lee-Kim et al.
2013:486–487), and “white space between the . . . lines . . . represents a statistically significant
difference” (Derrick and Schultz 2013:5).65 Returning to the eyetrack example data, Fig. 5.19
shows the SSANOVA fits for that dataset as dashed lines, and the faded band around each dashed
line represents the 95% confidence interval (1.96 standard errors either way, meaning that the
errors are assumed to be normally distributed).
65For other examples of this visual analysis of SSANOVA in practical use in a variety of fields, see Ratkovic
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Figure 5.19: Average proportion of gazes (solid lines) and SSANOVA fits (dashed lines) with
95% confidence intervals (faded bands)
The SSANOVA splines fit the data very well, even showing how the percentage of gazes on
empty space drops initially but then levels off slightly at around -500 ms, for example. At the
same time, the splines are smooth and do not overfit the ‘jittery’ noise. The confidence intervals
are very narrow here because the eyetrack dataset is quite large and does not have missing
data. Nevertheless, the intervals for the two distractor images (blue and light grey bands) overlap
around -500 ms, showing how the percentages of gazes for these two images are not significantly
different at that time.
Thus, smoothing splines can model even complex curves with good accuracy but without
overfitting, even when there are missing values and noise in the data. Comparing different
splines is easy. Random grouping effects can be included in an SSANOVAmodel (Gu 2013:216).
Finally, since SSANOVA achieves complex curve shapes not through the trick of orthogonalized
polynomials, but rather by combining a succession of standard polynomial curves, it is simpler
and more elegant. In conclusion, therefore, SSANOVA is also an appropriate method for
modelling and comparing eye gaze percentages.
5.2.4.4 Comparing these methods
I have argued here that comparing mean percentages across time windows is conceptually a
misguided method of analyzing eye gaze data, and that GCA and SSANOVA seem more suited
for that task. Which of the latter two is better? There is no immediately apparent answer to
(2009), Chanethom (2011), Ardestani (2013), Stevenson et al. (2014), and Zhang et al. (2014).
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that question. It is true that GCA (like mixed-effects models generally) seems most appropriate
when there are many independent variables and one wants to test which of them are significant
predictors of the data while controlling for all others. SSANOVA, on the other hand, is designed
to model (and investigate the differences between) just a few curves—based on only one or
two grouping variables of interest. In eyetracking studies that fit broadly into the visual world
paradigm, there are generally only a few curves that are compared. While this appears to make
SSANOVA a better fit, GCA is not incapable of dealing with just a few variables just because
it is designed to handle many. To answer the question of which method is better, this section
compares the performance of GCA and SSANOVA using the eyetrack dataset and two sets of
randomly generated, simulated data.66
The eyetrack dataset has data for all timepoints from all participants in all trials, as mentioned
in Section 5.2.4.3. To see how GCA and SSANOVA perform on less ideal data, this section
will use only a subset of the dataset, consisting of six (out of 48) sessions. Fig. 5.20 shows that
this subset exhibits the same broad pattern of proportion over time, but with certain differences:
for example, gazes on the ‘empty’ region appear to increase and gazes on the color-matching
distractor image appear to decrease at around 500 ms in the subset, whereas the whole dataset
(shown in Fig. 5.16 above) does not have this peak and trough.
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Figure 5.20: Average proportions of gazes on four different regions of the screen over time (in
milliseconds) in the subset
As demonstrated in Section 5.2.4.2 above, a linear model with orthogonalized polynomials of
time as predictors (as in GCA) can approximate data with non-linear changes over time, while
66I am grateful to Dave Kleinschmidt for suggesting simulated data as a test of performance. Any errors in the
implementation of this idea are of course my own.
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still being linear and therefore allowing the use of tools developed for linear models. Fig. 5.21
shows the best fit of a GCA model with third-order polynomial terms to the subset used here.
While the parameters of a GCA model are not easy to interpret, this method allows the relatively
simple statistical method of regression modelling to be extended to non-linear data. This model
is still a linear regression model: for example, the formula in (5.7) describes the model curve of
gazes on ‘empty’ regions (orange dashed line in Fig. 5.21).
(5.7) Y = 0.626 + (−2.598 × t1) + (0.407 × t2) + (0.480 × t3) + 
This formula multiplies predictors by parameters and adds constants (the intercept 0.626 and
the error term ). It is entirely ignorant of the fact that the predictors t2 and t3 were calculated
using quadratic and cubic polynomials.
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Figure 5.21: Average proportions of gazes in the subset (solid lines) and third-order GCA model
fits (dashed lines)
Third-order polynomials are essentially limited to one peak and one trough. Therefore, this
model does fairly well on those curves that can be approximated with one peak and trough (target
and object-matching distractor), but only captures a very rough overall shape of more complex
curves (color-matching distractor and empty region). To allow for more peaks and troughs and
thus enable GCA to fit the curve shape more accurately, orthogonalized polynomial terms of
higher order are necessary.
The best-fitting GCA model using seventh-order polynomial terms is shown in Fig. 5.22, and
(5.8) is its formula for the ‘empty’ (orange) curve. This model is obviously a closer fit than
the third-order GCA above, but that comes at a cost. Firstly, this is very computationally
expensive. The somewhat arbitrary order of 7 was chosen here simply because models with
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higher orders took very long to fit on a typical desktop computer. Moreover, the model fitting
function (lmer() from the lme4 package; Bates et al. 2014) warned that it failed to converge
on the data with seventh-order polynomials, which suggests (very briefly) that the model as
specified is not appropriate for the data as it is. Secondly, the model is all but impossible to
interpret: most of its 32 parameters achieve significance (under the assumption that the t-values
of estimated parameters approximate a standard normal distribution and that parameters whose
t has an absolute value of more than 1.96 are therefore significant at α = 0.05). While this at
first glance seems to reflect the fact that the seventh-order curves are obviously better fits than
the third-order ones, there is no objective way of finding the best order for a GCA model. A
model of lower order (fifth, say) would be less likely to overfit, but that would mean dropping the
‘significant’ higher-order terms. Thirdly, the seventh-order model appears to be overfitting the
data. Consider for example the color-matching distractor and empty region gazes before -500
ms, where this model suggests that there is an initial rise in the proportion of gazes toward the
color-matching distractor (and concurrent fall in gazes on empty regions), followed by a drop
before the major rise in proportion. This pattern is not apparent in the raw data, meaning the
model is inaccurate at best and misleading at worst here. This is a known problem: terms of
higher order “are just capturing differences in the tails” (Mirman 2014; “tails” here means the
beginning and end of the time window under analysis).
(5.8) Y = 0.626 + (−2.598 × t1) + (0.407 × t2) + (0.480 × t3) + (0.472 × t4) + (0.738 × t5) +
(0.280 × t6) + (0.240 × t7) + 
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Figure 5.22: Average proportions of gazes in the subset (solid lines) and seventh-order GCA
model fits (dashed lines)
The best SSANOVA fit to the same subset manages a fairly good fit, but without overfitting:
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Fig. 5.23 shows that the SSANOVA model captures the initial minor increase in gazes on the
object-matching distractor image (around -500 ms), but without modelling a fictitious drop
shortly thereafter. At the same time, it provides smooth curves: SSANOVA correctly does not
model the color distractor and empty curves to be on the same level at around 200 ms, even
though the data suggest this. The smoothness of splines makes them unlikely to fit this extreme
peak, and comparing the SSANOVA fits in Fig. 5.23 to the full data in Fig. 5.16 shows that the
larger dataset is very well approximated by SSANOVA even based on the small subset.
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Figure 5.23: Average proportions of gazes in the subset (solid lines) and SSANOVA model fits
(dashed lines) with their confidence intervals (faded bands)
Thus, on this one realistic dataset, SSANOVA appears to perform better than GCA: it is less
computationally expensive, it is less likely to overfit, and makes finding areas of difference
between curves easier thanks to the 95% confidence intervals.
However, this may be coincidence: it is conceivable that the eyetrack dataset is singularly
well suited to SSANOVA (the dataset is provided as part of an SSANOVA package, after all).
Therefore, I tested the performance of GCA and SSANOVA on simulated data in two sets of
simulations. This allowed more robust testing, since it is easy to simulate thousands of simple
random datasets. It also allowed me to make these simulated datasets much less perfect than the
eyetrack data by introducing a large random error into the data, and thus make these simulated
datasets more like the real eyetracking data collected in the present study. (These simulations
were run in R (R Development Core Team 2011); see Appendix G for details and code.)
The starting point for each of these two sets of simulations were data-generating functions.
A basic polynomial of the form given in (5.9) was defined for each simulation by specifying
the twelve β-values (resulting in effectively a GCA-like model, to counter the possible bias
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for SSANOVA in the eyetrack dataset). The variables x1, x2, and x3 are the values of
orthogonalized polynomials of first, second, and third order for the range of a continuous integer
variable x (simulating time bins); d1 and d2 are two of the three levels of the grouping variable
(thus simulating a study with three areas of interest; note that there is no variable for the third
level because that was used as the reference level); and the variables xn × dn are the interaction
terms between the orthogonal polynomials and the two grouping variable levels (which are
necessary in order to allow for different curve shapes over time for the different levels).
(5.9) y = β0+ (β1× x1)+ (β2× x2)+ (β3× x3)+ (β4×d1)+ (β5×d2)+ (β6× (x1×d1))+ (β7×
(x1 × d2)) + (β8 × (x2 × d1)) + (β9 × (x2 × d2)) + (β10 × (x3 × d1)) + (β11 × (x3 × d2))
Each of the two sets of simulations had two of these data-generating functions, a null function
with β1 . . . β11 set to 0 and an effect function with some of those β-values different from 0.
To introduce randomness,67 grouped errors were added to simulate 20 participants: firstly, the
constant β-values were changed by adding or subtracting random values for each simulated
participant, and a random error  was added to each y-value. Both of these randomizations
were based on normal distributions with mean 0. Thus, each simulated participant had their
individual generation function, and the output of these was subject to further noise. As a result,
each dataset in these simulations had 20 distinct y-values for each combination of x (time) and
d (area)—one for each simulated participant.
Each function was run 1000 times (with the randomization being (randomly) different for
each run). GCA and SSANOVA models were then fit onto each of these datasets, and their
performance was compared. The following paragraphs describe the results of these simulations
in two sets: the first set consists of 1000 datasets based on a function with just one β being
not 0 and 1000 datasets based on the corresponding function with all β-values being 0. The
second set consists of 1000 datasets based on a more realistic and complex function with several
β-values being not 0 and 1000 datasets based on its counterpart with all β-values being 0.
In the first set of simulations, only one β in the effect model (apart from the intercept β0) was
not 0: the parameter for the interaction between the ‘response’ level of the image factor and
the second-order orthogonalized polynomial value was set to 1, thus giving a parabola-like
trajectory to the curves for the percentages of gazes at the ‘response’ and ‘other’68 images (see
Fig. 5.24b). The null model had this and all other β1 . . . β11 set to 0 (and the same intercept β0
as the effect model), thus simulating the three absolutely identical flat lines in Fig. 5.24a (where
67Since all simulation data was computer-generated, strictly speaking the errors were only pseudorandom. I do
not consider the distinction to be relevant for these simulations, and will continue to use the term ‘random’ for
simplicity’s sake.
68The ‘other’ level of the image variable received the inverse of this effect due to the way contrasts were handled
in setting up the dummy variables for that categorical variable in this simple simulation.
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the three lines have been given different line types to make it more apparent that they overlap
completely).
image other response big
(a) Null model
image other response big
(b) Effect model
Figure 5.24: Data generation functions for the first set of simulations (before being randomized
for simulated participants)
Note that this was the data before randomization. With the random errors added to parameters
and y-values, the data was much more messy, as is apparent from comparing the two simulated
datasets in Fig. 5.25 to the underlying functions in Fig. 5.24.
image other response big
(a) Null model
image other response big
(b) Effect model
Figure 5.25: Examples of datasets in the first set of simulations (averaged across simulated
participants)
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1000 datasets like this were generated, a GCA model was fitted to each simulated dataset, and
each model’s parameter estimates, their standard errors, and the t-values resulting from these
values were saved for analysis. On the assumption that the t-values approximate a standard
normal distribution (which is the assumption that underlies how the p-values for parameter
estimates are often calculated), the t-values for the parameter of interest should ideally fall
between −1.96 and 1.96 in 95% of the simulations without an effect—in the simulation, they
fall in this interval 96.4% of the time (see Fig. 5.26). The t-values for the other predictors
(which were all zero in the data-generating function) should also be in this interval 95% of the
time, and they are 95.1–97.4% of the time.69 Similarly, the t-values for this parameter should
ideally be outside of that interval in 97.5% of the simulations with an effect—and they are in
91.4% of those simulated models.70 Thus, the GCA approach to this kind of data does not have
textbook-level/nominal performance (apparently it slightly underestimates the effect and is thus
conservative), but it does get very close.
null model data effect model data
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Figure 5.26: Density plot of t-values of GCA models in the first set of simulations
SSANOVAmodels were also fitted to these 1000 simulated datasets. Since SSANOVAmodels are
analyzed bywhether the 95% confidence intervals of different splines overlap (see Section 5.2.4.3
above), this was how these models were evaluated. Fig. 5.27 shows the SSANOVA splines with
95% confidence intervals for nine null-model and nine effect-model datasets as examples.
The number of models that had non-overlapping confidence intervals for at least one time bin
was 130 for the simulations without an effect and 331 for the models with an effect—in other
words, the false positive rate was 13% and the false negative rate an astonishing 66.9% in this
simulation. The size of the differences did not differ between the true and the false positives:
some models (like #134 in Fig. 5.27a and #139 in Fig. 5.27b) had only small differences in the
time interval (sequence of bins) where they did have a difference; others (#135 in both Fig. 5.27a
69The intercept (grand mean) was far from zero in the simulated data, and consequently its t-value is outside the
same interval in all 1000 simulation models.
70The other predictors are again zero, and their t-values should again be between −1.96 and 1.96 in 95% of
models—and they are in 94.3–97.4% of the models.
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Figure 5.27: Examples of SSANOVA models in the first set of simulations
and Fig. 5.27b) showed a much larger difference. Fig. 5.28a is a density plot of the largest vertical
differences (one from each model that did have a difference), with the false positives (shown in
blue, based on null-model data) and true positives (shown in orange, based on effect-model data)
being virtually indistinguishable. This is puzzling, but the difference between the two models
#135 in Fig. 5.27 is enlightening: the false positive #135 has a difference all the way through the
simulated range of time (it looks like a constant offset rather than an interaction between image
and time), while the true positive #135 (like all the models with a difference in Fig. 5.27b) only
shows a difference for part of that range. In fact, 79 of the 130 false positives (60.8%) did show a
difference all the way through, whereas only 32 of the 331 true positives (9.6%) did. Fig. 5.28b,
a histogram of the length of these differences, makes very obvious that false positives mostly
showed their difference for all bins and that true positives mostly had a difference for only a part
of the time range.
Redefining a ‘positive’ SSANOVA finding as showing a difference between confidence intervals
and this difference not lasting for the entire time range seems warranted. This, of course, changes
the numbers: there are 51 false and 299 true positives under that definition, so 29951+299 = 85.4%
of the positives are now true ones (up from 331130+331 = 71.8% under the previous definition).
The SSANOVA approach to this type of data as a whole still appears to be overly conservative,
especially when compared to the GCA’s performance above, but it must be remembered here
that the data was generated by what is essentially a GCA model—and an unrealistically simple
one, at that. As the examples in Mirman et al. (2008), Barr (2008), and Mirman (2014) show
(and as attempts at modelling subsets of the data gathered in the present study showed), GCA
models of real data generally have either no significant parameter βn or several ones, but not
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Figure 5.28: Comparison of false and true positives in SSANOVA models in the first set of
simulations
just one. Simulations where the effect model had several significant parameters would therefore
be more realistic.
The second set of simulations was designed to meet that goal. These simulations were like the
ones in the first set, except that the underlying data-generation function for the effect model had
non-zero values for the intercept, the main effect for the third-order time polynomial values,
and three interactions between time polynomials and image levels. These were chosen from the
effects with p < .05 in a GCA model of the adult participants’ data from experiment 2 of this
thesis (the data that is presented in Section 5.3), split by whether the area contained their ultimate
response choice, one of the other two choices, or the larger image representing the explicit
object in the instruction. All parameters corresponding to effects which had p ≥ .05 in that
empirical model were set to 0 in the effect model here. Fig. 5.29b shows this underlying model.
The null-model again had all parameters except the intercept set to 0, see Fig. 5.29a. Just as in
the first set of simulations, random errors were introduced into these models to generate 2000
datasets (1000 null-effect datasets and 1000 effect datasets) . Fig. 5.29c shows the resulting gaze
percentages over time from one simulated dataset generated by the null model, and Fig. 5.29d
shows the gaze percentages for one dataset generated by the effect model. GCA and SSANOVA
models were fitted to these 2000 simulated datasets.
For each of these 2000 GCA models, the parameter estimates, their standard errors, and the
t-values resulting from these values were calculated. On the assumption that the t-values
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(c) Data based on null model
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(d) Data based on effect model
Figure 5.29: Data generation functions for the second set of simulations (top panels) and
examples of simulated datasets (bottom panels)
approximate a standard normal distribution (Mirman 2014), the t-values for all parameters71
should ideally fall between −1.96 and 1.96 in 95% of the null-model simulations. As the panels
on the left in Fig. 5.30 show, they do so 93.4% to 96.3% of the time (slightly different percentages
for the different parameters). In the effect-model simulations, the t-values for the parameters
that were not zero should ideally be outside of that interval in 97.5% of the simulations with an
effect under the same assumption—and they are in 98.4% to 100% of those simulated models
(see the panels on the right in Fig. 5.30). The other predictors in the effect model were 0,
71Since the intercept was not set to zero in the null model, its t-value should be outside the -1.96–1.96 interval
in at least 97.5% of cases—in fact, it is outside this interval in all 1000 null-model simulation models.
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and their t-values should again be between −1.96 and 1.96 in 95% of models—as they are in
94.5–96.3%. Thus, the GCA approach to this kind of data is again demonstrated to be good
enough for practical use.
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Figure 5.30: Density plot of t-values of GCA models in the second set of simulations (dotted
lines at -1.96 and 1.96)
For each SSANOVA model in this set of simulations, the confidence intervals around the
smoothing splines for all three images were calculated, and the number of bins where the
confidence interval of the ‘response’ image did not overlap with the other two (and was above
them)72 was recorded. Fig. 5.31 is a histogram of the number of models by number of bins with
such a difference.
109 of the 1000 simulations based on the null model data did have a difference like that in at
least one time bin, and might therefore be considered false positives. 57 of those showed this
difference for the entire simulated range of time, while nomodel out of the other 1000 simulations
72This may seem arbitrary, but the early peak for ‘response’ is certainly the most striking aspect of Fig. 5.24b
and therefore the one that would most likely attract the attention of researchers.
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Figure 5.31: Histogram of SSANOVA models in the second set of simulations by number of
bins with difference deemed interesting (see text for details)
(based on effect model data) showed the difference all the way through (the maximum number
of time bins with a difference was 30, out of a total of 47 (63.8%), and only one model out of
1000 exhibited this). The difference between the positives in the two different simulation runs
is made clearer in Fig. 5.32 (which is just Fig. 5.31 without the values 0 and 47): the models
in the simulations based on data with an actual underlying effect cluster around 20 bins with
difference, whereas the false positives (based on null model data) are more evenly spread.
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Figure 5.32: Histogram of SSANOVA models in the second set of simulations by number of
bins with ‘interesting’ difference, without extreme values
This neatly replicates the pattern that allowed the elimination of many ‘false positives’ in the first
set of simulations, so it seems appropriate to not consider SSANOVA models with a difference
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throughout the entire time range to be positive findings. That leaves 52 (5.2%) false positives
for SSANOVA in this second set of simulations.
143 of the 1000 SSANOVA models on effect-model data failed to show such a difference, so the
false negative rate is 14.3% and the true positive rate 85.7%.
The cosine diagnostics (following Gu 2013:98–102) were also calculated for each SSANOVA
model in this set of simulations. Briefly, if one thinks of predictors, the response, and the error
term as vectors in some n-dimensional space, a good predictor would be almost orthogonal to the
error term but collinear to the response. Taking the cosine of the angles between these vectors
operationalizes these diagnostics into simple values between 0 and 1: the cosine of the angle
between predictor and error should be close to 0, and the cosine of the angle between predictor
and response should be large (approaching 1 ideally, but Gu 2013 accepts predictors for which
this cosine is as small as 0.38). If a variable in an SSANOVA model has a large cosine to the
error term or a small cosine to the response term, it is not a good predictor of the response and
should be removed from the model.
Fig. 5.33 shows density plots of these cosine values for the second set of simulations. No major
difference between the models based on the two different data-generation functions is apparent—
the error-cosines for the ‘bin’ predictor and its interaction with the ‘image’ predictor tend to be
larger when there is an effect in the data, but even the largest of these cosine values are still small
and would not be removed in Gu (2013)’s worked examples. The cosines to the response are
far from the ideal value of 1, but they are mostly in the range of values that Gu (2013) accepts.
This suggests that the predictors are helpful even when there is no underlying effect to predict,
which is puzzling. Recall, however, that time bin and area level really were the only variables
used in generating the data as well, and that their corresponding parameters were randomized
for each simulated participant. It is therefore possible that these two predictors were actually
made significant by chance for some of the participants, and that the cosine diagnostic values
reflect this. Furthermore, consider that Gu (2013:99-102) introduces these cosine diagnostics
as a method of identifying the best few predictors in a model with many predictors and all
their interactions. Since SSANOVA does not use several orthogonalized polynomial values of
time, the SSANOVA models here have just two variables (time and area) and their interaction.
It is hard to conceptualize what would be meant by ‘the best few predictors’ out of just three.
Therefore, the cosine diagnostics are conceptually inappropriate for the analysis of eyetracking
data with just one grouping variable.
In conclusion, the SSANOVA approach to this type of data still appears to be somewhat
conservative, especially when compared to the near-textbook performance of GCA. However,
conservativity is not a bad thing in statistical tests. At 5.2%, the false positive rate of SSANOVA
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Figure 5.33: Cosine diagnostics of SSANOVA models the in second set of simulations (the
y-axes of the left and right panels are different, but this is only to show the overlapping data in
both columns)
120
is also near textbook levels. Therefore, a negative SSANOVA finding may not be a true negative,
but a positive SSANOVA finding (keeping in mind the definition of ‘positive’ as above) can be
accepted with confidence.
5.2.4.5 Summary
The discussion and evaluation in this section can be summarized in three points.
Firstly, analyzing the percentages of gazes or fixations for different areas of interest by averaging
the percentages for each area across a time window longer than, say, 100 ms is appropriate only
when there are clear a priori reasons for the length of this time window. Many eyetracking
studies that analyze their data this way do not seem to have any such reasons, which casts
doubt over their results. In the present study, no single well-defined time window appears to be
interesting a priori: participants’ eye gaze could be attracted to one of the three ‘choice’ images
more than to the other two at the start of the trial, or as soon as they hear the explicit object in
the instruction, or after syntactic processing of the entire instruction sentence has finished, for
example. Therefore, to be able to find any significant difference in gaze percentages without the
risks of seeing spurious effects or not seeing true effects, the gaze percentages in the present
study will not be analyzed by averaging across longer time windows.
Secondly, GCA and SSANOVA, while being based on quite different statistical methods, are
both appropriate tools to model percentages of gazes or fixations for different areas of interest.
It is important to choose the size of the time bins that the data are combined into well, but at bin
sizes smaller than 100 ms (half of what is generally assumed to be necessary to plan a single
eye movement saccade), different sizes are unlikely to make a difference in the results and thus
would not hide any interesting pattern in the data or make spurious patterns appear. The choice
of 50 ms in the present study might be smaller than strictly necessary, since it combines at most
3 consecutive samples of data (collected at 60 Hz) and thus might not do as much averaging
as is justified. However, too small bins will not obscure patterns in the data and are therefore
unproblematic.
Thirdly, SSANOVA appears to be more conservative than GCA, not rejecting the null hypothesis
of no difference between percentage curves when in some cases where there is one.
For these reasons, the eyetracking data collected in experiment 2 is analyzedusingSSANOVA.
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5.2.5 Regression modelling
Much of the data in this thesis will be analyzed using linear and generalized linear regression
models. This section provides a basic practical introduction to this method73 and discusses
the issues of predictor significance and overfitting, and how they were addressed in the models
presented in this thesis. For readers who are familiar with regression modelling, the following
sentences summarize the approach taken in this thesis: regressionmodelling is used as hypothesis
testing, meaning all variables that are expected to have an effect are included and no model
reduction or selection takes place. The standard normal Wald assumption is made, and variables
with p < 0.05 are deemed to be significant. Overfitting is evaluated using ten-fold cross-
validation to yield M10, the mean of the estimates of the mean of the squared prediction errors.
Random effects were not included for practical reasons.
5.2.5.1 Numeric independent variable
Regression analysis is a method of determining whether one variable in a dataset has an overall
effect on another variable. For example, a linguist might be interested in whether words that are
usedmore frequently also share other features. One possible feature might be the number of other
words that share the same morphological base: table, for example, has many morphological
‘family members’ (tablespoon, coffee table, the verb table, and so forth), while desk has far
fewer. The etymology dataset provided as part of the R package languageR (Baayen 2013)
gives this family size and the frequency (in writing) for 285 Dutch verbs. To find out whether
words with larger families are used more frequently, we can fit a linear regression model with
frequency as the dependent variable and family size as the independent variable. This model is
represented by the dashed line in Fig. 5.34 and in more detail in Table 5.4.
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 5.45 0.28 19.28 < 0.01
family size 0.78 0.08 9.43 < 0.01
Table 5.4: Coefficients of regression model for writing corpus frequency on morphological
family size
The ‘intercept’ in Table 5.4 represents this model’s fitted or predicted value for a verb with a
family of size 0 (no other words derived from the same base). The dashed line in Fig. 5.34
intercepts the vertical axis (where the variable on the horizontal axis, family size in this case,
is 0) at 5.45, which is the the estimate for the intercept in Table 5.4. The next value along the
73I will not discuss the mathematical model-fitting methods or their computational implementation here—see
Freedman 2009 or Yan and Su 2009 for the former and Baayen 2008 or Gries 2009 for the latter.
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Figure 5.34: Corpus frequency of Dutch verbs by their morphological family size (dots) and
linear regression model thereof (dashed line)
same row, 0.28, is the standard error of this estimate, which is a measure of the certainty of the
estimate. This measure can be used to calculate the likelihood of a data sample yielding the given
estimate under certain assumptions: the Wald test divides the difference between the estimate
and the expected value by the standard error of the estimate. In a typical hypothesis-testing
approach, the expected value would be the value according to the null hypothesis, often 0. This
means the Wald test statistic for this intercept estimate is simply 5.45−00.28 = 19.5, and this value
will be shown in regression model tables throughout this thesis as t or z (depending on whether
the standard error of the estimate was itself estimated, as is the case in this example, or was
based on an a priori assumption). Note that the figures in Table 5.4 were rounded to two decimal
places after all of them had been calculated. The un-rounded values for the estimate and the
standard error have more decimal places (5.4481 . . . and 0.2826 . . . ), and thus give the slightly
different Wald test statistic of 19.28 shown in the table. It is commonly assumed (and I will
assume the same here) that the values of this statistic for regression model parameter estimates
are approximately normally distributed, with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Under this
assumption, the likelihood of a Wald test statistic is given by the cumulative distribution function
of this assumed distribution: in a standard normal distribution (mean 0 and standard deviation
1), a value of 19.28 is extremely rare. The fourth and final value in the Intercept row of Table 5.4
quantifies this rarity: under the null hypothesis and ancillary assumptions described above, we
would expect the estimate of a model based on a randomly drawn dataset to be close to 0. Since
randomly drawn datasets can be expected to show some random variation, and since we have to
take into account the standard error of the estimates, we can allow for this variation and error by
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quantifying “close to 0” to mean the Wald test statistic should fall within a certain range of 0 if
the null hypothesis were true. Assuming a standard normal distribution for the Wald test statistic
is useful for this, since it allows us to use a significance level. I will go with common practice
here and use α = 0.05. This means that any estimate with a Wald test statistic that is either in
the smallest 2.5% or in the largest 2.5% of a standard normal distribution will be deemed to
be so unlikely to arise by chance if the null hypothesis were true that the null hypothesis (of
the corresponding estimate being 0) can be rejected. Some results in this thesis are reported as
significant with a p-value of 0.05. In those cases, the calculated p-value was between 0.045 and
0.05 and was rounded to the latter for clarity and consistency (as statistics are rounded to two
decimal places wherever possible in this thesis). Under the assumption of normally-distributed
Wald statistics, significant results at α = 0.05 will have z or t either less than −1.96 or more than
+1.96, and these Wald statistics will be given with all regression models. The fourth column
in Table 5.4 gives the probability of the Wald test statistic given these term. For 19.28, this
probability is vanishingly small (less than 0.00001, though I will show such values as “< 0.01”
here in order to have consistent rounding practices). In other words, if the frequency of verbs
with family size 0 is really 0, and the corresponding Wald statistic is normally distributed, the
present dataset would be extremely unlikely to emerge.
The second row in Table 5.4 shows the same values for the effect of the family size. The model
estimates that for every increase of 1 in the family size variable, the frequency goes up by 0.78.
As discussed above, the model estimates that verbs with family size 0 have a frequency value
of 5.4574; this estimate for family size means that the model estimates verbs with family size
1 to have a frequency value of 5.45 + (1 × 0.78) = 6.23, verbs with family size 3.8 to have a
frequency value of 5.45 + (3.8 × 0.78) = 8.41, and so on. In other words, this estimate is the
slope of the dashed line in Fig. 5.34. This estimate has a standard error of 0.08, which means the
Wald test statistic for this estimate (with the null hypothesis being that family size has no effect
on frequency and that the parameter is thus 0) is 0.78−00.28 = 9.75 (again slightly different from
the table due to rounding, but the difference is immaterial here). Assuming that this statistic
is normally distributed, this value is very unlikely: p < 0.01. Therefore, given the etymology
dataset, I would reject the null hypothesis that family size and frequency are independent of each
other and argue that family size has an effect on frequency. As the estimate (0.78) is a positive
number, this effect is mathematically positive in the mathematical formulation used here: higher
family size values go together with higher frequency values (or lower family size goes together
with lower frequency).
74There are two verbs with a family size of 0 in the etymology data, namely vergen and moeten). It is apparent
from Fig. 5.34 that both of them are rather more frequent in the data than the model estimates, since the two dots
on the far left of that figure (which represent those two verbs) are far higher than the regression line. Regression
modelling as used here is a tool of hypothesis testing is not perfectly predictive, but it does show whether there is
an effect overall.
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Linear regression in effect is a way of finding the closest line to all the points in a scatterplot
like Fig. 5.34. It does not respect direction: the discussion here assumes that morphological
family size is a more basic feature of verbs and has some causal effect on how often speakers
(or rather writers) choose to use these verbs. This is an assumption outside of the regression
model: a reverse model, of family size being ‘predicted’ by frequency, would find a similar and
significant effect. The decision of how to conceptualize and interpret a model is crucial. In many
applications, however, an experimental outcome is used as the dependent variable and various
conditions of the experimental stimuli are used as independent variables. It is reasonable to
assume that the causality of effects, if the model finds any, does indeed go that way.
The etymology data also provides the ratio of the frequency in writing to the frequency in
speech for each verb. This could be useful in testing, for example, if the frequency extracted
from a written corpus is affected by the fact that it was a written and not a spoken corpus:
intuitively, some words may well be more frequent in writing than in speech, particularly in
the genres of writing that are commonly used for corpora (fracas, for example, may be more
frequent in newspaper writing than in other genres and modes). If there were such an effect, we
might reasonably expect that frequency in a written corpus and the ratio of written to spoken
frequency are not independent: if words with a higher ratio of written to spoken frequency
tend to have a higher written frequency overall, written frequency would be driven in part by
this ratio and thus by the mode or genre. A linear regression model shows that this is not
the case for the Dutch verbs in the etymology data. Although the parameter estimate for the
effect of the written/spoken frequency ratio is not 0 (but rather 0.06, which is the slope of the
dashed line in Fig. 5.35), this estimate is small relative to the (estimated) standard error of this
estimate. The Wald test statistic (with the null hypothesis being that there is no effect here) is
(0.06−0)
0.07 = 0.857 (as above, the t-value given in the table is different due to rounding; as above,
this mathematical difference makes no difference for the interpretation of the model). Assuming
a standard normal distribution centered on 0, this value is not very unlikely: its probability p is
0.41. As this is above the significance level established above, there is no evidence here that
the written/spoken frequency ratio has an effect on the written frequency. In other words, the
written corpus frequency does not overvalue verbs that are more frequent in writing than they
are in speech.
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 7.96 0.10 77.97 < 0.01
written/spoken ratio 0.06 0.07 0.82 0.41
Table 5.5: Coefficients of regression model for writing corpus frequency on ratio of writing to
speech corpus frequencies
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Figure 5.35: Frequency in writing of Dutch verbs by the ratio of written to spoken frequencies
(dots) and linear regression model thereof (dashed line)
5.2.5.2 Categorical independent variable
Regression modelling can also be used when the independent variable is not a number, but a
variable that can take one of a specific set of values (a categorical variable or ‘factor’). The
etymology data contains information regarding the inflectional paradigm for each verb. The
inflectional paradigm of a verb can be either regular or irregular, so those two options are the two
values for this factor (its ‘levels’). The frequencies of verbs may differ between the two: verbs
with irregular inflectional paradigms, for example, may be more frequent. Fig. 5.36 suggests
this, at least: the two boxes represent the distributions frequencies for verbs with regular and
irregular inflection. The thick black line inside each box shows the median frequency for the
respective group of verbs. The lower and upper ends of the boxes represent the first and third
quartiles: one quarter of the verbs with regular inflections have frequency values of less than
7.1 and thus fall below the box; one quarter of the verbs with regular inflections have frequency
values of more than 8.5 and thus fall above box; and it follows that the remaining two quarters
(or one half) have frequency values that fall inside the box. The vertical lines beyond the ends of
the boxes extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 times the difference between the first and
third quartile (the ‘interquartile range’, or the height of the box)—the end-point of the vertical
line extending from the top of each box is the largest value in the data that is less than or equal
to the third quartile value plus 1.5 times the interquartile range, and the end-point of the line
extending from the bottom is the smallest value that is equal to or larger than the first quartile
value minus 1.5 times the interquartile range. (This explains why these lines are not of equal
length in plots of this type: for example, the largest quarter of data points (above the box) may
126
be very clustered, so that the largest value is much less than 1.5 interquartile ranges above the
third quartile and the upper line ending at it it therefore very short.) Verbs with values more
extreme than than (lower than first quartile minus 1.5 times interquartile range, or higher than
third quartile plus 1.5 times interquartile range) are shown individually, as grey dots. The grey
X shows the mean value for each group; here, these are almost exactly the same as the medians.
It is thus apparent that the irregular verbs, on average, have a higher frequency than the regular
verbs. However, the difference is not enormous, and there is much variation even within each
group of verbs.
The relationship between this regularity factor and the written corpus frequency can be tested
statistically with a linear regression model. Table 5.6 shows the coefficients for this model, and
the orange75 line in Fig. 5.36 is a graphical representation of the model. It is obvious that the
orange line ends exactly in the grey X’s that show the mean values. With just one categorical
independent variable with two levels, this is precisely what linear regression does: the fitted or
predicted values of the dependent variable for either level are the mean values of the dependent
variable within that level. The parameter estimates for categorical independent variables have
a different meaning than the estimates for numerical independent variables: for example, with
the numerical independent variable of the ratio of writing/speech corpus frequencies in the
model in Table 5.5 discussed above, the intercept parameter is the fitted value for when this
independent variable is 0. A categorical variable cannot be 0 by definition—it can only take one
of a set of values (for example ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’). With binary variables (like regularity
here), a common practice is to choose one of these values as the ‘reference level’ and construct
a numerical variable based on that, which takes the value 0 for all data points that have the
reference level value and 1 for the data points that have the other level. The intercept thus becomes
the fitted value for the reference level. In the present model, the reference level is ‘regular’,
and the intercept value of 7.79 is the mean frequency value for regular verbs. For these verbs,
the constructed numerical variable is 0, and the coefficient for this variable is thus multiplied
by 0 and thus does not change the predicted value. For the non-reference level, however, the
numerical variable is 1. This means the fitted values for irregular verbs are calculated by taking
the intercept and adding the coefficient for this variable. With the present model, that means the
fitted value for all irregular verbs is 7.79+ (1×0.4) = 8.19, which is the mean of the frequencies
of all the irregular verbs.
Happily, the standard error, Wald test, and probability values work much the same way with
categorical independent variables as they did with numerical ones (discussed above): the
difference between the estimate and the expected value (if the expected value is 0, this is just the
75There is no meaning attached to the color of the line here. It was chosen merely to make the line more visible
in a figure with several other lines.
127
estimate) is divided by the standard error of the estimate, and the resulting statistic is located in a
standard normal distribution to find a probability value. If this p is less than 0.05, I assume that
the difference expressed by the variable estimate is significant, meaning the variable in question
has a significant effect. In the model of frequency by regularity, that is the case (p = 0.04):
irregular verbs are significantly more frequent than regular ones overall.
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 7.79 0.14 55.90 < 0.01
irregular 0.40 0.20 2.03 0.04
Table 5.6: Coefficients of regression model for writing corpus frequency on regularity of
inflectional paradigm
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Figure 5.36: Frequency in writing of Dutch verbs by regularity of inflectional paradigm (boxes)
and linear regression model thereof (orange line)
5.2.5.3 Multiple variables and their interactions
Crucially, regression models can take more than one independent variable. These multiple
regression models estimate a parameter for each independent variable (much in the same way as
the simple regression models discussed above) in the presence of the other independent variable.
The meaning of one independent variable’s parameter is the change in the dependent variable
that is correlated with an increase of 1 in this independent variable, keeping all others constant.
Multiple regression also allows for interaction effects, which model a change that goes together
when two independent variables change at the same time. Interactions typically mean deviations
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from the overall tendencies of either variable. For example, a model of general health might
show an interaction between quality of diet and amount of exercise: a better diet leads to better
health, more exercise leads to better health, but a better diet and more exercise at the same
time mean an even greater increase in health than the simple summation of the two individual
effects. Interactions can also reverse the trend of the individual effects: a model of election data
may show an effect of candidate age (with younger, less experienced, less known candidates
winning fewer votes) and an effect of demographics of the district (with districts with a younger,
less engaged population voting less overall), but also an interaction effect of the two: young
candidates running in ’younger’ districts may win more votes (because their platform or public
profile engage the voters more).
Continuing with examples from the etymology data, it is conceivable that the effect of family
size interacts with the effect of regularity: for example, the irregular English verb see is probably
more frequent than the regular believe, even though they have similar family sizes. A regression
model that uses these two effects side-by-side, without an interaction, would not reveal this effect.
Interaction effects allow the model to account for changes in two independent variables together
having an effect on the dependent variable. Fig. 5.37 shows the frequency of the 285 Dutch
verbs in a corpus of writing by their family size (just as in Fig. 5.34), colored by whether they
have a regular inflectional paradigm (blue dots) or an irregular one (orange dots). The regression
model using family size, regularity of inflection, and their interaction as predictors for frequency
is summarized in Table 5.7. The first three rows of that table can be interpreted much as above:
the intercept now is the fitted frequency value for when all variables are 0 or at their reference
level. This means that this model predicts a frequency value of 6.1 for regular verbs with no
other words derived from the same base. The effects for irregular inflection and family size by
themselves (middle rows of Table 5.7) can be added to this to calculate the predicted values for
the cases where only one of those variables changes: adding the effect of irregular inflection
(−1.61) to the intercept value gives 4.49 as the predicted value for an irregular verb with family
size 0; adding the effect of family size (multiplied by the family size) gives the predicted value
for a regular verb with that family size, like 6.1 + (3 × 0.53) = 7.69 for a verb with family size
3. The standard error, Wald test statistic, and p values in Table 5.7 are calculated as above; with
0.05 as the significance level for p, all effects are significant.
When both variables change from the intercept/baseline, however, the interaction effect (“irreg-
ular : family size”, the bottom row of Table 5.7) comes into play as well: we add both effects
and the interaction effect to the intercept value. The model thus predicts that an irregular verb
with family size 3 has a frequency value of 6.1 + (−1.61) + (3 × 0.53) + (3 × 0.58) = 7.82.
As both the main effect parameter for family size and the interaction parameter are multiplied
by the same value (a verb’s family size), they can be summed for simplicity into 1.11. This
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is how much the frequency value is changed by a change of 1 in the family size if the verb is
irregular—in other words, the slope of the regression line for irregular verbs. The interaction
effect does not affect the prediction for regular verbs, so the change and slope there are simply
the parameter for family size, 0.53. The two lines in Fig. 5.37 show the model fits for regular
(blue line) and irregular (orange line) verbs. It is apparent from these values and slopes that the
model suggests the effect of family size on frequency is stronger for irregular verbs than it is for
regular verbs.
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 6.10 0.36 17.14 < 0.01
irregular inflection -1.61 0.57 -2.85 < 0.01
family size 0.53 0.11 5.05 < 0.01
irregular : family size 0.58 0.17 3.49 < 0.01
Table 5.7: Coefficients of regression model for writing corpus frequency on regularity of
inflectional paradigm and family size
This concludes the illustration of regression modelling in this section. In practice, models with
many more independent variables can be fit to test which (if any) of them have a significant
effect on the dependent variable in the presence of all the others. This is the approach I will take
in this thesis: all (independent) variables that are present in the data and that I have a reason to
expect to have an effect on the dependent variable in question will be included in a given model
to test whether they do have an effect. In other words, no model reduction or selection will occur.
The p-values of their parameter estimates under the normality assumption for the Wald statistic
will be used as the indicator for whether an independent variable has a significant effect on that
dependent variable.
5.2.5.4 Cross-validation
Regression models with more independent variables can often approximate the dependent
variable in the data more closely than models with fewer independent variables. This, however,
is a blessing and a curse: the closest fit to a given set of data is the one that describes each
data point exactly. In practical applications, this phenomenon (called ‘overfitting’) is generally
undesirable because the data is assumed to be noisy—to contain some variation that is not due
to the independent variables in question, but rather to chance. For example, consider school or
university test grades: intuitively, grades in a test can be modelled as being largely determined by
time spent studying for that test, previous test performance, and general intelligence. However,
an intelligent A student who spent weeks in the library may on occasion do poorly on a given test
because they did not sleep well the night before or the on-campus café was out of their favorite
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Figure 5.37: Frequency in writing of Dutch verbs by regularity of inflectional paradigm and
family size (dots) and regression models thereof (lines)
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energy drink. It would be next to impossible to collect all this data, and its effects may not be of
interest. Fitting this data point exactly would mean spuriously assuming this noise is also caused
by the independent variables, which means their effects may be wildly mis-estimated: an overfit
model of this test data could suggest that general intelligence has no effect, or even a negative
effect, on test performance.
The method I will use here to check whether a model does fit the noise inherent in the data too
closely is ten-fold cross-validation. The dataset used to fit a model is randomly split into ten
distinct, non-overlapping sub-sets (‘folds’) of as close to equal size as possible. For each fold,
the model parameters are re-estimated using just the nine other folds, and the model with those
re-estimated parameters then makes predictions for all of the data points in the one remaining
fold. As the parameters were estimated without those data points, it cannot be overfitted to
them. For each data point, the difference between the prediction and the actual data point value
is calculated and squared. The mean of all these squared errors is calculated for each fold,
and the mean of the ten resulting means of squared errors is used as a measure of overfitting
for the model as a whole. If the model was severely overfitted, the parameter estimates will
vary greatly between the original model and at least some of the re-estimations. Therefore, at
least some of the re-estimated parameters will fit the data in the one fold that the respective
re-estimation process did not use less closely than the original model does. In other words,
the mean of the ten cross-validation mean squared errors will be large relative to the original
model’s mean squared error (the mean of the squared differences between that model’s predicted
values and the data values). If the original model was not overfitted much, on the other hand,
the parameters will change little between each re-estimations. The predictions on the un-used
fold will not be much worse than the fitted values of the model were as a whole, and the mean
of the cross-validation mean squared errors will not be much larger than the mean squared error
of the original model.
As the data is split into ten folds randomly, it is good practice to repeat this cross-validation
process with different random splits.76 Each repetition’s mean of mean squared errors will be
slightly different, of course, but the mean of all these means of mean squared errors remains
a good estimate of overfitting. As ‘mean of ten-fold cross-validation means of mean squared
errors’ is an unwieldy phrase, I will report this value as xM10, with the number of repetitions
of the ten-fold error processes in the place of x. MSE will be used to mean a (full) model’s
mean squared error.77 For example, the model of frequency in writing by morphological family
76I use the number 2332 as the initial random seed for each cross-validation process here.
77For models predicting a numeric dependent variable (reaction time, for example), the mean squared error and
xM10 are calculated from the actual and fitted values of that numeric variable. For generalized models, which
predict categorical variables by transforming them into a binary (0 or 1) variable, the fitted values are probabilities
of the outcome coded as 1.
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size, regularity of inflection, and their interaction (Table 5.7 and Fig. 5.37) has MSE = 2.02
and 50M10 = 2.10. The mean of squared errors in cross-validation is not much larger than the
mean of squared errors in the model, which confirms the impression in Fig. 5.37 that this model
does not suffer from overfitting.
5.2.5.5 A word on mixed-effects modelling
This section so far has described fixed-effects regression modelling. However, mixed-effects
models (Bates et al. 2014) are increasing in popularity. They ‘mix’ fixed effects with random
effects: variables that are not of interest can also affect the dependent variable as well as how
the variables of interest (the fixed effects) affect the dependent variable. In linguistics, it is
reasonable to assume that a dependent variable (word frequency, for example) depends not only
on certain fixed effects (regularity of the inflectional paradigm, for example), but also in part on
the particular speaker or word. Some speakers may use many more words (types), which would
lower the frequency of any one word. A corpus based in part on cooking recipes would probably
slightly overrepresent the frequency of roux and underrepresent dog. Finally, the fixed effects
may differ for different speakers or words (some speakers may be more sensitive to the regularity
of the inflectional paradigm, or their data may suggest this by random chance). These effects
are assumed to follow a random distribution—some speakers will show lower word frequencies,
but others will show higher ones. Mixed-effects models allow researchers to control for these
random effects and not be misled by random patterns in the data.
Using mixed-effects modelling properly, however, can be computationally expensive (Barr et al.
2013, Bates et al. to appear), and there are practical problems. I fit mixed-effects models to some
of the data in this thesis, and in many cases these models did not converge, meaning the fitting
algorithm did not arrive at final estimates for the parameters. The parameter estimates that were
reported were very similar to those in the corresponding fixed-effects models. Convergence
was attained by sequentially excluding effects (both fixed and random), but the converging
model formulae were very impoverished (often modelling just two or three of the effects of
interest) and thus unable to answer the research questions of this thesis. I am not confident in
drawing conclusions from non-converged mixed-effects models. Therefore, this thesis reports
the fixed-effects models only to make it as obvious as possible to the reader that random effects
were not (successfully) modelled.
5.2.6 The multiple comparisons problem
This section briefly discusses the statistical problem of multiple comparisons and introduces the
Holm-Bonferroni correction that is used in this thesis to address that problem.
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Many statistical test are tests of data against a null hypothesis: if there was no actual effect, how
likely is it that we would have collected this dataset? Two entirely uncorrelated variables may
appear to be correlated in a particular sample dataset by random chance. The strengths of these
spurious correlations (or other effect strengths) are assumed to form a certain distribution, often
the standard normal distribution around 0—in other words, datasets that show weak spurious
effects are more likely than datasets with strong spurious effects. Thus, a strong effect is more
likely to be due to an actual underlying effect than to random chance. The effect size is a
useful metric in determining the likelihood that a particular finding is true. Some weaker effects
are also true, however, and statistical tests can be used to operationalize the likelihood that a
particular effect is spurious (or, conversely, that it is a true effect). This is one interpretation of
p-values: if the null hypothesis (no effect) was true, how likely would a set of data showing this
particular effect be? A result that issufficiently unlikely given the null hypothesis is deemed to
be significant evidence for the alternative hypothesis. 5% (= 0.05) is the commonly used value
for the significance level (α): if a particular test results in a p-value less than 0.05, the data being
tested are deemed to show significant evidence against the null hypothesis. Linear regression
modelling as discussed in Section 5.2.5.1 above follows these same principles: larger parameter
estimates directly lead to smaller (‘more significant’) p-values.
This understanding of statistical testing rests on the assumption that there is one randomly
collected data sample and one hypothesis (effect) to be tested against it: given one effect strength,
how common is this effect strength in the random distribution of effect strengths centered around
0? If it is rather uncommon (unlikely) there, we can assume with some certainty that we did
not get it from that distribution, and that the null hypothesis is therefore false. However, many
(if not most) researchers test more than one hypothesis at a time. This means that they ‘draw’
several effect strengths at the same time, which increases the likelihood of finding one that is
less than 5% likely to appear by chance. If I think of a number between 1 and 100 (inclusive)
and give you one chance to guess it, you are unlikely to guess right by chance, and a correct
guess will be surprising (p = 0.01). If I give you ten guesses, your chances at a correct guess
are much larger (p = 0.1, assuming you never guess the same number twice). While there are
some relevant differences between this example and hypothesis testing, the principle is the same:
more guesses/hypotheses increases the chance of a correct/significant result.
Statistical tests therefore need to account for the number of hypotheses tested simultaneously.
Austin et al. (2006) illustrate this problem with a large dataset of hospital diagnoses in Canada:
they compared the birth dates of patients with the 223 most common diagnoses using Fisher’s
exact test. 72 of these diagnoses were ‘significantly’ more frequent for one astrological sign than
for the other eleven under a naive significance threshold of α = 0.05 for each test—for example,
Canadians born between 23 August and 22 September (under the sign of Virgo) were more likely
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than other zodiac signs to experience excessive vomiting in pregnancy (p = 0.04), and those born
between 19 February and 20 March (Pisces) were more likely to suffer heart failure (p < 0.01).
Of course, these ‘significantly’ higher risks are entirely “spurious”, in the words of the title of
Austin et al. (2006)’s article. They highlight that appropriate corrections show these associations
between astrological signs and certain diagnoses to be statistically insignificant.
Having shown why it is necessary to correct for multiple hypotheses (or comparisons) above,78
the rest of this section will describe how it can be done. One simple way is to divide the desired
significance level α (often 0.05) by the number of comparisons m and take the result as the
new significance level that p-values need to be lower than in order to be deemed significant.
Austin et al. (2006) tested 223 diagnoses for differences between astrological signs, meaning they
performed m = 223 comparisons. The Bonferroni-corrected significance level for their study
is 0.05223 ≈ 0.0002. All p-values reported in Austin et al. (2006:966) are larger than that, which
(rightly) suggests all the associations between diagnoses and astrological signs are insignificant
and only appear in the data due to chance.
The Bonferroni correction (αcorrected = αm ) has been criticized for being too restrictive: if
all hypotheses are compared against the same corrected significance level, then only very
strong effects will be deemed significant and weaker true effects will falsely be deemed to be
insignificant. Moreover, it is intuitively inconsistent, in that effects that appear to be the same
can be deemed significant or insignificant depending on apparently unrelated factors. Imagine
two researchers shared a dataset, but tested it independently. The first researcher investigates
ten hypotheses. Nine of them are obviously not confirmed (all p > 0.1), but one of them looks
promising with p = 0.0046137. The Bonferroni correction provides αcorrected = 0.0510 = 0.005,
meaning this one strong effect is deemed to be significant. The other researcher investigates
the same ten hypotheses, but is also interested in confirming a well-established effect with this
data and therefore adds an eleventh hypothesis. This eleventh hypothesis is confirmed with
p = 0.000001, and the other ten obviously receive the same p-values as they did with the first
researcher. However, because this second researcher tested m = 11 hypothesis, their αcorrected
is 0.0511 = 0.0045. The additional eleventh hypothesis is still deemed significant, of course. The
other strong hypothesis (with p = 0.0046137) is now insignificant, even though it was significant
for the first researcher using the same data and the same tests.
Holm (1979) offers a simple procedure that is based on the Bonferroni correction and is just
as powerful, but less restrictive and less inconsistent. All p-values are calculated and ordered
78Gelman et al. (2012) argue that the multiple comparisons problem can be ignored in social science, where the
null hypothesis of no true underlying correlation is supposedly “less likely” (Gelman et al. 2012:209). However,
this thesis does not test previously established effects, but is aimed at determining whether or not the effects of
interest really exist. I do not see how this assumption that the null hypothesis is irrelevant can be maintained when
pursuing this more exploratory aim and will therefore correct for multiple comparisons where necessary.
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from smallest to largest. For the smallest p-value, the normal Bonferroni correction is applied:
the null hypothesis is rejected for this effect if and only if p < αm . If this is the case, the
procedure moves on to the next smallest p-value and crucially reduces m by 1—the ‘strongest’
hypothesis has been confirmed already, so it should not affect this and future calculations. Thus,
the second-smallest p-value is compared against α2 = αm−1 . If it is smaller than this threshold,
the procedure moves on to the third-smallest p-value and checks whether it is smaller than
α2 =
α
m−2 , and so forth. As soon as one p-value is larger than the threshold (and thus deemed to
be insignificant), the procedure stops and deems this and all larger p-values to be insignificant.
Holm (1979) provides more details. Applying this Holm-Bonferroni procedure to the above
example with two researchers sharing the same dataset, the second researcher would test their
smallest p-value (0.000001) against α1 = 0.0511 = 0.0045, find it significant, move on to the
second-smallest p-value (0.0046137), test it against α2 = 0.0511−1 = 0.005, find it significant, and
so forth. Crucially, the first researcher would test p = 0.0046137 against α1 = 0.0510 = 0.005—in
other words, both researchers would arrive at the same result.
This Holm-Bonferroni method is not without its shortcomings either (Chen 2014:160–166
discusses them and also describes other methods), but its computational simplicity and statistical
usefulness make it a reasonable choice.
For ease of presentation, a set of p-values can be adjusted by simply multiplying each p-value
with the denominator of the corresponding αi (where i is the number of the p-value in the set
under consideration, counting from smallest to largest, and m is the number of comparisons
being made, meaning the number of p-values in that set):
(5.10) αi = αm−(i+1)
(5.11) padjusted = p × (m − (i + 1))
In the above example, this yields 0.000001×11 = 0.000011 and0.0046137×(11−1) = 0.046137.
These adjusted p-values can then be judged against any desired significance level α without
further correction. In this example, both of these adjusted p-values are significant atα = 0.05, but
only the first one is significant at a stricter α = 0.01. In this thesis, I will report p-values adjusted
by this Holm-Bonferroni method where appropriate and provide the number of comparisons
m.
5.3 Results
In this second experiment, participants were presentedwith sets of images and stimulus sentences
with one object masked by noise. They implicitly made a choice out of three of the images
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for that noise-masked object. This section analyzes the time taken to make these choices as
well as the choices themselves. This is followed by analyses of participants’ touchscreen input,
their gaze behavior, and finally the correlation between simultaneous touchscreen input and
gazes.
5.3.1 Reaction times
For the results of this experiment, I define reaction time as the time between the end of the
instruction sentence (from which point images could be moved by dragging) and the point
at which a theme image was dragged into the rectangle surrounding a recipient image. This
reaction time differed significantly between age groups, as the boxplots in Fig. 5.38 show. A
linear regression model79 was fit to this data to determine the effects of age group, the trial
number in sequence,80 and the interaction between these two terms on this reaction time measure.
The coefficients of this model are given in Table 5.8. Four-year-olds served as the reference age
group, and 0 as the intercept value for trial number in sequence. The significant effect with a
negative parameter for the adult age group shows that, compared to four-year-olds, adults reacted
significantly quicker (had a lower reaction time value). The main effect of the trial number
in sequence is not significant, meaning that the reference group (four-year-olds) did not get
significantly quicker (or slower) over the course of the experiment. The interaction between the
adult age group and the trial number in sequence has a negative parameter (−0.01), but with a
p-value of 0.1, it does not reach significance as defined in Section 5.2.5—the adult participant
group got slightly quicker over the course of the experiment, but not significantly so. The main
effect associated with the eight-year-old age group and the interaction between this group and the
trial number in sequence have to be considered together: the positive and significant effect for the
eight-year-olds suggests that, at the intercept level for trial number (which is 0), eight-year-olds
are significantly slower than four-year-olds. The data for the first trial in sequence do not support
this: four-year-olds’ mean reaction time on trial 1 is 7.26 seconds, and eight-year-olds’ mean
reaction time is 7.06 seconds. This main effect makes more sense when the interaction with trial
number is also taken into account: this interaction is negative (−0.03) and significant (p < 0.01).
This means that the model shows that eight-year-olds did get significantly quicker over the course
of the experiment. Regression is vulnerable to overestimating such effects near the ends of the
range of one variable (“in the tails”): in capturing the overall downward trend, the values at the
start of this experiment (at the intercept level, which is where the main effects for age group are
79Mixed-effects regression with random effects of participant was deemed unsuitable for the present study in
general because of the small number of participants per age group.
80As the sequence of trials within each block was randomized for each participant, different participants saw
different trials as their first, second, . . . trials. By “trial number in sequence”, I mean this ordinal number rather
than any unique trial (meaning ‘picture combination’) identifier.
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estimated) are estimated slightly too high. In the present case, this leads to a significant main
effect for the eight-year-old age group. The boxplots of these reaction times in Fig. 5.38 make it
obvious that four- and eight-year-olds’ reaction times do not differ significantly overall, and that
the four-year-olds’ reaction times show the most variation.
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Figure 5.38: Reaction times by age group (lower and upper ends of boxes indicate first and third
quartiles, vertical lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 interquartile ranges of these
quartiles, grey dots are more extreme values; note that 14 reaction times greater than 30 s are
not shown)
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 6.57 0.24 27.23 < 0.01
trial number in sequence < 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.83
eight-year-old group 1.02 0.34 2.99 < 0.01
adult group -1.21 0.33 -3.63 < 0.01
eight-year-olds : trial number -0.03 0.01 -3.48 < 0.01
adults : trial number -0.01 0.01 -1.65 0.10
Table 5.8: Coefficients of regression model for reaction time (variables in bold are deemed to
have significant effects; MSE = 18.1, 100M10 = 18.2)
5.3.2 Choices
In each trial in this experiment, participants made a ‘choice’: when the noise in the recorded
instruction sentence was in the place of the theme object (as in Now give the to the dogs or
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Now give the dogs the ), they picked one out of three options for theme objects and dragged
it to the recipient (which was explicit in the instruction). When the noise was in the place of the
recipient (Now give the the keys or Now give the keys to the ), participants dragged
the explicit theme to one of the three options for recipients. Each of these options matched the
explicit object in exactly one of the three features of interest (length in syllable number, binary
a priori animacy, and grammatical number), but did not match it in the other two features—in
other words, there was one matching choice and two mis-matching choices for each of the three
features. This section presents participants’ choices by these features.
four eight adult
p = 0.89
p = 0.22
p < 0.01
p < 0.01
p < 0.01
p < 0.01
33.3
66.7
monosyllabic bisyllabic monosyllabic bisyllabic monosyllabic bisyllabic
length of explicit object
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
choice monosyllabic bisyllabic
Figure 5.39: Percentage of choices by their length (split by length of the explicit object and by
age group), with p-values of χ2 tests (Holm-Bonferroni-corrected)
Fig. 5.39 compares the percentages of monosyllabic and bisyllabic choices from trials with
monosyllabic explicit objects to the same percentages from trials with bisyllabic explicit objects,
for each of the three age groups. If the choice was not affected by length—if, in other words, it
is random with respect to length—we would expect the proportion of monosyllabic to bisyllabic
choices being made to be roughly the same as the proportion of monosyllabic to bisyllabic
options being available to choose from. Since there were two bisyllabic options when the explicit
object was monosyllabic, and two monosyllabic options when the explicit was bisyllabic, these
random percentages would be 66.7% length-mismatching choices and 33.3% length-matching
choices. The grey lines with each bar show these expected levels (or, in graphical terms, where
the dividing line between the orange and blue segments should be if the random expectation
was true). The p-values given inside the bars in Fig. 5.39 result from testing the respective
bars against this expectation (using Pearson’s χ2 goodness-of-fit test on the response counts,
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and applying Holm’s sequential Bonferroni procedure for m = 6 comparisons to the resulting
p-values in order to avoid falsely rejecting the null assumption in multiple comparisons, as
described in Section 5.2.6; the same test and correction were also used for the p-values in
Figs. 5.40 and 5.41). The four-year-olds’ choices do not differ significantly from these expected
values (p = 0.89 and 0.22). The eight-year-olds’ and adults’ choices, on the other hand, do:
eight-year-olds and adults prefer bisyllabic options when presented with a monosyllabic explicit
object and monosyllabic options when presented with a bisyllabic explicit object significantly
more than expected by chance (all p < 0.01). There were no further differences in this regard
between trials with the gap in place of the theme and trials with the gap in place of the recipient
in the instruction sentence.
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Figure 5.40: Percentage of choices by their animacy (split by animacy of the explicit object and
by age group), with p-values of χ2 tests (Holm-Bonferroni-corrected)
Four-year-olds also were apparently not guided by animacy in their choices, as the two leftmost
bars in Fig. 5.40 show.81 Eight-year-olds were more likely than chance to pick one of the two
inanimate options when the explicit object was animate (p < 0.01), but apparently did not have
a preference for animates or inanimates when the explicit object was inanimate (p = 0.29). For
adults, the reverse is true: when the explicit object was inanimate, adults chose significantly
more inanimate options than expected by chance (p < 0.01), but with animate explicit objects,
81Analyzing the data in this manner requires a categorical split in the animacy variable. A numerical measure
derived from the results of experiment 1 (Section 4.2) would therefore be impracticable here. Most categorical
splits that could be derived from the same results would simply replicate the a priori split between animals and
inanimate objects, as is apparent from Fig. 4.1 (page 69). Therefore, that a priori categorical split is used here.
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there was no significant preference. This apparent preference for inanimates is different from the
other significant deviations from random chance discussed so far: the latter can all be subsumed
under feature-mismatching (bisyllabic choices for monosyllabic explicits, and so on), whereas
this preference for inanimates is apparent only when the explicit object is also inanimate. In
other words, adults apparently tend towards feature-matching choices in that case.
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Figure 5.41: Percentage of choices by their grammatical number (split by number of the explicit
object and by age group), with p-values of χ2 tests (Holm-Bonferroni-corrected)
Feature-matching is also apparent in the percentages of singular and plural choices made by
eight-year-olds and adults (all significant at p < 0.01), shown in Fig. 5.41. The effect is
particularly striking in the choices made by the eight-year-old age group: even though each trial
offered two mismatching options and only one matching one, eight-year-olds chose this one
option that matched the number of the explicit object in 54% of trials. The choices made by
four-year-olds again do not differ significantly from random chance here.
If the choices in this experiment reflect speakers’ preferences or expectations regarding the dative
alternation, and if those preferences are (or can be described as) preferred orderings of features,
then the features of participants’ choices in this experiment should change depending not only
on the feature of the explicit object (which it does, as shown above), but also depending on the
position of the gap in the instruction sentence. This gap is in the place of either the first or the
second of the two objects in linear order, meaning either before or after the other, explicit object.
Since a choice implicitly fills this gap, differences in the features of this choice across different
positions reveal possible ordering preferences.
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Figure 5.42: Percentage of choices by their grammatical number, split by number of the explicit
object, by age group, and by position of gap in instruction sentence
Fig. 5.42 shows the proportions of choices by their number, divided three different ways. This
is the same data as shown in Fig. 5.41, but with an additional split between the trials where the
gap replaced the first object in the instruction sentence (Now give the to the dogs or Now
give the the keys, shown in the top row of Fig. 5.42) and the trials where the gap replaced
the second object in the instruction sentence (Now give the dogs the or Now give the keys
to the , shown in the bottom row of Fig. 5.42). To make the figure easier to read, the grey
lines again show the level that would be expected by chance, even though the above has shown
significant deviations from this. If the ordering of objects does have an effect on the grammatical
number, there should be a significant difference between a vertical pair of bars: for example, it
appears that four-year-old participants were more likely to choose the one plural option in trials
with plural explicit when the explicit object preceded the gap in the instruction sentence (second
bar in the bottom row of Fig. 5.42) than when the explicit object followed the gap (second bar
in the top row). A two-sample χ2 test for equality of proportions shows this difference to be
significant (p < 0.01 after Holm-Bonferroni correction form = 6 comparisons). Eight-year-olds
chose more plurals overall, as discussed above, but this preference was significantly stronger
in plural-explicit trials with the explicit object preceding the gap in the instruction (fourth bar
from the left, bottom row) than in plural-explicit trials with the explicit object following the gap
(fourth bar, top row; p < 0.01). The other four vertical pairs of bars do not differ significantly,
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and there are no significant differences in the length or animacy of the choices between trials
with the explicit object preceding the gap and trials with the explicit object following the gap
(all corrected p > 0.05).
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Figure 5.43: Percentage of choices by their grammatical number, split by number of the explicit
object, by age group, and by function of gap/choice
Independent of the position of the gap was its function: in half of the trials, the gap replaced the
recipient of the give in the instruction sentence (Now give the the keys orNow give the keys
to the ); in the other half, the gap replaced the theme (Now give the to the dogs or
Now give the dogs the ). In Fig. 5.43, the choices by number have been divided according
to this function: the top row of bars shows the choices in the recipient-gap trials, and the bottom
row shows the choices in the theme-gap trials. As above, two-sample χ2 tests for equality of
proportions were computed for each vertical pair of bars; here, this test investigates whether any
age group differed in its choices depending on the function that that choice ostensibly performed
in the instruction sentence. Only for the eight-year-old age group and singular explicit objects
does that test show a significant difference (p = 0.02 after Holm-Bonferroni correction form = 6
comparisons)—in other words, eight-year-olds were more likely to choose a plural when the
gap in the instruction sentence replaced the theme than when it replaced the recipient. The
difference between the two types of trials is not significant when the explicit object is plural,
and neither is either difference for four-year-olds and adults (all corrected p > 0.05).
When analyzing these choices with respect to animacy, the only significant differences are with
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Figure 5.44: Percentage of choices by their animacy, split by animacy of the explicit object, by
age group, and by function of gap/choice
adults: Fig. 5.44 shows that adults chose more inanimates as themes (the two rightmost bars
in the bottom row) than as recipients (two rightmost bars, top row) regardless of whether the
explicit was inanimate or animate, and two-sample χ2 tests show both of these differences to be
significant (corrected p < 0.01 and p = 0.02, respectively). The differences for the children’s
age groups appear small in Fig. 5.44 and insignificant in two-sample χ2 tests (all corrected
p > 0.1).
By design, the features of each option were not independent: the one option that matched
the grammatical number of the explicit object always mis-matched its animacy and length, for
example (see Section 5.1.2 for details). There were three different options, which (with this
controlled manipulation of features) should allow feature-based preferences to surface. However,
the explicit object manifested its values of the three features of interest all at the same time,
and an analysis of the choices by each feature of the explicit separately (as done above) will
therefore be limited in what it can reveal. For a less limited analysis, three generalized linear
models were fit to the data, one for each feature of the choice. Each model approximated
had one of the features of participants’ choices (length, animacy, or number) as its dependent
variable. This is reasonable if the dependent variables are not strongly associated with each
other, which these three are not: Yule’s coefficient of association is between −0.1 and 0.1 for
each pairwise association, meaning the three features of participants’ actual choices are almost
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perfectly independent of each other. The dative construction used in the instruction sentence
and the function of the gap in the instruction sentence (which the choice ostensibly filled) were
included as independent variables. Bresnan et al. (2007) argue that the dative alternation can be
viewed as an ordering phenomenon depending on certain features of the two objects, and that
there are feature-specific ordering preferences which are independent from each other (short
before long independent from animate before inanimate, and so on). Therefore, the interaction
between age group, relative position of the gap (first or second of the two objects), and the
explicit object’s value for the feature of the response that a model was estimating (length of the
explicit object in the length model, animacy of the explicit object in the animacy model, number
of the explicit object in the number model) were also included. The other two features of the
explicit object (animacy82 and number in the length model, and so on) were also included as
main effects.83
Table 5.9 gives the coefficients of the length model. Here, monosyllabic choices are the reference
or 0-level, and bisyllabic choices the alternative level (coded as 1). Variables with positive
parameter estimates thus make the (numeric) result of the model formula calculation larger,
pushing the model prediction towards bisyllabic choices. Likewise, variables with negative
parameter estimates favor monosyllabic choices. Of the significant effects (at p < 0.05), that
of the length of the explicit object and its interactions with age group is the most striking:
monosyllabic choices were much more likely when the explicit object was bisyllabic, and even
more so among eight-year-olds84 and adults than among four-year-olds. As there were two
monosyllabic options and one bisyllabic one in trials with bisyllabic explicit objects, this is not
82For the sake of consistency, a priori animacy was used as the categorical independent variable in all three
models. Equivalent models with a numeric independent variable derived from the results of experiment 1 (see
Section 4.2) instead of this categorical variable were also fit (with all other variables being the same). This numeric
independent animacy variable was derived from the group-wise percentages of “yes” answers in experiment 1,
with the percentage of answers to “Could this one move towards you?” weighted double because the answers to
that questions were split more cleanly. (For example, 75% of four-year-old participants said that the crab could
move towards them, and 25% said that it could play with them (see Fig. 4.1 on page 69). The group-wise numeric
animacy value for crab for the four-year-old group was thus (0.75×2)+(0.25×1)3 ≈ 0.58. The adult group gave markedly
different answers for crab: 100% said it could move, and 36% said it could play, giving (1.00×2)+(0.36×1)3 ≈ 0.79
as the adults’ group-wise numeric animacy value for crab.) The models with this numeric animacy value as an
independent variable did not differ in interesting ways from the models with categorical a priori animacy as an
independent variable: all effects that were significant in one model were also significant in the corresponding other
one (and worked in the same direction), and no effect that was insignificant in one was significant in the other. In
the interest of clarity, only the models with a priori animacy are reported here.
83For readers familiar with regression modelling in R, the linear model formula for the length
model was choice.length ∼ (explicit.length * gap.position * group) + explicit.animacy +
explicit.number + construction + gap.function.
84Note that the p-value of the bisyllabic:eight-year-old interaction is between 0.045 and 0.05 and was therefore
rounded to 0.05. The z-value of −2.00 is outside the non-significant range of −1.96 to 1.96, which shows the
significance of this effect more clearly. The z of the main effect associated with eight-year-olds, on the other hand,
is just inside this range, meaning that that main effect is not deemed to be significant here even though its rounded
p-value is also 0.05 (the more specific value being somewhere between 0.05 and 0.055 and thus larger than 0.05).
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surprising. The significant and positive main effect associated with the adult age group means
that adults prefer bisyllabic options in trials with monosyllabic explicit objects (the reference
level for the length effect in this model) and, conversely, monosyllabic options in trials with
bisyllabic explicit objects. This was apparent in Fig. 5.39 and is confirmed by an entirely
different method here. The effect of number in this model is unexpected: everything else being
equal, bisyllabic choices were more likely when the explicit object was plural than when it
was singular. When the gap (and thus the choice, implicitly) was the theme of the instruction
sentence, monosyllabic choices were preferred. The most interesting interaction, that between
the length of the explicit and the relative position of the choice, is significant only in interaction
with the age group: above the other effects, eight-year-olds preferred monosyllabic choices when
the instruction sentence had the gap after a bisyllabic explicit object. Four-year-olds and adults
do not show this ordering effect, however.85
variable parameter estimate standard error z p
(Intercept) 0.65 0.14 4.70 < 0.01
bisyllabic explicit object -1.63 0.17 -9.44 < 0.01
animate explicit object -0.13 0.08 -1.71 0.09
plural explicit object 0.22 0.08 2.88 < 0.01
eight-year-olds 0.33 0.17 1.95 0.05
adults 0.86 0.18 4.79 < 0.01
gap after explicit 0.18 0.17 1.08 0.28
gap was theme -0.17 0.08 -2.28 0.02
prepositional construction -0.03 0.08 -0.45 0.65
bisyllabic explicit : gap after explicit 0.21 0.24 0.88 0.38
bisyllabic explicit : eight-year-olds -0.50 0.25 -2.00 0.05
bisyllabic explicit : adults -1.15 0.26 -4.50 < 0.01
gap after explicit : eight-year-olds 0.22 0.25 0.89 0.37
gap after explicit : adults 0.08 0.26 0.29 0.77
bisyllabic explicit : gap after explicit : eight-year-olds -0.99 0.36 -2.72 0.01
bisyllabic explicit : gap after explicit : adults -0.61 0.37 -1.67 0.10
Table 5.9: Coefficients for the model of the length of choices (positive parameters indicate
effects favoring bisyllabic choices, variables in bold are deemed to have significant effects;
MSE = 0.178, 100M10 = 0.180)
The coefficients of the model for the animacy86 of the choice are shown in Table 5.10 (note that
85It might be argued that the preposition to introduces a syllable to the length of the recipient object in the
prepositional sentences and thus could confound the true length effect. However, the interaction between length
and ordering is not significant in a model (not shown here) based on only the data from trials with a double-object
instruction sentence either.
86While it would be possible to use a numeric measure of animacy based on the results from experiment 1 as the
dependent variable (fitting a linear regression model instead of a generalized one), I see no way of deriving a useful
measure: averaged or weighted percentages of “yes” or “no” responses across all participants would go against the
fundamental assumptions that the age groups differ from each other. Using by-group percentages would avoid this
problem, but it would make the model rather more difficult to interpret: if, for example, a particular option had a
lower animacy score for eight-year-olds and adults, a lower parameter estimate for the interaction of one feature
with eight-year-olds may still mean an equally strong effect, or it may not. Finally, a by-participant measure would
mean introducing individual participant effects via the back door, under the guise of this dependent variable that
could be different for each participant. As mentioned above, most categorical splits that could be derived from the
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this model was not pruned, for reasons laid out in Section 5.2.5.3). The effect of the animacy of
the explicit object here has the same cause as the effect of explicit length in the length model
above: since there were two inanimate options in all trials with an animate explicit object, it is
not surprising that animate explicits go together with inanimate choices. Likewise, it is apparent
from Fig. 5.40 that adults on the whole chose more inanimates, and that eight-year-olds chose
significantly more inanimates when the explicit was animate, so the significant main effect
of adults and the significant interaction for eight-year-olds and animate explicit objects here
again serves as independent confirmation of that finding. The two remaining significant effects
are more interesting: when the gap in the instruction sentence was the theme, participants
tended to choose inanimates to fill the gap. Independent of this, when the gap in the instruction
sentence was after an animate explicit object, inanimates were also more likely to be chosen.
The theme effect is readily explained as a preference for (or prototypicality of) inanimate themes
and animate recipients with give (and other ditransitive transfer verbs). The interaction between
explicit animacy and relative position, finally, is an order effect predicted by Bresnan et al.
(2007): inanimate objects are preferred following animate ones.
Experiment 3 shows that participants of all ages prefer animate recipients and inanimate themes
with give (see Section 6.2 for details). As the prepositional construction has often been argued to
be less restrictive with regard to what verbs it can be used with and what meanings it can encode
(Oehrle 1976, Gropen et al. 1989, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2008), it is conceivable that these
animacy preferences may be stronger in trials with double-object instruction sentences. As the
double object construction has the recipient as the first object, this would mean that animate
choices are more preferred in double-object trials with the gap in place of the first object than in
other sorts of trials. If this preference was strong enough, this would result in a dataset showing
an apparent preference for animates before inanimates, even though there was none. As this
preference is exactly what the model for the animacy of the choice shows, this possibility was
investigated by splitting the dataset into two sub-sets, one with all the double-object trials and
one with all the prepositional trials, and fitting a model with the same formula (except the main
effect of construction, of course) to each of them. If the interaction between animacy and order
was significant in the double-object model only, the above account for the ordering effect in the
model for all data would be strengthened. However, the interaction is insignificant in both of the
smaller models (not shown here). Thus, there is no evidence for a stronger animacy preference
with the double object construction. The fact that the interaction that shows the ordering effect
is insignificant in both smaller models does not necessarily cast doubt on the significance of that
effect in the larger model: the smaller models were based on half the dataset each, and thus had
larger standard errors for all parameter estimates. Since the standard error is used in assessing
results of experiment 1 would simply replicate the a priori split between animals and inanimate objects. Therefore,
that a priori categorical split is used here.
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effect significance (see Section 5.2.5.1 for details), smaller datasets make z- or t-values smaller
and p-values larger. The non-significance of the ordering interaction in the smaller models does
not invalidate the significance of the same interaction in the larger model.
variable parameter estimate standard error z p
(Intercept) 0.93 0.14 6.69 < 0.01
bisyllabic explicit object -0.08 0.07 -1.09 0.28
animate explicit object -1.23 0.17 -7.42 < 0.01
plural explicit object -0.05 0.07 -0.72 0.47
eight-year-olds -0.03 0.17 -0.17 0.87
adults -0.55 0.16 -3.41 < 0.01
gap after explicit 0.17 0.17 0.98 0.33
gap was theme -0.24 0.07 -3.52 < 0.01
prepositional construction -0.07 0.07 -1.03 0.30
animate explicit : gap after explicit -0.47 0.24 -1.98 0.05
animate explicit : eight-year-olds -0.96 0.25 -3.83 < 0.01
animate explicit : adults 0.40 0.23 1.75 0.08
gap after explicit : eight-year-olds 0.19 0.24 0.77 0.44
gap after explicit : adults 0.10 0.23 0.43 0.67
animate explicit : gap after explicit : eight-year-olds -0.01 0.36 -0.02 0.98
animate explicit : gap after explicit : adults 0.18 0.33 0.57 0.57
Table 5.10: Coefficients for the model of the animacy of choices (positive parameters indicate
effects favoring animate choices, variables in bold are deemed to have significant effects;
MSE = 0.209, 100M10 = 0.211)
As with the two other models, the effect of the number of the explicit object in the model for the
number of the choices (see Table 5.11 for coefficients) is not surprising: every plural explicit
object was accompanied by two singular options and only one plural one, so the strong effect
in favor of singular choices is caused by the experimental design. The effect of length (long
explicit objects favoring singular choices) is unexpected here, but it is parallel to the number
effect in the model for the length of the choice (where plural explicits favor short choices).
Plural options were apparently also more likely to be chosen when the choice was to be the
theme (or, conversely, singulars were more likely as recipients). Four age-related interactions
were significant: both eight-year-olds and adults chose relatively more plural options when the
explicit was also plural. This effect works against the expected design effect discussed above
to produce the tendency (seen in Fig. 5.41) of eight-year-olds and adults to match the number
of the explicit in their choice. Finally, both eight-year-olds and adults chose more singulars
when the gap followed the explicit object in the instruction sentence, regardless of the number
of that explicit object. The number-sensitive ordering effect (expressed in the model as three
interactions: the two-way interaction between number of explicit and relative position of gap;
the three-way interaction between number of explicit, relative position of gap and eight-year-old
age group; and the three-way interaction between number of explicit, relative position of gap
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and adult age group) is not significant, meaning that the number of the chosen object was not
affected by the number of the explicit and its position together—all else being equal, singulars
were not more preferred after plurals, as the harmonic alignment findings in Bresnan et al. (2007)
would predict.
variable parameter estimate standard error z p
(Intercept) 0.32 0.13 2.42 0.02
bisyllabic explicit object -0.14 0.07 -2.13 0.03
animate explicit object 0.07 0.07 1.09 0.28
plural explicit object -1.37 0.17 -8.06 < 0.01
eight-year-olds -0.26 0.16 -1.60 0.11
adults 0.06 0.16 0.36 0.72
gap after explicit 0.32 0.17 1.93 0.05
gap was theme 0.19 0.07 2.98 < 0.01
prepositional construction 0.05 0.07 0.82 0.41
plural explicit : gap after explicit 0.30 0.24 1.26 0.21
plural explicit : eight-year-olds 1.23 0.23 5.29 < 0.01
plural explicit : adults 0.55 0.23 2.42 0.02
gap after explicit : eight-year-olds -0.68 0.23 -2.98 < 0.01
gap after explicit : adults -0.59 0.23 -2.62 0.01
plural explicit : gap after explicit : eight-year-olds 0.64 0.33 1.94 0.05
plural explicit : gap after explicit : adults 0.24 0.32 0.75 0.45
Table 5.11: Coefficients for model of the grammatical number of choices (positive parameters
indicate effects favoring plural choices, variables in bold are deemed to have significant effects;
MSE = 0.237, 100M10 = 0.239)
It seems a truism that speakers prefer using frequently used words over rarer words—that is,
after all, how word frequency is defined. Word frequency is known to have many other effects:
for example, frequent words are read more quickly than rarer words(Whitford and Titone 2012),
speakers are quicker to recognize frequent words as words than they recognize rarer words as
words (Keuleers et al. 2011), and frequent words are less likely than rarer words to show sound
changes (Hay et al. 2015). It is conceivable that participants in this experiment were affected by
the frequencies of the choices: since frequent words are quicker to read and recognize, speakers
may have a subconscious preference for more frequent words. To test for this, the base-10
logarithm87 of the CELEX lemma frequency of the intended nouns was computed for all images
used as options (or small images). For each trial, the mean frequency of the two options that
were not chosen was then subtracted from the frequency of the choice. A positive value for this
relative frequency measure thus means that the choice noun is more frequent than the other two
options, and a negative value means that at least one of the options not chosen is more frequent
than the choice.
87The distribution of word frequencies covers a large range, and the raw frequencies are commonly converted
into their logarithms in order to arrive at more useful, less wide-ranging measure of frequency.
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The relative frequency measure is summarized in Fig. 5.45. It is apparent that the relative
frequency values fall around to zero, which suggests that more frequent words were not chosen
more overall. Because the distribution of these values is not normal, the Kruskal-Wallis rank
sum test was used to test whether there are significant differences between the three age groups
here, and there are (p < 0.01). Specifically, pairwise Mann-Whitney tests show that the relative
frequencies of four-year-olds’ choices differ significantly from those of eight-year-olds and adults
(both p < 0.01 after Holm-Bonferroni correction for m = 3 comparisons). Eight-year-olds
and adults do not differ significantly (p > 0.1). This frequency measure therefore reveals that
eight-year-olds and adults showed a slight preference for more frequent words here, and that
four-year-olds did not. This is intriguing in light of previous findings that also suggest word
frequency effects grow stronger with age: in word-recognition tasks, older children show a larger
difference between high- and low-frequency words than younger children do (Pearson and Studt
1975); in reading, older adults show a larger difference between high-and low-frequency words
than adolescents and younger adults do (Rayner et al. 2006). The present finding is in line with
this literature.
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Figure 5.45: CELEX lemma frequency of choice relative to CELEX lemma frequency of other
options, by age group (lower and upper ends of boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical
lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 interquartile ranges of these quartiles)
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5.3.3 Touch input
Participants dragged images on the touchscreen in this experiment. These input patterns of
sequences of touch points (sampled at 60 Hz), or ‘paths’, were recorded. For each of these paths,
the length of the path (as the sum of the Euclidean distances between each pair of consecutive
touchscreen input points, recorded at 60 Hz) and the Euclidean straight-line distance between its
start and end points were measured. These were then used to calculate the sinuosity of each path,
which is the path length divided by the Euclidean distance between start and end (Stølum 1996).
Sinuosity can be understood as a proportion: a path with sinuosity 1.5 is 1.5 times as long as
the Euclidean distance between its start and end points. As a path between two points cannot
be shorter than the distance between the two points, sinuosity cannot be less than 1. Paths with
sinuosity close to 1 are almost perfectly straight, and larger sinuosity values mean more curved
or ‘roundabout’ paths. Fig. 5.46 presents these differences in bins of 0.5 each. It is apparent that
the vast majority of dragging paths (90.7%) have a sinuosity value between 1 and 1.5, regardless
of age group. This means that participants overwhelmingly produced very straight dragging
paths, although participants in the four-year-old age group seem to have shown slightly more
variation.
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Figure 5.46: Sinuosity of drag paths by age groups
The same age group difference is also apparent in the duration of each drag path, shown in
Fig. 5.47 (141 paths (3.2%) lasted longer than 5 seconds and are not shown in this plot for
reasons of clarity). Most dragging paths were completed very quickly: 3407 paths (76.3%) were
completed in less than 1 second each.
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Figure 5.47: Durations of drag paths by age groups (cut off at 5 s; lower and upper ends of
boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5
interquartile ranges of these quartiles, grey dots are more extreme values)
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Figure 5.48: Durations of drag paths as a proportion of total trial time, by age groups (cut off at
5 s)
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Four-year-olds were slower to complete trials and took longer to drag images overall. The
proportion of the total trial time spent dragging may therefore be a better measure of dragging
speed than the raw drag path duration. While drag path duration and trial time are correlated
across age groups (ρ = 0.47, p < 0.001), there are differences between the age groups: the
proportion of each trial spent dragging was higher for the four-year-old group, as Fig. 5.48 shows.
On average, four-year-olds spent 10.1% of each trial dragging images, eight-year-olds took 6.2%,
and adults 3.8%.
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Figure 5.49: Durations of drag paths, by age groups and participant answers to “Could this one
move towards you?” (cut off at 5 s)
The durations of drag paths were minutely different depending on whether the participant doing
the dragging had answered “yes” or “no” to the question “Could this one move towards you?”
in experiment 1 (see Section 4.2): if a participant answered “yes” for an image, they dragged
that image and its plural counterpart slightly slower. This is represented by the orange boxes in
Fig. 5.49, which are slightly higher than their blue counterparts (which show the durations of
dragging paths for images that could not move according to the individual participant). A linear
regression model (see Table 5.12) shows that this difference is not significant for any age group,
however. More sinuous paths took longer, for obvious reasons, and eight-year-olds and adults
were significantly quicker than four-year-olds.
As described in Section 5.1.2, participants had to touch each of the three smaller (‘choice’)
images before the trial progressed to the interactive stage. 21 participants (12 adults, 4 eight-
year-olds, and 5 four-year-olds) touched first the left, then the middle, and finally the right image
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variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) -0.16 0.06 -2.70 0.01
eight-year-old age group -0.58 0.09 -6.37 < 0.01
adult age group -1.40 0.28 -4.97 < 0.01
sinuosity 1.30 0.02 54.64 < 0.01
“yes” answer to move question -0.06 0.07 -0.85 0.39
eight-year-olds : sinuosity 0.14 0.05 2.92 < 0.01
adults : sinuosity 0.55 0.26 2.09 0.04
eight-year-olds : “yes” answer -0.13 0.10 -1.34 0.18
adults : “yes” answer 0.12 0.09 1.25 0.21
Table 5.12: Coefficients for regression model of dragging path duration (variables in bold are
deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 1.58, 100M10 = 1.55)
on 60 or more trials. One adult and one eight-year-old had the reverse pattern (right-to-left) in 60
or more trials. Among the 19 remaining participants (who had no consistent pattern throughout
the entire experiment), there was still a strong preference for the left-to-right order (used in
57.1% of their trials). These patterns indicate that participants completed this part of the task
very routinely and without problems. It is reasonable to assume that the left-to-right order is
the most common one due to it also being the reading direction in English, particularly since it
was preferred more strongly by adults (who can be assumed to be expert readers) than by young
children. Possible effects of handedness cannot be investigated here since handedness was not
recorded.
5.3.4 Eye gaze
The eye gaze data was analyzed using smoothing spline analysis of variance (SSANOVA).
This statistical method is described in detail in Section 5.2.4; briefly, SSANOVA fits smooth
curves with confidence intervals to the curves described by data, allowing for random effects (of
participant, here). Where the confidence intervals of two SSANOVA curves do not overlap, a
significant difference between the two curves can be assumed. As there is a random component
to SSANOVA model fits,88 false positives can occur. Using simulated datasets, I have argued
in Section 5.2.4.4 that SSANOVA curves whose confidence intervals never overlap throughout
the entire time period under analysis are to be treated with caution, and that curves with non-
overlapping confidence intervals for only part of the time period are more likely to be true
positive findings of significant differences.
In this section, I present plots of several SSANOVA models and discuss them. All models
88All SSANOVA models presented here were fit with the same random seed, namely 2332.
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are based on gaze data that was processed as described in Section 5.2.3. As the three smaller
images differed in the features of interest, the smaller images were divided by these features (into
animates and inanimates, for example), and gaze percentages were calculated for each. Since the
most important linguistic stimulus in this touchscreen/eyetracking experiment was the instruction
sentence (Now give the to the dog.), the eye gaze data time stamps were normalized to the
start of the instruction sentence for these SSANOVA models. Due to limitations of the Python
script used in the experiment, eye gaze data was not reliably recorded for about half a second
from the start of the instruction sentence. To rule out possible effects of unreliable or missing
data in this time period, only data from after 0.7 seconds after the start of the instruction sentence
was included in the analysis. It seems likely that gaze behavior during passive looking and gaze
behavior during interaction (touchscreen dragging, in this case) would be different: Mrotek and
Soechting (2007) found that participants who were asked to follow a moving stimulus with their
eyes exhibit different saccade behavior than participants who were asked to intercept the same
moving stimulus with their hand, and Bieg et al. (2010) found that the distance between the
gaze location and a mouse cursor differs in different tasks. Even the mere presence of their
hand in their visual field changes participants’ gaze patterns (Thura et al. 2008). To rule out
this possible confound, the start of participant touchscreen dragging input is the end of the time
window for the SSANOVA models presented here. The SSANOVA model curves for this dataset
are relatively level more than 3 seconds after the start of the instruction sentence, mostly due to
sparseness of data. Therefore, data from that less interesting period is not shown here.
The first SSANOVA model was fit to data divided by whether the gazes were on the small image
that the participant would eventually choose as their response this trial, one of the other two
smaller images, or the larger image (explicitly named in the instruction sentence). The faded
and more jagged lines in Fig. 5.50 represent the data for this split, averaged across participants.
The smooth lines represent the respective SSANOVA models, and the ribbons surrounding them
show the 95% confidence intervals of the models. This shows very clearly the conservativeness
advantage of SSANOVA: the peak in four-year-olds’ gazes on the response image (faded orange
line) just after 1 second from the start of the instruction, for example, is visually impressive, but
the corresponding model does not fit it very closely. The peak in adults’ gazes on the response
image just before 1 second, on the other hand, is better supported across trials and participants,
and thus the SSANOVA curve (orange line with ribbon) approximates it. As the orange ribbon
does not overlap either of the other two ribbons in this time period, this peak can be assumed
to be significant. In other words, around 1 second after the start of the instruction sentence
(which is during the instruction sentence still), adults are already much more likely to gaze at
the image they will choose as their response than at either of the other two options (which are
combined into the blue line). Four- and eight-year-olds do not exhibit the same pattern in their
gaze behavior to a significant degree—in fact, the percentage of gazes on the response does
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Figure 5.50: Percentages of gaze on images split by response (faded jagged lines) and SSANOVA
models with confidence intervals (smooth lines with ribbons)
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not appear to be significantly different from the percentage of gazes on the other two options
throughout the entire time window. If there was no preference for any of the three smaller images,
we would expect that the percentage of gazes on the response would be significantly lower than
the percentage of gazes on the other two, since there are two of them. The fact that there is no
significant difference either way in the children’s gaze data is thus significant in itself: contrary
to what we would expect if there was no preference, the response was not less likely to be gazed
at than the other two options combined. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there is a
preference for gazing at the response image; it is merely less pronounced and immediate with
the children than it is with the adults.
Each one of the three smaller images matched the larger image in exactly one of the three features
of interest—for example, a large image of three dogs would be accompanied by images of one
camel (also animate, but singular and bisyllabic), three baskets (also plural, but inanimate and
bisyllabic), and a lock (also monosyllabic, but inanimate and singular). Splitting the three smaller
images up by which feature of the larger image they matched and fitting SSANOVA models to
this data (see Fig. 5.51) reveals that adults’ gaze was significantly more likely to be directed at the
animacy-matching89 smaller image (orange curve and ribbon) than at the number-matching one
(blue curve and ribbon) in the time between 0.7 and 1 seconds after the start of the instruction.
The children’s gaze data does not exhibit a significant difference here.
Fig. 5.52 shows the data and models for the trials where the explicit object was animate, with
the smaller images divided into inanimates (blue) and animates (orange). By design, there were
two inanimate options and one animate option in these trials. Therefore, the fact that both four-
and eight-year-olds were significantly more likely to gaze at inanimates than at animates here
(the blue ribbon being higher than the orange one, and not overlapping with it) is not surprising.
Adults, however, did not show this expected significant difference (the blue and orange ribbons
overlap). This means that, in trials with an animate explicit, adults looked at the one animate
option at least as much as at the other two options combined up to about 2 seconds after the start
of the instruction sentence (which is where the ribbons diverge, at least for a fraction of a second
and by a very short distance). In the trials with inanimate explicit objects (not shown here),
all age groups looked at the two animate options significantly more than at the one inanimate
one.
When the explicit object was monosyllabic, four- and eight-year-olds looked at one of the two
bisyllabic options more than at the one monosyllabic one at around the 1-second mark, but
this (expected) preference disappears between 1 and 2 seconds after the start of the instruction
89This SSANOVA approach to analyzing eye gaze data by features of the gaze targets requires a categorical
split in the animacy variable. A numerical measure derived from the results of experiment 1 would therefore be
impracticable here, as a categorical split derived from these results would simply replicate the a priori split between
animals and inanimate objects. Therefore, that a priori categorical split is used for all SSANOVA analyses here.
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Figure 5.51: Percentages of gaze on images split by which feature of the ‘big’ image they
matched (faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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Figure 5.52: Percentages of gaze on images split by animacy in trials with animate explicit
object (faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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Figure 5.53: Percentages of gaze on images split by length in trials with monosyllabic explicit
object (faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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Figure 5.54: Percentages of gaze on images split by length in trials with bisyllabic explicit object
(faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
161
sentence (see Fig. 5.53). Adults’ gazes only show this expected difference from the 1-second
mark to about the 1.4-second mark, meaning they looked at the monosyllabic option more than
expected before and after this time period. When the explicit object was bisyllabic, however,
adults and eight-year-olds exhibit the expected pattern: they gazed significantly more at the two
monosyllabic options than at the one bisyllabic one (see Fig. 5.54). The difference becomes
insignificant for adults at around 1.5 seconds after the start of the instruction, however. More
interestingly, four-year-olds initially do not show a significant difference, suggesting they look
more at the one bisyllabic option than at either of the two monosyllabic options (though the
expected pattern emerges quickly). Taken togetherwith the data from the trials withmonosyllabic
explicit objects, this means that four-year-olds’ gazes were more likely to be on bisyllabic options
than on monosyllabic ones overall.
This apparent preference for imageswith bisyllabic namesmay be caused by novelty or processing
difficulty: if the four-year-old participants (on average) learned some of the nouns much more
recently than others, the images representing the newer nouns would likely be more interesting
to these four-year-olds. If unknown or recently acquired nouns are harder to process than
familiar nouns, participants may gaze at images of unknown or more recently acquired nouns
more. Eight-year-olds and adults, on the other hand, would not be expected to be affected by
the relative novelty or difficulty of these common words, which would explain why they do
not gaze at bisyllabic options more overall. The age of acquisition norms of Kuperman et al.
(2012) were used to investigate these possibilities.90 The mean Kuperman et al. (2012) ages of
acquisition tend to be higher for the bisyllabic words used as options in this experiment than for
the monosyllabic ones (see Fig. 5.55), but the difference is not significant (Welch’s t = 1.816,
p = 0.08).
The gaze data was also analyzed with the option nouns split by several age-of-acquisition
thresholds (3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 as convenient steps and 4.38, the median age of acquisition of the
nouns used in this experiment). Of course, these splits do not make for two evenly-sized groups
of nouns: while length was controlled such that exactly half of the options across the whole
experiment were monosyllabic and the other half bisyllabic, there were many more options with
an age of acquisition greater than 3 than there were options with an age of acquisition of 3 and
lower. Therefore, the null assumption that the confidence intervals of the SSANOVA model
curves for the two groups should overlap if there is no significant preference for gazing at one
group more than at the other does not hold for these splits.91 The resulting graphs (not shown)
90Kuperman et al. (2012)’s norms are based on Amazon Mechanical Turk users stating what age they were (or
think they were) when they understood a word. However, Kuperman et al. carefully removed unreliable responses,
and their norms correlate very well with those developed in other studies. Moreover, their list of words is much
more comprehensive than those of previous age-of-acquisition norming databases, and thus (unlike these previous
studies) has norms for all of the words used in the present study.
91The assumption of equality does not even hold for the median split, as 4.38 is the median of the nouns’
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can thus only be interpreted as showing tendencies. The curves for both groups are fairly flat
in all of them, and the gap between them shrinks as the age-of-acquisition threshold grows.
Crucially, no early peak like the ones on bisyllabic options in Figs. 5.53 and 5.54 is apparent in
any of these curves, which suggests that those peaks are not caused by novelty or processing
difficulty.
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Figure 5.55: Kuperman et al. (2012)’s age-of-acquisition norms for the nouns used in experi-
ment 2, by noun length (lower and upper ends of boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical
lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 interquartile ranges of these quartiles, grey
dots are more extreme values)
To test whether the early peak for bisyllabic nouns in four-year-olds’ gazes was carried by only a
few of the bisyllabic nouns, further SSANOVA fits were computed, each comparing the gazes
on the image for one specific bisyllabic noun (basket, for example) to the gazes on all other
bisyllabic nouns (baskets, hegehog, . . . ). Of course, the SSANOVA curves for the individual
noun will be very low, as only a small percentage of all gazes in the entire experiment are
expected to fall on the basket image specifically. If the peak was due to just one or a few specific
nouns, their individual curves would be higher than those of the other bisyllabic nouns. No such
difference is apparent in the graphs of these noun-wise SSANOVA models (not shown here),
meaning there is no evidence that a preference for gazing at one or a few specific bisyllabic
options caused the apparent bisyllabic preference in the four-year-old age group.
We see a similar initial preference for plurals in trials with singular explicit objects (data and
age-of-acquisition values, but trials were not balanced for age of acquisition—in some trials, two or even all three
options had ages of acquisition above this median value.
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Figure 5.56: Percentages of gaze on images split by grammatical number in trials with singular
explicit object (faded lines) and SSANOVAmodels with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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Figure 5.57: Percentages of gaze on images split by grammatical number in trials with plural
explicit object (faded lines) and SSANOVAmodels with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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SSANOVA models shown in Fig. 5.56) as well as in trials with plural explicit objects (Fig. 5.57),
where four-year-olds as well as eight-year-olds show either no difference or a preference for
plural images around the 1-second mark. Strikingly, adults look at the plural options much more
often than at the singular option in the singular-explicit trials around the 1-second mark, as the
bottom panel of Fig. 5.56 shows. While this fits the expected pattern (since there are two plural
options and only one singular one in each of these trials), this peak for plurals is the largest one
in all the SSANOVA models shown here. It is difficult to test whether the percentage of gazes at
the plural options conforms to the null hypothesis of being about twice as high as the percentage
of gazes at the singular option. The magnitude of the difference here strongly suggests that it is
higher, meaning that adults’ gazes were strongly attracted to plural options in the presence of a
singular explicit object.
The two plural options can be disentangled by dividing the three images by which feature
of the explicit object (‘big’ image) they matched. Since this concerns only the trials with a
singular explicit, the number-matching choice will be the singular one, and the animacy- and
length-matching choices will both be plural. Fig. 5.58 shows the data divided this way (the same
split as in Fig. 5.51, except that Fig. 5.51 included data from all trials; the lines and ribbon for
the ‘big’ image are not shown in Fig. 5.58 for reasons of clarity). The blue and light grey lines
and ribbons represent the two plural options, and there is a gap between these two ribbons and
the orange one representing the singular up to about the 1-second mark. The two ribbons for
the plural options, however, do overlap. In other words, adults looked at each of the two plural
options significantly more than at the singular option in that time, but did not prefer one of the
two plural options over the other.
Fig. 5.59 shows the SSANOVA model for gaze data from trials where the gap in the instruction
sentence replaced the theme (see Section 5.1.2 for details), with the smaller images split by their
animacy: the blue lines represent inanimate options, and the orange lines animate ones. While
each individual trial had two options of one kind and one of the other, this was balanced across
trials, meaning there were the same number of inanimate and animate options overall. The
datasets contains roughly the same number of gaze samples from trials with animate explicit
objects and from trials with inanimate explicit objects.92 Therefore, there should be no significant
difference between the numbers of gazes at animates and inanimates if there is no preference for
gazing at one of them. However, it appears that four-year-olds’ gazes are attracted significantly
more by the inanimate option or options than by the animate one(s) just before the 1-second
mark, and that adults’ gazes are attracted significantly more by the animate option(s) just after
the 1-second mark. This pattern is only apparent when the options represent possible themes;
92Specifically, gaze samples from animate-explicit trials make up 50.8% of the four-year-olds’ gaze data, 48.2%
of the eight-year-olds’ gaze data, and 48.6% of the adults’ gaze data.
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Figure 5.58: Percentages of gaze on images split by which feature of the ‘big’ image theymatched
in trials with singular explicit object (faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence
intervals (lines with ribbons)
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Figure 5.59: Percentages of gaze on images split by animacy in theme-gap blocks (faded lines)
and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
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the SSANOVA models for the goal-gap blocks (not shown here) do not suggest any differences
between gazes on inanimate and animate images for any of the age groups.
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Figure 5.60: Percentages of gaze on images split by grammatical number in theme-gap blocks
(faded lines) and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
Similarly, both four-year-olds and adults were more likely to look at images representing plurals
than at ones representing singulars around 1 second after the start of the instruction sentence
during theme-gap trials, as Fig. 5.60 shows. This preference was not found in goal-gap trials
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(plots not shown here). Eight-year-olds’ gazes, on the other hand, do not seem to be affected by
number at any point in the time window studied here.
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Figure 5.61: Percentages of gaze on images split by length in theme-gap blocks (faded lines)
and SSANOVA models with confidence intervals (lines with ribbons)
In the same theme-gap trials and at around the same time, four-year-olds’ gaze was also more
likely to fall on images representing bisyllabic nouns than on monosyllabic ones (see Fig. 5.61).
(Recall that the participants had heard audio stimuli of each of the three nouns before the
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instruction sentence.) Eight-year-olds and adults did not gaze at bisyllabic images more than at
monosyllabic ones, or vice versa.
None of these preferences reduce to a position effect: the three smaller images were randomly
assigned to the three positions dynamically, and post-hoc analyses show no significant association
between one feature and one position. Moreover, SSANOVA models (not shown here) do not
indicate significantly more gazes on one of the three positions for any age group.
5.3.5 Gaze and touch
Gaze data samples with concurrent touchscreen input samples were separated from the data
described above in order to test how closely related gaze and touch are. A pair of one gaze
and one touch sample was judged to be concurrent if they were recorded immediately after one
another. 98.2% of these pairs had the same timestamp (within one microsecond), and the largest
time difference within a pair was 14.7 milliseconds. Since even this largest difference is very
small, each of these pairs was accepted as one gaze-and-touch data point. This yielded 14174
data points from 16 four-year-olds, 14348 data points from 17 eight-year-olds, and 8376 data
points from 21 adults.
The Euclidean distance between the gaze and touch positions was calculated for each of these
data points with a gaze position on the screen (4811 data points, or 13%, had a gaze position
outside the screen boundaries). Fig. 5.62 shows density plots of these distances for each of the
three age groups (in orange, top three panels). It is immediately apparent that small distances
are very common (and measures of the distribution of distance values support this: skewness
is 1.23 and excess kurtosis is 1.73, indicating that the values are concentrated on the left). For
comparison, a dataset was simulated with two points placed (uniformly) randomly in a window
the same size as the one used in the experiment (1280 by 800 pixels). The distribution of these
random points, shown in grey in the bottom panel of Fig. 5.62, is much less biased (skewness
0.38, kurtosis −0.49). This illustrates that concurrent gaze and touch positions are very close to
each other.
To further establish this connection between gaze and touch positions, a linear regression model
of gaze position (in x and y pixel coordinates) on touch position (also in x and y pixel coordinates)
was fit to this data. It is conceivable that different age groups show differently strong connections
between gaze and touch. To control for this, age group and interactions between age group
and the two coordinates were also included in the regression model. This model (coefficients
shown in Table 5.13) indicates that each of the two coordinates of the gaze position is correlated
with the corresponding coordinate of the concurrent touch position. The interactions between
age group and coordinates suggest that the strength of this correlation differs with different age
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Figure 5.62: Density plots of the distance between concurrent gaze and touch position by age
group (orange, top three panels), and the distance between two random points in the same
window (grey, bottom panel)
groups, and since the main effect parameter is positive (0.81 in the x-coordinate sub-model)
but the interaction effect parameters are negative (−0.12 and −0.28), the suggestion is that the
correlation is weaker with eight-year-olds and weaker still with adults than it is with the reference
group, the four-year-olds. Correlation statistics support this: Spearman’s ρ for this correlation
is smaller with the adult group (0.44) than with the eight-year-olds (0.60) and the four-year-olds
(0.63).93 The significant main effects of age group means that the age groups’ gaze positions
overall were different in both coordinates. The two-dimensional density plots of gaze samples by
position in Fig. 5.63 show this very well: four-year-olds’ gazes are spread widely, while adults’
gazes are more concentrated. Surprisingly, the x-coordinate of the touch position is a significant
predictor for the y-coordinate of the gaze position. However, the estimated effect strength of the
touch x coordinate (0.13) is much smaller than that of the touch y coordinate (0.64), and that
sub-model (for the y coordinate of the gaze position) is a worse fit to the data than the other
sub-model (y-coordinate sub-model R2 = 0.06; x-coordinate sub-model R2 = 0.23).
93I am not reporting p-values for these correlations because I consider them to be irrelevant: the regression
model in Table 5.13a shows convincingly that the x-coordinates of concurrent touch and gaze are correlated; the
point of the ρ statistics here is to compare the strength of this established correlation across age groups.
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Figure 5.63: Position of gaze data samples by age group (standardized to an overall mean of 0
and an overall standard deviation of 1 for ease of comparison; darker cells contain more data
samples)
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) -36.83 2.93 -12.58 < 0.01
x coordinate of touch position 0.81 0.01 78.06 < 0.01
y coordinate of touch position -0.01 0.02 -0.55 0.58
eight-year-olds 29.64 4.11 7.21 < 0.01
adults 47.92 4.71 10.18 < 0.01
touch x coord. : eight-year-olds -0.12 0.02 -7.89 < 0.01
touch x coord. : adults -0.28 0.02 -15.16 < 0.01
touch y coord. : eight-year-olds 0.05 0.03 1.88 0.06
touch y coord. : adults 0.23 0.03 7.28 < 0.01
(a) Coefficients for x coordinate of gaze position
variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) -133.89 3.50 -38.27 < 0.01
x coordinate of touch position 0.13 0.01 10.49 < 0.01
y coordinate of touch position 0.64 0.02 29.01 < 0.01
eight-year-olds 80.80 4.91 16.44 < 0.01
adults 79.82 5.63 14.19 < 0.01
touch x coord. : eight-year-olds -0.22 0.02 -12.00 < 0.01
touch x coord. : adults -0.20 0.02 -9.38 < 0.01
touch y coord. : eight-year-olds -0.06 0.03 -1.66 0.10
touch y coord. : adults < 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.90
(b) Coefficients for y coordinate of gaze position
Table 5.13: Coefficients for the regression model of gaze position (variables in bold are deemed
to have significant effects; MSE = 73575.2, 100M10 = 73612.8)
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The distribution of the distance between concurrent gaze and touch positions, and the regression
of one on the other, show that gaze and touch were closely related or, in other words, that gaze
and touch were often focused on the same region or image. While this finding is very clear,
it is important to remember that the data supporting it are the time points for which both eye
gaze and touch screen input were recorded. Eye gaze recording was far from continuous, as
detailed above, and participants actively used the touchscreen only for a fraction of each trial,
as described in Section 5.3.3. As the experiment required participants to use the touchscreen
mostly for dragging, gaze and touch can thus only be said to be strongly correlated during that
particular action.
Look-ahead gazes, meaning gaze behavior that anticipates later interaction, have been identified
in very different tasks, such as walking (Patla and Vickers 2003), washing one’s hands (Pelz and
Canosa 2001), or replicating models using toy construction sets (Mennie et al. 2007). While the
connection between touchscreen input and eye gaze has not been studied closely, it is reasonable
to expect such look-ahead gazes in this experiment. The data show none, however: within each
age group, the cross-correlations between the x coordinates of gaze and touch is strongest at a
lag value of 0, meaning the concurrent gaze sample is a better predictor of a given touch sample
than any preceding or following touch sample overall. The same is true for the y coordinates of
gaze and touch. Thus, no ‘look-ahead’ behavior is apparent in the data for any age group. It must
be stressed, however, that this task likely included several sub-routines, each of which may well
have their own associated gaze behavior pattern. A look-ahead tendency in one of these patterns
may thus have been drowned out by the absence of a look-ahead tendency in the other patterns.
Therefore, this negative finding (that there were no look-ahead gazes in this experiment) must
be treated with great caution.
5.4 Summary
Across all age groups, the touchscreen appears to have been easy to use. There were no
complaints or other indications of problems. Dragging paths are very straight (Fig. 5.46) and
were completed quickly (Fig. 5.47 and Table 5.12), although speed increases with age. When
interacting with the touchscreen, participants tended to focus their gaze on the point of touch
input (Section 5.3.5). This tendency is stronger for younger participants. Participants’ choices
out of the three options in each trial reveal several coexisting preferences: eight-year-olds and
adults prefer to choose the option that matches the grammatical number of the explicit object
(Fig. 5.41). Adults prefer inanimate options if the explicit object is also inanimate or if the gap in
the instruction sentence was in place of the theme object (Fig. 5.44). Eight-year-olds, on the other
hand, prefer inanimate choices when the explicit object is animate (Table 5.10). There is some
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evidence that eight-year-olds also prefer monosyllabic options when the gap in the instruction
sentence followed a bisyllabic explicit object (Table 5.9). Similarly, participants in all age groups
show a preference for animate-before-inanimate ordering (Table 5.10): inanimate choices were
favored more when the gap followed an animate explicit object than when it preceded that object,
or conversely animate choices were favored when the gap preceded an inanimate explicit object
than when it followed it. The adult participants also showed strong patterns in what images they
gazed at: several seconds before making the choice, adults gazed at their eventual choice image
more than at the other two options (Fig. 5.50). They also looked more at the option that matched
the explicit object (and big image) in animacy than at the other two options, particularly during
trials with an animate explicit object (Figs. 5.51 and 5.52). When the explicit object was singular,
adults looked at the plural options more than at the singular one (Fig. 5.56). In trials where the
gap in the instruction sentence had a gap in place of the theme object, adults were more likely
to look at animate options, and four-year-olds were more likely to look at inanimate options
(Fig. 5.59). Both four-year-olds and adults also gazed at plural options more than at singular
ones in these theme-gap trials (Fig. 5.60), and four-year-olds showed a similar preference for
biysllabic options over monosyllabic ones (Fig. 5.61).
Per-participant analyses replicate the a priori animacy categorization and do not reveal any
differences in this study, except in one case—adults dragged images of animals or inanimate
objects slightly slower if they had answered “yes” to the question “Could this one move
towards you?” for that animal or inanimate object. This could be explained by a subconscious
understanding that entities capable of movement need less ‘help’ in moving, but also by a
feature of the task design: in all trials, the image being moved implicitly filled the position of
the theme in the instruction sentence. The prototypical animacy pattern for give is an animate
recipient being given an inanimate theme. Thus, motion-capable entities (being somewhat like
the prototypical animate entity) make somewhat worse themes. This misfit may be argued to
cause a slight hesitation when dragging these motion-capable entities. However, it would be
reasonable to expect a similar hesitation effect on the reaction time, and a linear model (not
shown here) shows that this effect is only significant among the four-year-old age group there. As
even this significant effect is quite small, and the hesitation apparent in adults’ dragging speed
is also minimal, there is no strong evidence for this idea that the lack of fit to the prototypical
animacy for themes made participants drag motion-capable themes slightly slower. These minor
differences in speed that were discovered incidentally without being a specific aim of this study
may thus well be a spurious finding.
Four-year-old participants dragged images more slowly than the older participants did, but
this small difference could reflect motor development: four-year-olds are undergoing not only
outwardly visible physical growth, but also neurological development (Berk 2013). This means
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that they are less able and less skilled at performing physical tasks than older children and adults
are, which explains the dragging speed difference. Note also that the speed difference was fairly
small in absolute terms: the median length of a dragging path was 264 ms among the adult age
group and 835 ms among the four-year-olds. Children are certainly slower, but they still finish
the simple dragging path in less than a second. Moreover, nothing suggests that the touchscreen
itself was difficult to use for even the youngest participants. Therefore, this speed difference
probably indicates a general developmental difference rather than a linguistic one.
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6 Experiment 3: Elicitation
The aim of the experiment presented in this chapter is to address the production aspect of first
two research questions of Chapter 3: Do speakers produce animate-before-inanimate and plural-
before-singular order? Participants are asked to reproduce sentences which systematically vary
animacy and number of the two objects as well as their order. Various aspects of their productions
are used to assess which configurations are produced, which provides insight into participants’
knowledge of ordering preferences and their interactions with selectional preferences.
6.1 Methodology
6.1.1 Participants
The participants of experiments 1 and 2 (22 adults, 20 eight-year-olds, and 20 four-year-olds)
all participated in this experiment as well.
6.1.2 Procedure
This experiment followed immediately after experiment 2 in the same session. It used drawings
with priming prompts to elicit give sentences from participants: theywere shown a sequence of 24
drawings (not randomized) and played pre-recorded sentences describing the action depicted in
each drawing (see Appendix E for these drawings and sentences). These drawings were shown on-
screen, and the participants heard the accompanying sentences over headphones.94 Participants
were asked to repeat each sentence to a stuffed toy (see Figure 6.1), and the experimenter then
advanced the presentation program (programmed and run in PsychoPy, version 1.80.00, like
experiment 2) to the next drawing and sentence.
Participants were told that this toy was an alien. This was done because they otherwise might
not have repeated some of the sentences at all, as they were too odd: the third sentence in this
experiment, for example, was (6.1).
(6.1) Mom gave the cushions Anne.
As the accompanying picture (Fig. 6.2) shows, Anne was the intended theme and the cushions
the intended recipient here. The ‘oddness’ obviously stems from the fact that animates (like
94The screen and headphones used were the same as in experiment 2. The speaker who was recorded saying these
sentences was the same female New Zealand English speaker that had been recorded for the nouns and instructions
in experiment 2.
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Figure 6.1: Stuffed toy used as ‘addressee’ in experiment 3
Figure 6.2: Drawing used to illustrate Mom gave the cushions Anne.
Anne) are prototypical recipients and inanimates (like the cushions) prototypical themes of give.
These odd sentences had to be used, however, since they are one of the possible combinations of
dative alternation construction and object animacy and the aim of this experiment was finding
the effect of order, regardless of the construction used or the role of either object.95 Models
95Another possible source of oddness in the design of the sentences in this experiment (see Appendix E) was
the repeated use of the phrase the parents. It could be argued that parents is typically used with a possessive, but
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of the dative alternation choices made by adults (see Section 2.1) appear to show a preference
for the realization that places an animate object before an inanimate one and a plural object
before a singular one. These two96 ordering principles are in conflict when one object is an
animate singular and the other an inanimate plural, as in (6.1). This sentence and others that
violate one or both of these principles were used to see which principle was easier to violate.
(6.1) has an inanimate plural object before an animate singular one, meaning it violates the
animate-before-inanimate principle, but not the plural-before-singular one. The twenty-third
sentence, Ben gave the cat the crackers, reverses these features: it has an animate singular object
before an inanimate plural one, meaning it violates the plural-before-singular principle, but not
the animate-before-inanimate one. Some sentences (like the seventh one, The cat gave [recipientthe
basket] [themethe kittens]) violate both principles. The fourth and final option, sentences that
violate neither of these principles (for example the sixteenth one, Mom gave the children to the
sofa), was also included.
Participants’ speech during this experiment was recorded, and I later transcribed these recordings.
These transcripts were then used to statistically analyze the choice of construction and the
likelihood of correct repetition based on the animacy and grammatical number of objects as well
as the construction modelled in the pre-recorded sentence. Because violation of the principles
may also make sentences more difficult to process, three measures of processing difficulty were
also considered in the analysis: response time, disfluencies, and comments or other reactions
indicating that a participant found a sentence odd or unacceptable.
This third experiment was the last one in an experiment session. Participants and parents were
given a further information or ‘debriefing’ sheet and the chance to ask questions as well as
withdraw their consent. They received their incentive (vouchers or toys, see Section 4.1.1)
and remuneration for parking fees (where applicable) together with a small card containing the
researcher’s contact details in case of further questions. Parents of child participants were also
offered small cards with a brief invitation to the experiment, to give to other parents of suitably
aged children who they knew. This concluded the experiment session.
This experiment was approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury
(reference number HEC 2013/166).
not with the. Possessives may be more difficult to process than the because they require a referent, the possessor.
Other phrases used here (like the cat or the blocks) are more common with the. To get consistent object phrases
without any differences in processing requirements, the was chosen for all phrases (except proper names) because
it is unnatural with fewer of the nouns.
96The length-based ordering principle (‘short before long’) is well supported in the literature on the dative
alternation and other optional ordering phenomena, which is why it was not investigated in this third experiment
(by systematically varying object length).
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6.1.3 Limitations
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, it is conceivable that recruiting participants through schools
could bias the sample of parents and children. The one obvious possible factor here would
be ‘openness’ in general—perhaps parents who are more likely to agree for their children to
participate in research also influence their children to be more open and talkative in general.
This, however, would only matter in a relatively unrestricted production task. The picture-based
elicitation technique used in experiment 3 is very restrictive, as it is designed to elicit a few
specific sentences; individual differences in talkativeness should matter relatively little. Only
two of the youngest participants did not cooperate during this experiment, and the rest did not
exhibit major differences in openness and talkativeness during it. Therefore, though the sample
may be biased, this bias is not expected to affect the data collected in experiment 3 either.
In sentence imitation, a strong priming effect from the prompt or target sentence cannot be
avoided. Experiment 2 minimizes these unwanted effects of priming: using the same verb
throughout the entire experiment means that lexical priming (give being preferred with one or the
other construction) was the same for all items and will thus not distort the results (Ivanova et al.
2012). Structural priming is still a possibility, of course: if the first trial was a sentence using
the double object construction, for example, this would still be in very recent memory during
the second trial and could thus make double object responses more likely during the second
trial. However, in this elicitation experiment, the items were presented in an order that alternated
between one double object and one prepositional construction (see order of presentation in
Appendix E). Therefore, any structural priming would always work in favor of the construction
not used in the current trial’s target sentence. While the target sentences alternated between the
prepositional and the double object construction, participants’ production may not always follow
this and may thus be seen to be affected by participants’ own recent constructions. However,
priming has been shown to be effective regardless of who used the priming construction (Bock
1986, Gries 2005, Bresnan et al. 2007, Shimpi et al. 2007, de Marneffe et al. 2012). I therefore
assume that the most recent prime, the elicitation prompt, will have the strongest priming
effect precisely because it was the most recent one. In this way, the problem of uncontrolled
‘self-priming’ was avoided. Thus, the effect strength and direction of structural priming are the
same for each trial, and no confounding effect on the results is to be expected (compare Jaeger
and Snider 2013:68–73).
As in experiment 2, the verb give is arguably the best choice for the target sentences in
experiment 3: actions of giving are easy to represent in drawings and are easily understood from
these pictures as giving actions. Furthermore, the very high frequency of give in child speech
as well as child-directed speech (Gropen et al. 1989, de Marneffe et al. 2012) means that other
180
transfer verbs might be replaced by give in participants’ productions anyway, just as in Stephens
(2010:134, 154). This means that give makes this elicitation experiment as easy and naturalistic
as possible while still producing the desired data.
Some of the target sentences used in this experiment are rather odd, as they contain animate
theme objects being ‘given’ to inanimate recipients (for example Mom gave the cushions Anne).
This is by design, as it allows for statistical analysis to reveal whether animacy patterns affected
how (or whether) participants reproduced these target sentences.
Children are quicker than adults to lose attention to experimental tasks. The ‘dry runs’ I did
myself when designing and programming the session consisting of experiments 1, 2, and 3 took
less than 40 minutes each, but of course child participants cannot possibly be expected to be
as quick or concentrated on these experiments. In fact, some of the youngest participants grew
bored, restless, and even uncooperative as the session went on. Experiment 1 (“Could this one
move/play?”) was expected to not bore children, and it did turn out to maintain their interest.
Experiment 2 was less simple, of course; however, it was designed with very few repetitions
(only two per possible combination of factors) and had ample pauses between the four blocks.
Therefore, it was as accommodating to young children’s attention span as was possible within
the confines of stringent research design. The pre-experiment information sheets as well as the
experimenter’s instructions also presented the experimental task as a game, and the fact that it
was done on a computer (with the perhaps unknown but certainly intuitive touchscreen as an
input device, no less) only helped this framing of the experiment. Experiment 3, finally, was
certainly not the most exciting, but as even very young children frequently engage in free and
guided story-telling (Foster-Cohen 1990:127–128), it was expected that they see it as a story and
thus not get bored. The drawings provided enough structure to elicit useful reproductions from
18 of the 20 four-year-old participants, all 20 eight-year-olds, and all 22 adults.
6.2 Results
Two participants in the four-year-old age group did not cooperate during this experiment (likely
due to fatigue, as it was the last experiment in sessions that lasted up to an hour for some
participants). Other than that, participants appeared to have no problems with the task as such.
This section presents the results of this experiment as analyzed by five measures: construction
used, accurate reproduction of the target sentence, time to begin reproduction, disfluencies, and
indications that participants found a sentence odd. The effects of age group and the objects’
animacy and number on these measures are investigated to determine whether they reveal more
specific patterns of difficulties with processing or (re-)production.
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6.2.1 Construction
One of the most basic measures of participant behavior in this experiment is the type of
construction used. Half of the target sentences used give in the double-object construction, the
other half used the prepositional construction. The participants’ productions for each trial were
manually transcribed and subsequently tagged for the construction used and various features of
the two objects. In 58 trials, the participant did not produce a sentence at all, and with a further
four, it was not possible to tell with certainty whether the participant used the prepositional or
the double-object construction (due to technical problems with the recording equipment). These
62 trials were excluded from the analysis in this section. Fig. 6.3 shows the percentages of
constructions used, split by age groups and further by the construction in the target sentence.
(The raw counts and totals differ between age groups: 18 four-year-olds, all 20 eight-year-olds,
and all 22 adults cooperated during this experiment, although some trials across age groups
were removed as described.) The difference between the double object and prepositional target
sentences is obvious, as are the differences between age groups: prepositional targets almost
always elicited prepositional productions. Adults use the double object construction for almost
all double object targets, but the children use the prepositional construction for those too, with
four-year-olds preferring it more than eight-year-olds do.
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Figure 6.3: Number of sentences by dative constructions
In 110 trials, the participant used a different construction than the target sentence, but still
produced a useable response. 102 of them had the double object construction in the target
sentence (and thus the prepositional one in the reproduction; these make up the orange segments
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singular recipient plural recipient
singular theme 16 31
plural theme 34 23
(a) Grammatical number in target sentence
animate recipient inanimate recipient
animate theme 15 61
inanimate theme 11 15
(b) Animacy in target sentence
Table 6.1: Features of the objects in the target sentence in trials with double-object target
sentences and prepositional reproductions
of the first, third, and fifth bar in Fig. 6.3). They are fairly balanced for the number of the target
objects (see Table 6.1a), but show an interesting imbalance for animacy (Table 6.1b): more
than half of these trials had an animate theme and an inanimate recipient in the target sentence
(Fisher’s exact test confirms this to be significantly different from an evenly-distributed table:
p = 0.03). In all but two of these 61 cases, the participant effectively retained the order of objects,
but inserted the preposition to and thus changed the functions of the two objects: (6.2a–6.5a)
are the four target sentences with an inanimate recipient and an animate theme in the double
object construction, and (6.2b–6.5b) show the pattern of participants’ production in 59 of these
61 trials. These four are all of the sentences with this specific combination of construction and
animacies; no other target sentence shared this combination. The 61 trials where participants
changed the sentence to the prepositional construction are distributed among the four sentences
almost perfectly evenly, and no other sentence elicited a similar amount of it. Therefore, it
appears that this change is related to this specific combination of the double object construction,
an inanimate recipient, and an animate theme—this combination is evidently harder to reproduce
accurately. 24 of the other 41 trials with a double-object target and a prepositional reproduction
(Table 6.1) also had this to-insertion, 13 saw meaning-preserving construction changes (Ben
gave the kitten to the parents for the target Ben gave the parents the kitten), and the remaining 4
had miscellaneous errors and interruptions.
(6.2) a. Mom gave the cushions Anne.
b. Mom gave the cushions to Anne.
(6.3) a. Mom gave the basket the kittens.
b. Mom gave the basket to the kittens.
(6.4) a. The parents gave the chairs the children.
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b. The parents gave the chairs to the children.
(6.5) a. The cat gave the milk the kitten.
b. The cat gave the milk to the kitten.
A generalized linear regression model was fit to the data from the remaining data to model how
the construction a participant used was affected by age group, the construction used in the target
sentence, the animacy and number of both objects the participant used in their production, and
the interaction between age group and all other variables named. Table 6.2 shows the coefficients
of this model, rounded to two digits. Variables with positive parameter estimate values favor the
prepositional construction, and conversely variables with negative parameter estimate values
favor the double object construction. (Note that this model was not pruned, for reasons laid out
in Section 5.2.5.3.)
variable parameter estimate standard error z p
(Intercept) 0.10 0.39 0.26 0.79
eight-year-old age group -3.12 0.74 -4.22 < 0.01
adult age group -80.64 3196.15 -0.03 0.98
prepositional target sentence 4.50 0.55 8.24 < 0.01
inanimate theme produced -0.27 0.33 -0.83 0.41
plural theme produced -0.25 0.32 -0.77 0.44
inanimate recipient produced -0.80 0.34 -2.36 0.02
plural recipient produced > −0.01 0.32 > −0.01 1.00
eight-year-olds : prepositional target 2.41 0.88 2.73 0.01
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme 1.88 0.65 2.91 < 0.01
eight-year-olds : plural theme 0.40 0.50 0.79 0.43
eight-year-olds : inanimate recipient 0.03 0.57 0.06 0.95
eight-year-olds : plural recipient 0.16 0.50 0.31 0.75
adults : prepositional target 79.96 2902.41 0.03 0.98
adults : inanimate theme 31.73 1566.18 0.02 0.98
adults : plural theme 31.64 1557.93 0.02 0.98
adults : inanimate recipient 16.17 873.03 0.02 0.99
adults : plural recipient 15.38 873.03 0.02 0.99
Table 6.2: Coefficients for regression model of the construction used in participants’ productions
(positive parameters indicate effects favoring the prepositional construction, variables in bold
are deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 0.056, 100M10 = 0.058)
Unsurprisingly, the construction in the target sentence had a strong effect: prepositional target
sentences elicited more prepositional responses, and conversely double-object targets elicited
mostly double-object responses. This model takes the four-year-old age group as the reference
level for age. This means that the negative effect associated with eight-year-olds shows that eight-
year-olds were significantly less likely to choose a prepositional construction than four-year-olds
were—in other words, the apparent preference for the prepositional construction is strongest for
the four-year-olds. The strikingly large negative effect associated with adults does not reach
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significance under the standard assumptions (as detailed in Section 5.2.5) because its standard
error is even larger. I suspect that this is because the produced construction is almost perfectly
determined by the target construction within the adult age group: ignoring missing data, the
target and produced construction do not match in only 4 out of 522 trials (or 0.8%). Within
both child age groups, however, there is much more variation. Against that varied baseline, the
complex regression model presented here is unable to quantify effects in the neater data from
adult participants with certainty, leading to large standard errors for the main effect of adults
(third row from the top in Table 6.2) and all interactions with it (bottom five rows). A model
with the same formula was also fit to only the four- and eight-year-olds’ data. The differences
between its coefficients (not shown here) and those in Table 6.2 are small, and there are no
differences in significance.
Inanimate recipients are significantly associated with the double object construction. As this
construction puts the recipient after the theme, this effect reflects previous corpus-based findings
of an animate-before-inanimate preference. Finally, the interactions between eight-year-olds on
the one hand and target construction or theme animacy on the other hand are significant, both
with a positive parameter estimate. The first of these interactions is apparent in Fig. 6.3: while
the eight-year-olds produced fewer prepositional constructions than the four-year-olds (relatively
speaking), they did still prefer the prepositional construction very strongly when the target
sentence was also prepositional. In other words, this positive interaction effect of eight-year-
olds and prepositional targets adjusts for the negative main effect of eight-year-olds, which by
itself models the drop in prepositional constructions when moving from the reference baseline
of four-year-olds and double-object targets to the eight-year-olds and double-object targets.
The other interaction (eight-year-olds : inanimate theme produced) is more straightforward to
interpret: for eight-year-olds, the animacy of the theme and the construction used are more
strongly correlated than for the four-year-olds. The parameter estimate is positive, meaning
the eight-year-olds apparently preferred the prepositional construction with an inanimate theme
and the double-object construction with an animate one. In part, this reflects the to-insertion
pattern discussed above, which was strongest with inanimate recipients for animate themes: the
productions with an inserted to effectively turned the inanimate recipients into inanimate themes.
23 of the 61 responses with this to-insertion were produced by eight-year-olds, which makes
them stand out against the otherwise mostly accurate reproductions by eight-year-olds. 36 of the
to-insertion responses came from four-year-olds, but they had much more varied productions,
and I assume this is why this sub-pattern does not make the corresponding effect significant for
four-year-olds in the present regression model.
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Figure 6.4: Percentages of accurate reproductions of target sentences by age group (lower and
upper ends of boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical lines extend to the most extreme
value within 1.5 interquartile ranges of these quartiles, grey dots are more extreme values)
6.2.2 Accurate reproduction
Based on the audio recordings of each trial, I noted whether the participant had accurately
reproduced the target sentence. If a participant repeated one or more words in an otherwise
accurate reproduction or if they revised their production to an accurate reproduction, that
trial was not counted as an accurate reproduction, because the accuracy of reproduction was
intended to measure difficulty in reproduction here and these types of disfluencies have been
connected to processing difficulty in children (Buhr and Zebrowski 2009). Therefore, counting
disfluent reproductions as accurate would mean counting trials where participants evidently had
difficulties as free of difficulty. Otherwise accurate reproductions with pauses were counted
as accurate reproductions, as were reproductions that were accurate considering systematic
participant idiosyncrasies: for example, it was obvious from all of one participant’s recorded
trials that they always produce [d] in the place of /g/ and [t] in the place of /k/. Dad dave Anne
the toat was counted as an accurate reproductions of the target Dad gave Anne the coat for
this participant. There were 277 trials with inaccurate reproductions in total. The construction
changes discussed above are among them, of course, as are many trials with repeated words in an
otherwise accurate reproduction and trials where (four-year-old) participants did not cooperate.
In some trials, participants changed words in the target sentence to phonologically close ones
(like Dan for target Dad) or morphosyntactic alternatives (like a for target the). A few trials saw
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participants producing just one object of the target sentence. In only 3 trials, participants used
a verb form different from the ubiquitous target gave (two carried, one brang, all three usages
ditransitive).
The percentage of correct reproductions was then calculated for each sentence and age group.
Fig. 6.4 shows a summary of these percentages. The difference between the age groups is striking:
adults performed very well on all sentences; eight-year-olds were less accurate on average and
show much more difference between sentences; and four-year-olds are less accurate again and
showed even more variation. I take this to mean that, at least for the four- and eight-year-olds, the
stimulus sentences were too long for simple ‘parroting-back’ or verbatim repetition (Lust et al.
1998:73) and thus were re-produced in the strict meaning of the term. The adult participants
may have been able to hold an entire target sentence in working memory and repeat it from
working memory without processing (Vinther 2002).
Fig. 6.5 shows the same data, with two lines for the mean percentages of accurate reproductions
depending on which dative construction was used in the target sentence. There is an obvious
upwards slope with increasing age for both lines, but the blue line (showing mean percentages of
correctly reproduced double object sentences) is lower than the orange line (mean percentages
of correctly reproduced prepositional sentences) for all age groups. All three age groups were
more likely to accurately reproduce prepositional sentences than double-object sentences, and
the difference is particularly striking for four-year-olds.
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Figure 6.5: Percentages of accurate reproductions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages
for construction in the target sentence (lines)
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Figure 6.6: Percentages of accurate reproductions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages
for combinations of number (lines)
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Figure 6.7: Percentages of accurate reproductions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages
for combinations of animacy (lines)
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In Figs. 6.6 and 6.7, the mean percentages for different combinations of object number animacy
have been added as colored lines (the boxes showing the overall percentages are the same as in
Fig. 6.4). The lines in Fig. 6.6 form a very tight bundle, meaning there is very little difference
between the mean percentages of accurate reproductions for the four combinations of number.
In Fig. 6.7, on the other hand, the lines are more spread out, suggesting that animacy may be
a source of systematic variation here. Fig. 6.8 shows the same data with colored lines for the
different orderings of animacy. It suggests that children reproduced sentences with an animate
object as the second object (orange and dark grey lines) less accurately than sentences with an
inanimate second object.
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Figure 6.8: Percentages of accurate reproductions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages
for combinations of animacy and order (lines)
A linear regression model was fit to this data to test whether the percentage of accurate repro-
ductions was affected by age group, target sentence construction, animacy of the two objects
in the target sentence, and all two- and three-way interactions between age group, target con-
struction, and object animacy. This model (see Table 6.3 for all coefficients) provides evidence
that older participants and target sentences using the prepositional construction all favor higher
percentages of accurate reproductions. Inanimate recipients, on the other hand, have a negative
parameter, meaning sentences with an inanimate recipient saw a lower percentage of accurate
reproductions. The significant interactions between age groups and construction type also have
negative parameters. Since the main effect of construction type is a positive one, these negative
interaction effects work to (mostly) cancel it out: the calculation in (6.6a) shows this model’s
fitted or predicted percentage of correct repetitions by four-year-olds and the target sentence
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variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 0.36 0.06 6.11 < 0.01
eight-year-old group 0.36 0.08 4.35 < 0.01
adult group 0.57 0.08 6.83 < 0.01
prepositional target 0.33 0.08 3.99 < 0.01
inanimate recipient -0.15 0.07 -2.11 0.04
inanimate theme 0.11 0.07 1.53 0.13
eight-year-olds : prepositional -0.28 0.12 -2.40 0.02
eight-year-olds : inanimate recipient 0.05 0.10 0.52 0.61
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme 0.04 0.10 0.38 0.71
adults : prepositional -0.27 0.12 -2.24 0.03
adults : inanimate recipient 0.14 0.10 1.38 0.17
adults : inanimate theme -0.07 0.10 -0.64 0.52
inanimate recipient : inanimate theme 0.15 0.10 1.49 0.14
prepositional : inanimate recipient 0.18 0.10 1.76 0.08
prepositional : inanimate theme -0.18 0.10 -1.76 0.08
eight-year-olds : inanim. recipient : inanim. theme -0.10 0.14 -0.71 0.48
adults : inanim. recipient : inanim. theme -0.26 0.14 -1.76 0.08
prepositional : inanim. recipient : inanim. theme -0.11 0.14 -0.77 0.45
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanim. recipient -0.02 0.14 -0.12 0.90
adults : prepositional : inanim. recipient -0.19 0.14 -1.33 0.19
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanim. theme 0.14 0.14 0.99 0.33
adults : prepositional : inanim. theme 0.09 0.14 0.62 0.54
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanim. recipient -0.06 0.20 -0.31 0.76
adults : prepositional : inanim. recipient 0.24 0.20 1.15 0.25
Table 6.3: Coefficients for regression model of percentages of accurate reproductions (variables
in bold are deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 0.005, 10M10 = 0.01)
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Anne gave the drawing to the parents.
(6.6) a. 0.36 + 0.33 + 0.11 − 0.18 = 0.62
b. 0.36 + 0.33 + 0.11 − 0.18 + 0.57 − 0.27 − 0.07 + 0.09 = 0.94
As this is a prepositional sentence with an inanimate theme, the parameters for these two variables
(0.33 and 0.11, respectively) are added to the intercept value (0.36). The parameter for the
interaction (−0.18) is also added, resulting in a fitted percentage of 62% (the actual percentage
in the data is 50% for this combination). In (6.6b), the predicted value for the same sentence
with adult participants is calculated by adding the adult main effect (0.57) and the relevant
interactions (−0.27 for adults and prepositional, −0.07 for adults and inanimate theme, and 0.09
for adults and prepositional and inanimate theme) to all these, with 94% as the result (the actual
value observed in the data is 91%). The negative parameter for the interaction of adults and
prepositional targets (−0.27) cancels outmost of the parameter for themain effect of prepositional
targets (0.33) here, and the similar negative parameter for the interaction of eight-year-olds and
prepositional targets (−0.28) has a similar effect for the eight-year-olds—meaning this main
effect of prepositional targets is strong only among the four-year-olds according to this model.
This is not surprising: as seen in Fig. 6.4, adults have high percentages of accurate repetitions for
all sentences, meaning they are unlikely to show any (strong) effect of construction type or object
features. Four-year-olds, on the other hand, are less likely to accurately reproduce a double
object construction sentence than a prepositional one, as Fig. 6.4 suggest and the significant and
strong effect of construction type in the regression model summarized in Table 6.3 shows.
The interactions between construction type and the animacy of the two objects were included to
test for effects of animacy order effects (to test, for example, whether inanimate-before-animate
targets are less likely to be reproduced accurately). If the interaction between prepositional
construction and inanimate recipient reached significance, it would serve as evidence for an order-
ing effect: in the double-object animate-theme baseline, an inanimate recipient is significantly
associated with fewer accurate reproductions. As the double object construction has the recipient
before the theme, this is consistent with an ordering effect: in the baseline, sentences with an
inanimate object first elicited fewer accurate reproductions than other sentences. However, if this
were truly an effect of animacy ordering, the interaction of the prepositional construction and
inanimate recipients would have to be significant as well (with a positive parameter estimate):
since the prepositional construction has the recipient after the theme, an inanimate recipient
should not be associated with fewer accurate reproductions there. As this interaction is not
significant (for any age group), there is no strong evidence here for any animacy ordering being
preferred or more easy to process.
A linear regression model testing for effects of number was also fit to the data. No effect or
191
interaction involving number reached significance, which is why that model is not shown here.
This does mean, however, that there is no evidence for any systematic difference in accurate
reproductions that relates to number, and thus no evidence for any combination of number, order,
and role of objects being systematically preferred or easier than any other.
6.2.3 Reproduction initiation time
Participants may take longer to start reproducing sentences that are harder to process. The time
from the end of the target sentence stimulus to the start of the participant’s reproduction serves
as a measure of this. For each recorded trial, the starting point of the participant’s reproduction
of the target sentence was determined by the “To Text Grid (silences)” method of Praat (Boersma
2001), and these starting points were then manually checked and adjusted where necessary (for
example, where the first detectable sound in the recording was a background noise rather than
the participant speaking). The resulting response initiation times are shown in Fig. 6.9. A linear
regression model was fit to this data to test whether response initiation time was affected by
accuracy of reproduction, age group, target sentence construction, animacy and number of the
two objects in the target sentence, and all two- to four-way interactions between age group, target
construction, object animacy, and object number.
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Figure 6.9: Reproduction initiation times by age group (lower and upper ends of boxes indicate
first and third quartiles, vertical lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 interquartile
ranges of these quartiles, grey dots are more extreme values)
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variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 2.20 0.22 10.18 < 0.01
accurate reproduction -0.21 0.06 -3.49 < 0.01
prepositional target -0.15 0.31 -0.50 0.61
eight-year-old age group -0.85 0.29 -2.94 < 0.01
adult age group -0.60 0.29 -2.08 0.04
inanimate theme 0.04 0.18 0.20 0.84
inanimate recipient 0.14 0.18 0.74 0.46
singular theme 0.22 0.18 1.22 0.22
singular recipient 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.93
eight-year-olds : prepositional target 0.64 0.41 1.58 0.11
adults : prepositional target 0.25 0.40 0.63 0.53
inanimate theme : inanimate recipient -0.13 0.27 -0.49 0.63
singular theme: singular recipient 0.38 0.28 1.36 0.17
prepositional : inanimate theme 0.13 0.25 0.53 0.60
prepositional : inanimate recipient -0.16 0.25 -0.62 0.53
prepositional : singular theme -0.36 0.26 -1.41 0.16
prepositional : singular recipient 0.04 0.26 0.14 0.89
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme 0.37 0.24 1.53 0.13
adults : inanimate theme 0.18 0.24 0.76 0.45
eight-year-olds : inanimate recipient 0.51 0.24 2.09 0.04
adults : inanimate recipient -0.06 0.24 -0.24 0.81
eight-year-olds : singular theme 0.24 0.24 1.01 0.31
adults: singular theme -0.11 0.24 -0.47 0.64
eight-year-olds : singular recipient 0.28 0.24 1.14 0.25
adults : singular recipient 0.04 0.24 0.18 0.85
prepositional : inanimate theme : inanimate recipient 0.56 0.38 1.45 0.15
prepositional : singular theme : singular recipient -0.17 0.39 -0.44 0.66
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme : inanimate recipient -0.58 0.37 -1.59 0.11
adults : inanimate theme : inanimate recipient -0.06 0.36 -0.17 0.86
eight-year-olds : singular theme : singular goal -0.58 0.37 -1.56 0.12
adults : singular theme : singular goal -0.22 0.36 -0.61 0.54
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanimate recipient -0.32 0.34 -0.93 0.35
adults : prepositional : inanimate recipient 0.19 0.34 0.57 0.57
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanimate theme -0.48 0.34 -1.42 0.16
adults : prepositional : inanimate theme -0.30 0.34 -0.89 0.37
eight-year-olds : prepositional : singular recipient -0.44 0.34 -1.28 0.20
adults : prepositional : singular recipient -0.08 0.34 -0.24 0.81
eight-year-olds : prepositional : singular theme -0.33 0.34 -0.97 0.33
adults : prepositional : singular theme 0.17 0.34 0.51 0.61
eight-year-olds : prepositional : inanimate theme : inanimate recipient 0.11 0.52 0.21 0.83
adults : prepositional : inanimate theme : inanimate recipient -0.59 0.51 -1.16 0.25
eight-year-olds : prepositional : singular theme : singular recipient 0.53 0.52 1.03 0.30
adults : prepositional : singular theme : singular recipient 0.04 0.51 0.07 0.94
Table 6.4: Coefficients for regression model of reproduction initiation times (variables in bold
are deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 0.57, 100M10 = 0.62)
193
This model (see Table 6.4 for all coefficients) provides evidence that older participants are
quicker to initiate their reproductions, which is apparent in Fig. 6.9. The model shows that
accurate reproductions are initiated significantly faster than inaccurate ones. This is made
more clear in Fig. 6.10, where the orange line for the average initiation time of inaccurate
reproductions is above (and approximately parallel to) the blue line for the average initiation
time of accurate reproductions. The model also suggests that eight-year-olds are faster to initiate
sentence reproduction when the target sentence contains an animate recipient than when the
target sentence recipient is inanimate. In Fig. 6.11, the blue line (for mean reproduction initiation
time of target sentences with animate recipients) is lower than the orange line (mean reproduction
initiation time for inanimate recipient target sentences) only for the eight-year-old age group. In
other words, four-year-olds and adults were not quicker to reproduce sentences with animate
recipients than sentences with inanimate recipients, but eight-year-olds were. No other effects
or interactions in this model are significant.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
four eight adult
age group
re
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
in
iti
at
io
n 
tim
e,
 in
 s
mean times
accurate reproduction
inaccurate reproduction
Figure 6.10: Reproduction initiation time by age group (boxes), with means for accurately and
inaccurately reproduced sentences (lines)
6.2.4 Disfluencies
Once reproduction has been initiated, reproduction of more difficult sentences may be more
likely to be interrupted. Therefore, all trials were manually annotated for the presence of speech
disfluencies. I used the following disfluency categories (based on the disfluency types of Conture
1990:15):
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Figure 6.11: Reproduction initiation time by age group (boxes), with means for target sentences
with animate and inanimate recipients (lines)
• one-word repetitions (Anne gave– gave . . . )
• multi-word repetitions (Anne gave– Anne gave . . . )
• interjections (uh, but also no, and the like)
• pauses not in line with the impression of the participant’s speech rate during this trial
(within or between words)
• revision (Anne made– gave . . . )
• sound or syllable repetitions (Anne ga– gave . . . )
Because the incidence of some disfluencies was low (for example, only 34 trials contained
revisions and only 7 had sound or syllable repetitions), all disfluency categories were collapsed
into a single variable for the presence of any disfluency. The percentage of trials with any
disfluency was calculated for each target sentence and age group to measure difficulties in
reproduction. Fig. 6.12 compares these percentages across the three age groups. Adults were
hardly ever disfluent (7 out of 22 × 24 = 528 trials, or 1.3%), while eight- and particularly
four-year-olds produced many disfluencies. Disfluencies have been used in many studies of child
language as a measure of processing or production difficulty (for example Gordon et al. 1986,
Bernstein Ratner and Sih 1987, Buhr and Zebrowski 2009, McDaniel et al. 2010, and Williams
2014), and they were frequent enough among four- and eight-year-olds in the present data to be a
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usefulmeasure of difficulty here. The fact that adults were almost never disfluent is not surprising,
considering their well-developed memory capacity and the length of the sentences: McDaniel
et al. (2010) found that children aged between three and eight years produce disfluencies in
various places across the clause, whereas adult disfluencies tend to be nearer the beginning of
the clause. They argue that children plan their speech less far ahead than adults do, and this
is most likely due to children being limited by memory or processing capacity. If there is a
capacity limitation that becomes less restrictive with development in the first decade of life, it
is only to be expected that four-year-olds produce more disfluencies than eight-year-olds and
eight-year-olds in turn produce more disfluencies than adults.
l
l
0
25
50
75
100
four eight adult
age group
pe
rc
en
t d
isf
lu
en
t
Figure 6.12: Percentages of disfluencies in reproduction, by age group (lower and upper ends of
boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical lines extend to the most extreme value within 1.5
interquartile ranges of these quartiles, grey dots are more extreme values)
A linear regression model was fit to this data to test whether the percentage of disfluent
reproductions was affected by age group, target sentence construction, animacy and number of
the two objects in the target sentence, the two-way interactions between object numbers and
between object animacies, and all three-way interactions between age group and those two-way
interactions. This model (see Table 6.5 for all coefficients) shows that eight-year-olds and adults
were significantly less likely than four-year-olds to produce disfluent reproductions, which is
readily apparent from Fig. 6.12. There are also significant effects of animacy: inanimate theme
and recipient objects each have a marginally significant (both p = 0.06) negative or lowering
effect on the percentage of disfluent reproductions (against the baseline of two animate objects),
and the combination of an inanimate theme with an inanimate recipient has a positive effect that
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variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) 0.41 0.06 6.46 < 0.01
prepositional target -0.08 0.02 -3.37 < 0.01
eight-year-olds -0.16 0.07 -2.18 0.03
adults -0.31 0.07 -4.29 < 0.01
inanimate theme in target sentence -0.12 0.06 -1.93 0.06
inanimate recipient in target sentence -0.12 0.06 -1.93 0.06
singular theme in target sentence -0.06 0.04 -1.53 0.13
singular recipient in target sentence -0.04 0.04 -1.03 0.31
inanimate theme : inanimate recipient 0.23 0.09 2.51 0.01
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme 0.05 0.09 0.62 0.54
adults : inanimate theme 0.09 0.09 1.05 0.30
eight-year-olds : inanimate recipient 0.11 0.09 1.25 0.21
adults : inanimate recipient 0.10 0.09 1.18 0.24
singular theme : singular recipient 0.08 0.06 1.32 0.19
eight-year-olds : inanim. theme : inanim. recipient -0.15 0.12 -1.21 0.23
adults : inanim. theme : inanim. recipient -0.16 0.12 -1.29 0.20
Table 6.5: Coefficients for regression model of percentages of disfluent reproductions (variables
in bold are deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 0.01, 10M10 = 0.01)
almost cancels out each of these negative effects (0.23 against −0.12 and −0.12). In other words,
one inanimate object means a lower percentage of disfluencies than in the baseline, but this is
cancelled out in the case of two inanimate objects. Thus, sentences with two inanimate objects as
well as sentences with two animate objects were more likely to be reproduced with disfluencies
than sentences with one inanimate and one animate object, regardless of the function of those
objects. Note that the corresponding interaction effects with eight-year-olds and adults are in
the reverse direction of these effects (positive for one inanimate object: 0.05, 0.09, 0.11, and
0.10; negative for the interaction effects with both objects being inanimate: −0.15 and −0.16).
Although they are not significant according to the Wald test, these effects mostly cancel out the
main effects and interactions discussed above. In other words, sentences with one animate and
one inanimate object were less likely to cause disfluencies among the four-year-olds. This is
illustrated in Fig. 6.13. Although none of the corresponding effects are significant, the fact that
the parameter for the interaction of eight-year-olds and inanimate themes, 0.05, is smaller than
those of the other age-animacy interactions (0.09, 0.11, and 0.10) would appear to replicate the
intriguing pattern in the middle column of Fig. 6.13: eight-year-olds are slightly less likely to be
disfluent when reproducing sentences with inanimate themes and animate recipients than with
any other animacy pattern, though the difference is not significant. (This is more apparent in
Fig. 6.14, where the disfluency distributions have been further split between target sentences
with this prototypical pattern (orange boxes) and all other patterns (blue boxes), and the orange
box is noticeably lower than the blue one for the eight-year-old age group). In the regression
model, inanimate themes increase the likelihood of disfluency less than inanimate recipients
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do for eight-year-olds (the estimate for the eight-year-olds:inanimate theme interaction, 0.05, is
smaller than that of the eight-year-olds:inanimate recipient interaction, 0.11). This, however, is
nothing more than an interesting trend, as the parameter does not achieve significance in the
model.
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Figure 6.13: Percentages of disfluencies by age group (boxes), with mean percentages for
combinations of animacy (lines)
6.2.5 Oddness reactions
After the experiment had been concluded, I noticed reactions indicating that a participant found
the target sentence funny or odd in some recordings. These include comments like “That’s silly!”
or “That doesn’t sound right!”, laughter or chuckling, and intonations that indicate amusement
or questioning/disagreement. I will call them ‘oddness reactions’ here. All trials were manually
annotated for the presence or absence of oddness reactions. They were rare (24 from four-year-
olds, 15 from eight-year-olds, and 9 from adults for a total of 48), and most of them (43 of the
total 48) occurred in trials without any noticeable disfluency. Percentages of oddness reactions
were calculated for each sentence and age group (see Fig. 6.15), and these percentages were
analyzed using linear regression (percentage of oddness reactions as affected by target sentence
construction type, age group, target sentence objects’ animacy and number, and all two-and
three-way interactions between age group, target sentence objects’ animacy, and target sentence
objects’ number).
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Figure 6.14: Percentages of disfluencies by age group in trials with inanimate themes and
animate recipients (orange boxes) and other animacy combinations (blue boxes)
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Figure 6.15: Percentages of oddness reactions to target sentences by age group (note the labels
on the vertical axis; lower and upper ends of boxes indicate first and third quartiles, vertical lines
extend to the most extreme value within 1.5 interquartile ranges of these quartiles, grey dots are
more extreme values)
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variable parameter estimate standard error t p
(Intercept) -0.02 0.03 -0.76 0.45
prepositional target 0.01 0.01 1.07 0.29
eight-year-olds > −0.01 0.03 > −0.01 1.00
adults > −0.01 0.03 > −0.01 1.00
inanimate theme 0.04 0.03 1.53 0.13
inanimate recipient 0.06 0.03 2.04 < 0.05
singular theme 0.03 0.02 1.52 0.14
singular recipient < 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.77
inanimate theme : inanimate recipient 0.07 0.04 1.72 0.09
eight-year-olds : inanimate theme -0.03 0.04 -0.75 0.45
adults : inanimate theme -0.02 0.04 -0.62 0.54
eight-year-olds : inanimate recipient 0.01 0.04 0.37 0.71
adults : inanimate recipient -0.01 0.04 -0.38 0.70
singular theme : singular goal -0.03 0.03 -1.16 0.25
eight-year-olds : inanim. theme : inanim. recipient -0.10 0.05 -1.91 0.06
adults : inanim. theme : inanim. recipient -0.12 0.05 -2.20 0.03
Table 6.6: Coefficients for regression model of percentages of oddness reactions (variables in
bold are deemed to have significant effects; MSE = 0.001, 10M10 = 0.003)
The resulting model (see Table 6.6 for all coefficients) shows that inanimate recipient objects
lead to a higher percentage of oddness reactions. Marginally (p = 0.09), the combination of
an inanimate recipient with an inanimate theme further increases the percentage of oddness
reactions for four-year-old participants. This two-way interaction effect is cancelled out for
eight-year-olds (marginally: p = 0.06) and adults (significantly: p = 0.03) by the respective
three-way interaction effects. This is made more apparent in Fig. 6.17, where the blue and
light grey lines showing the mean percentage of oddness reactions for sentences with inanimate
recipients are above the other two lines across age groups, and the blue line (inanimate theme and
recipient) rises above all others for the four-year-old age group. There is no significant effect of
age group by itself, but this may be caused by the relatively low percentages of oddness reactions
overall (note the scale in Fig. 6.15). Since the values are so small, the differences between age
groups are quite small as well. The grammatical number of objects has no significant effect,97
and neither does the type of construction used in the target sentence.
6.3 Summary
Crucially, the effects of ordering that were expected following the corpus studies of the dative
alternation were not found in this sentence imitation experiment. The other interesting or
significant results can be condensed into three points. Firstly, the prepositional construction
appears to be easier overall for children than the double object construction. Both the four-
97Note that the figures in this section have been scaled to adequately show the rare oddness reactions—the orange
line for mean percentage of oddness reaction in sentences with singular themes and plural recipients is above the
other lines in Fig. 6.16, for example, but the difference is minute: 6.9% with the next-highest line at 6.2% for the
four-year-olds, 5% versus 2.5% for eight-year-olds, and 2.8% versus 2.3% for the adults.
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Figure 6.16: Percentages of oddness reactions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages for
combinations of number (lines)
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Figure 6.17: Percentages of oddness reactions by age group (boxes), with mean percentages for
combinations of animacy (lines—note that the dark grey line (animate/animate combination) is
at 0 for all age groups)
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and eight-year-old age groups used the prepositional construction more than the double object
construction in their reproductions of sentences (Fig. 6.3). Four-year-olds were also more likely
to reproduce a prepositional target sentence accurately (Fig. 6.5). Secondly, animate recipients
are easier to reproduce, and recipients are arguably even expected to be animate: eight-year-old
participants reproduced sentences with animate recipients quicker than sentences with inanimate
recipients (Table 6.4). Sentences with inanimate recipients also caused more “oddness reactions”
(like laughter or comments about the sentence being “silly” accompanying the reproduction) than
sentences with animate recipients did (Fig. 6.17 and Table 6.6). Thirdly, and in addition to the
second point, the prototypical animacy pattern for the objects of give (an inanimate theme and
an animate recipient) seems to be easier to reproduce as well, and participants will even change
sentences to get this prototypical pattern. Four-year-olds are quicker to reproduce sentences with
one inanimate and one animate object, regardless of the order or roles of these objects (Fig. 6.11).
This curious disregard for order and roles is explained in part by a common pattern of changes:
participants often changed double object sentences with an inanimate recipient and an animate
theme (likeMom gave the cushions Anne) to amore prototypical prepositional sentence by simply
inserting to between the two objects (yielding Mom gave the cushions to Anne). There were
also more oddness reactions to sentences with two inanimate objects (Fig. 6.17), which cannot
be amended towards the prototypical pattern in this way. Finally, eight-year-old participants
showed slightly fewer disfluencies in sentences with inanimate themes and animate recipients
than in other types of sentences (Fig. 6.13), though the difference is not significant.
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7 Discussion
This thesis took a psycholinguistic approach to a syntactic question in the domain of first language
acquisition, and its results and contributions are as multifaceted as that description. I found
evidence for an animate-before-inanimate preference in experiment 2, but not in the elicited
productions of experiment 3. There was no evidence for a plural-before-singular preference, and
a length difference of just one syllable does not appear to be enough to trigger the shorter-before-
longer preference. Touch input is closely related to eye gaze, making touchscreens a potential
alternative to eyetracking.
7.1 Is there any evidence for an animacy ordering preference?
Experiment 2 (Chapter 5) asked participants to choose between three options for filling a gap
in a dative sentence where their choice would fill either the theme or the recipient slot. When
the gap came after an animate explicit object in the instruction sentence, participants were more
likely to select inanimate choices than when the gap came before an animate object. In other
words, an animate-before-inanimate preference appears to have guided participants’ choices, at
least in part. The interaction effects in the regression model that reveals this effect (Table 5.10)
suggest that it does not differ significantly across age groups, meaning that all participants, from
the four-year-olds to the adults, show this same order effect. This is independent experimental
evidence for the the animacy-related ordering effect reported by Bresnan et al. (2007) for adult
speakers. Previous studies of the dative alternation in child language (de Marneffe et al. 2012
and an unpublished analysis of the data in Bürkle 2011) did not find a significant animacy
ordering effect in child speech corpora, probably due to the uncontrolled and unbalanced nature
of corpus data. The fact that experiment 2 did find this effect with child participants after all
demonstrates the usefulness of the experimental approach as a supplement to corpus studies,
and adds to an emerging literature that seems to converge on the idea that the dative alternation
choice is just as complex in the language of children (from four years of age) as in the language
of adults (Stephens 2010, de Marneffe et al. 2012, van den Bosch and Bresnan 2013)—in the
words of de Marneffe et al. (2012:54), “child speech only differs from the speech of their adult
interlocutors in degree, not in kind”.
The verb give prototypically selects an inanimate theme and an animate recipient. For example,
we are much more likely to give a coffee to Kate (and to talk about this event) than we are to
give a coffee to Kate’s desk or give Kate to the coffee. The latter pattern may even be hard to
parse—what does it mean for a coffee to be given a person? Sandberg et al. (2012) show that
speakers with and without aphasia have more trouble understanding sentences with that pattern
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than sentences with other patterns. The results of the present study provide some insight on
how this animacy pattern is learned. There is a wealth of evidence (discussed in Section 2.3)
that children have a basic understanding of the concept of animacy, and that it can have effects
in their speech. This is reflected in the finding that sentences with animate recipients were
overall more likely to be reproduced accurately in experiment 3 than sentences with inanimate
recipients, which violate the prototypical pattern. Other measures also show that four-year-olds
are affected by such animacy violations: among four-year-olds, sentences with two inanimate
objects met with more oddness reactions such as laughter or comments like “That’s silly!” than
other types of sentences (Fig. 6.17). In experiment 2, trials with the gap replacing the theme
in the instruction sentence (and participants choosing between three theme options) saw more
of four-year-olds’ gazes falling on pictures of inanimate objects than on pictures of animates
(Fig. 5.59). This difference was not found in the goal-gap trials. In other words, the four-year-old
participants were particularly drawn to inanimates in the condition where the prototypical
animacy pattern demands inanimates. Together with the comparatively large number of oddness
reactions to sentences with two inanimates, this suggests that four-year-olds are aware that give
prototypically takes only one inanimate object (its theme) and are trying to fulfil this early
version of the prototypical pattern.
This tentative developmental milestone immediately raises one question, however: if four-year-
olds’ behavior is evidence of their having learned the prototypical animacy pattern, and if this
pattern persists into adulthood (a reasonable assumption), why do the eight-year-olds not show
the same behavioral differences? The answer that can be inferred from the present data is that
while the prototypical animacy pattern itself persists, its behavioral correlates change. Firstly,
somemeasures do reflect an understanding of the prototypical animacy pattern in eight-year-olds:
they were more likely to accurately reproduce sentences with an inanimate theme than those with
an animate theme (Fig. 6.7). Together with the overall facilitating effect of animate recipients on
reproduction accuracy (see Table 6.3), this effect of inanimate themes completes the prototypical
animacy pattern. The fact that eight-year-olds’ sentences show both of these effects is evidence
for eight-year-olds (still) possessing this pattern. Moreover, they also produced fewer disfluencies
when reproducing sentences with the prototypical pattern than when reproducing any other type
of sentence (Fig. 6.13). The absence of any correlate of this animacy pattern in eight-year-olds’
gaze data can be explained by charting the development of this animacy pattern and its effects
further, into adulthood. The gaze data collected from the adult participants shows the reverse
of the effect found in the four-year-olds’ gazes. In trials asking them to choose one of three
theme options, adult participants looked at the animate options significantly more than at the
inanimate options. Maintaining the basic assumption that adults know the prototypical animacy
pattern, this can be explained as a different type of attention: whereas four-year-olds attended
more to the options that fit the pattern, adults attended more to the unexpected options that
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violate the pattern. With this tentative explanation, the absence of a difference between animate
and inanimate theme options in the eight-year-olds’ gaze data is no longer surprising—they are
undergoing development of their attention and expectations, and so are sometimes attending to
the expected options and sometimes to the unexpected ones. Averaging over many trials and
participants then would then lead to a mean result of no difference, which is exactly what was
found here.
The data from adult participants in experiment 3 is uninformative not because they are unaware
of the prototypical animacy pattern, but because of floor or ceiling effects: with fully-developed
meta-linguistic skills, adults are capable of reproducing any sequence of words, so a violation of
animacy patterns in an otherwise grammatically correct sentence in their native language poses
no challenge for reproduction. In other words, because adults reproduced virtually all sentences
accurately and without disfluencies or oddness reactions, there is no way for any significant
differences relating to the animacy pattern to emerge in their data. Because of children’s
developing cognitive skills, inaccurate reproductions, disfluencies, and oddness reactions were
more common in the two children’s age groups. This makes it possible to gain insights from
their data.
7.2 Is there any evidence for a number ordering preference?
Participants’ choices between the three smaller images in experiment 2 did not show an ordering
preference related to grammatical number: they did not choose plural options more in trials
where the gap preceded a singular object than in trials where the gap followed a singular object,
and they did not choose singular options more when the gap followed a plural object than when
it preceded a plural object. In experiment 3, none of the measures used revealed systematic
differences that could be explained by an ordering preference for number. In light of the plural-
before-singular preference in the literature following Bresnan et al. (2007), such preferences
would be expected (assuming the experiments in the present study allow such effects to surface).
There are two possible explanations for this negative finding: either the plural-before-singular
ordering preference do not hold for the participants in this study, or the experiments in this thesis
were not suitable for testing for this effect. The first of these possibilities is not as far-fetched
as it may first appear, since most of the studies that reported a plural-before-singular ordering
preference are based on corpus data and thus have to be interpreted with the limitations of
corpora in mind. However, the second possibility is more likely. The task in experiment 2 was
designed specifically for the present study, meaning it is simply not known whether this task
would replicate the ordering effects found in corpus studies. The task was also somewhat long,
which means at least some (particularly younger) participants likely got fatigued and changed
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their behavior (probably to random choice, in order to ‘just finish’) part of the way through the
task.98 Moreover, the features of one option image systematically depended on the features of
the other two: each of the three options matched the explicit object in exactly one of the three
features of interest. This was a deliberate design choice to keep the number of choices small,
but it does mean the features are not perfectly independent, which is a challenge in statistical
analysis. Thus, there are several possible confounding factors in the experiment, and any of
them could be expected to mask a subtle ordering preference. The fact that this study did not
find the plural-before-singular preference attested in Bresnan et al. (2007) therefore does not
constitute evidence against this ordering preference.
The choices in experiment 2 show some other effects of animacy and grammatical number
in children and adults. Similarly to the results of the pilot study (see Section 5.1.4.1), these
effects can be seen as tendencies to choose options that match or mismatch one of the features
of the explicit object. In experiment 2, the eight-year-olds overall tended to choose animacy-
mismatching options, meaning they were more likely than chance to select an inanimate option
in trials with an animate explicit object and more likely than chance to select an animate option
in trials with an inanimate explicit object. As mentioned above, the features of the three options
were not independent of each other. There was always one animacy-matching option and two
animacy-mismatching ones, one of which matched the grammatical number (but not the length)
and one of which matched the length (but not the number) of the explicit object. This means that
a very strong mismatching tendency for one feature will manifest as a matching tendency for
the other features: in the hypothetical extreme case where all participants always chose one of
the two animacy-mismatching options and had no preference regarding number or length, they
would choose the number-match and the length-match around 50% of the time each. This would
appear as significant deviations from the 33% random chance of choosing the number-match and
the 33% random chance of choosing the length-match (compare the analysis in Section 5.3.2),
even though participants were absolutely insensitive to either of these features. Of course,
this hypothetical extreme case is rather unlikely, and a less extreme mismatching tendency for
one feature would not cause these misleading significant deviations. Nevertheless, multiple
matching/mismatching tendencies within the same participant groups have to be interpreted
cautiously, as it is not clear which of them are true effects and which are merely caused by
the interaction of these effects with the details of the experimental design (and, of course, it is
conceivable that there is more than one concurrent true effect).
Happily, there is only one such pair of tendencies: eight-year-old participants made more
98Pupillometry data, which some eyetrackers can collect during gaze-tracking tasks, may be able to reveal
whether there was such a change in behavior. Human pupils dilate under cognitive load (Porter et al. 2007), so if
a participant changed their behavior to a less processing-intensive random choice, their pupils may not dilate as
much after this change as they did before.
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animacy-mismatching choices than expected by chance, as mentioned above (see Fig. 5.40), and
they also made more number-matching choices than chance (Fig. 5.41). It is not clear which
of these reflects the preferences of the eight-year-old participants, but it is intriguing that the
adult participants also show the number-matching preference, but not the animacy-mismatching
one. Moreover, an animacy-matching tendency is apparent in adults’ gazes (Fig. 5.52). This
at least suggests that the number-matching preference is the true one, as the development from
a strong number-matching preference in eight-year-olds (manifesting as an epiphenomenal
animacy-mismatching tendency) to a more moderate number-matching preference in adults
(without epiphenomena) is a more parsimonious account of this data than the development
from an animacy-mismatching preference in eight-year-olds to a number-matching preference
in adults. Moreover, a tentative explanation for number-matching is more forthcoming than one
for animacy-mismatching: singular recipients can plausibly be given singular or plural themes
(give Kate a coffee and give Kate three bagels are both very imagine-able), but it would perhaps
be more plausible to give a plural theme rather than a singular theme to a plural recipient (give
three bagels to the boys is fine, but give a coffee to the guysmakes one wonder which of the guys
really received the one coffee). In other words, a plural-for-plural strategy is semantically more
plausible, and it is easy to imagine this strategy being generalized to singular-explicit trials and
thus becoming a number-matching strategy—particularly since all trials after the initial training
featured the very obvious contrast between two plural images (depicting three animals or objects
each) and two singular images (depicting just one animal or object each). Eight-year-old and
adult participants looking for a strategy or ‘solution’ to the task would have been likely to base it
on this obvious difference, which would explain the number-matching tendencies observed with
these two age groups.
7.3 Is there any evidence for a length ordering preference with a minimal
length difference?
There is no evidence for amonosyllabic-before-bisyllabic preference in the results of experiment 2.
The effect of length on the dative alternation and similar two-item ordering effects is well
established: speakers of all ages prefer shorter items to be ordered before longer items (Wasow
2002, Bresnan et al. 2007, deMarneffe et al. 2012). The question in this study is whether a length
difference of one syllable (and zero words) is enough to cause this effect. As with the animacy
and number effects discussed above, there is some uncertainty inherent in interpreting the results,
as the methodology used here may not be able to uncover such ordering effects at all. In light of
this, the fact that eight-year-olds’ choices appear to manifest a bisyllabic-before-monosyllabic
preference (Table 5.9) has to be treated with great caution. In light of the well-established
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strength of the short-before-long effect on postverbal constituent ordering, it seems unlikely that
this one finding is evidence of a long-before-short preference—especially given that there are
other, more parsimonious explanations for the present data: the task may be unable to reveal
length-related ordering effects, and a length difference of one syllable may not be enough to
trigger the short-before-long effect. In either case, the apparent bisyllabic-before-monosyllabic
preference would then be a spurious finding, as would the four-year-olds preference for gazing
at bisyllabic options. The length-mismatching tendency in adults’ choices is most likely an
epiphenomenon of another matching tendency, as discussed above.
7.4 Do these preferences emerge in a particular order?
As the three experiments did not find evidence for number- or length-based ordering effects, the
question of an order of emergence of these effects cannot be answered here. One interesting
developmental trajectory is apparent, however: in experiment 3, children (in both age groups)
weremore likely to reproduce target sentences using the prepositional construction than sentences
using the double object construction. Reproductions of prepositional sentences also contained
fewer disfluencies. The adults’ reproductions do not show these differences, as they performed
essentially without inaccuracies or disfluencies. It is clear that the prepositional construction
carries some processing advantage for children. I do not mean that it is acquired earlier, which
Gropen et al. (1989) already showed to be an unfounded assumption—rather, it appears that
children who have already acquired both constructions have an easier time (re-)producing
prepositional sentences or, in other words, a harder time (re-)producing double object sentences.
It is interesting in light of this latter formulation that many of the inaccurately reproduced
double object sentences were reproduced using the prepositional construction. (Note that this
does not logically follow from the fact that more double object sentences were reproduced
inaccurately: there are many other changes or errors that would render a reproduction inaccurate,
for example exchanging the two objects without inserting a preposition, omitting one or both
objects, using different objects or verbs, and so forth.) This suggests that both factors play a
role: the double object construction can be difficult to reproduce, and there is some processing
advantage to the prepositional construction. The obvious candidate for this processing advantage
is the preposition to itself. It clearly marks the object following it as the recipient and thereby
makes the sentence less ambiguous. This would be particularly helpful in sentences where
other hints to the roles of the two objects are less clear, for example with sentences that deviate
from the prototypical pattern of inanimate theme and animate recipient. The double-object
sentences with animate themes and inanimate recipients (the strongest possible deviation from
the prototypical animacy pattern) were more likely to be reproduced inaccurately in experiment 3
than prepositional sentences with the same pattern. It thus seems plausible that the prepositional
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construction easier for children to process and produce because the recipient is marked more
clearly in the prepositional construction than in the double object construction. This is in line
with previous findings regarding the use and usefulness of to as a cue: the presence of to “is by far
the strongest cue” that hearers use in identifying the recipient (McDonald 1987:114), and persons
with and without aphasia are least likely to arrive at the intended meaning of a dative alternation
sentence when the objects violate the prototypical animacy pattern (animate theme, inanimate
recipient) and the sentence uses the preposition-less double object construction (Sandberg et al.
2012).
7.5 Does touchscreen input reflect attention?
When actively interacting with the touchscreen, participants looked at regions close to the point
of touch—in other words, their touch input is correlated to their gaze, and gaze is an established
attention measure. Therefore, the assumption that touchscreen input and gaze target are closely
correlated (made commonly in touchscreen implementations, as discussed briefly in Section 3.5)
is justified. In light of this finding, researchers can use touchscreens as attention-measure
devices more confidently, and designers can be confident in assuming that touchscreen input
requires and reflects attention. The distance between the gaze and touch locations appears to
grow with age, but it is possible that this is an artifact of hardware problems: the fact that gaze
data collection failed completely for four four-year-olds, three eight-year-olds, but only one
adult could be argued to suggest that the particular eyetracker used here is less likely to capture
gaze data from younger participants with more varied gaze behavior, while adults with similar
variation can still be recorded. This would in effect make the adults’ gaze data more messy.
As the accuracy of the touchscreen data does not differ between age groups, messier eye gaze
data would make the correlation between touch and gaze weaker. Although the pattern of gazes
does differ between age group (as the regression model in Section 5.3.5 shows), this difference
is not necessarily due to one group’s data being messier overall. The fact that algorithmic
correction was successfully applied to the gaze data from 12 four-year-olds, 12 eight-year-olds,
and 14 adults (see Section 5.2.3 for details) further suggests that the eye gaze data collected
from most adult participants was bunched just as tightly as the data collected from children. The
difference in correlation strengths could therefore be due to gaze data from a few ‘messier’ adult
participants, while no gaze data was recorded from their child counterparts (which would make
the child gaze data appear ‘cleaner’ and thus more closely correlated with the corresponding
touch locations).
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8 Conclusion
Previous studies of the English dative alternation (almost exclusively corpus work, exemplified
by Bresnan et al. 2007; see Section 2.1) found that speakers tend to use the construction that
places shorter objects before longer ones, animate objects before inanimate ones, and plural
objects before singular ones. Apart from the animate-before-inanimate preference revealed by
experiment 2, the present study did not find evidence for these ordering effects. This overall
negative finding does not invalidate those previous results, of course—the highly artificial tasks
used here and the various data collection methods used to construct these corpora are different
in many ways. The present finding does show, however, that the ordering tendencies are no more
than tendencies: large corpora of (mostly) naturalistic speech allow them to be detected, but
in an individual processing or production situation, they can easily be overpowered by myriad
other influences. Syntactic priming is known to be one such influence, task strategies and task
demands appear to be others.
By ‘task strategies’, I mean consistent and conscious strategies that participants can adopt for an
experimental task. Some of the adult participants in the pilot study described in Section 5.1.4.1
commented that they chose the animate option in trials with an animate as the big picture and
the inanimate option in trials with an inanimate big picture. They were evidently trying to find
the ‘solution’ or pattern, and animacy presented itself. The task strategy here was to choose the
option that matched the animacy of the big picture, at least for some participants. Number was
not varied in that pilot—all pictures showed one animal or object. In experiment 2, number was
varied. It is possible that number then presented itself as the most obvious pattern, which would
explain why the eight-year-old and adult participants appear to have used a number-matching
strategy: when presented with a singular big image representing the explicit object in the
instruction sentence, eight-year-olds and adults chose the one singular option more often than
chance would suggest; when the big image representing the explicit object was plural, they chose
the plural option more than chance would suggest.
No major strategy or pattern is apparent in the four-year-olds’ choices. The demands of the
experimental tasks, however, explain this: all three experiments presented in this thesis were
administered in one session. Participants were free to take breaks between the experiments
as well as between the blocks in experiment 2, and even a session without breaks could take
more than 45 minutes. Loss of interest and fatigue due to this long duration, combined with
the discovery that there did not seem to be a wrong choice in experiment 2 (any choice led
to the ‘reward’ stimulus), may very well have led (some) four-year-old participants to simply
get through the task without trying to ‘solve’ it like the older participants did. Moreover, four-
year-olds’ general cognitive skills are less well developed than those of the older children and
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adults—even if they did try to adopt a strategy, they may have been less successful at formulating
or implementing it consistently.
Ordering preferences, task strategies and task demands cannot explain every single choice made
in experiment 2: participants did not try to match the animate-before-inanimate ordering in
absolutely every trial, eight-year-olds and adults did not always choose the option that matched
the explicit object in grammatical number, and four-year-olds did not seem to make systematic
choices to the same extent as eight-year-olds and adults did. However, these influences are the
strongest ones apparent in the choice data, and any other potential pattern is simply lost under
their strength and the noise that is common to experiments of this nature.
The eye gaze data collected during experiment 2 is also fairly noisy, which is due in part to the
limitations of head-free eyetracking technology. The gaps in the eye gaze recording (explained
in Section 5.2.2) as well as the fact that I analyzed the raw gaze samples (as opposed to post-
processed fixations defined by some algorithm) make for a less even dataset, further adding to
this noise. Moreover, the methodological evaluation in Section 5.2.4 indicates that SSANOVA
is conservative when applied to eye gaze data, which means that SSANOVA models are less
likely to deem a given difference between images or conditions to be a significant difference
than other statistical methods would be. However, with these limitations in mind, the significant
differences that were found in the eye gaze data can be accepted much more confidently.
More participants in the adult participant group provided useful gaze data than participants in
either of the two child groups. It is therefore not surprising that their data also provides more
cases of significant differences. As they heard the instruction sentence, adults already looked
at the option that they would later choose more than at the other two options combined (see
Fig. 5.50). It is impossible to establish causation from the data—adults may immediately have
decided on their choice and then looked at it, or they may have been more likely to choose the
option that they happened to be looking at during the instruction sentence (resembling a mere
exposure effect).99 No matter which of these two possibilities is true, this finding shows that the
act-out choices and the eye gaze data captured some of the same features of adult participants’
behavior in this experiment. If the four-year-old participants did choose randomly, as I have
argued above, it is not surprising that their gaze behavior does not correspond to these random
choices: whether their gazes were random or patterned, they are unlikely to show interesting
correspondences to a random set of data.
99Mere exposure effects are preferences for previously seen items over novel ones, regardless of attitude towards
or conscious awareness of these previously seen items—the mere exposure to them is apparently enough to cause
this preference. In the same vein, the results and gaze data from experiment 2 may reflect a preference for the image
that happened to be being seen during the instruction sentence, simply because it was being seen as the sentence
was heard. A mere exposure effect would be particularly likely here because the stimuli used were photographs,
which have been found to elicit stronger mere exposure effects than line drawings (Bornstein 1989:279).
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The gazes of eight-year-old participants, however, are interesting: their choices do not appear
to be random, so a correspondence between choices and gazes (like the one found with adult
participants) is possible. However, there is none. Two explanations suggest themselves: either
the eight-year-olds really did not look at their subsequent choices more than at the other options;
or they did look at their choices more, but this difference was smaller than it was among the
adults and therefore got lost in the noise or the conservative analysis. Hardly any interesting
difference between gazes at one image and gazes at another were found at all in the eight-
year-olds’ gaze data, while the four-year-old and adult age groups each showed several such
differences. This is suggestive of considerable variation in the eight-year-olds’ gaze behavior.
The significant patterns of gazes found with younger children and adults differ from each other,
which could be explained by a cognitive development between four years of age and adulthood.
It is reasonable to assume that some participants in the eight-year-old age group are further along
that developmental path than others. This would mean some of them display more adult-like
gaze behavior while others display more four-year-old-like gaze behavior—in other words, that
there is considerable variation in the eight-year-olds’ gaze data. As the groups are fairly small
already, trying to separate the eight-year-olds into more and less adult-like sub-groups would
not be statistically sound: smaller datasets (from smaller groups) are more susceptible to false
positive findings.
The fact that adults’ choices were mirrored in their gazes shows neatly how an attention measure
(like eye gaze) and a simpler measure (like the choice between the three options made on the
touchscreen) can provide similar results, and that both are useful. As eyetracking has a very fine
temporal resolution, it can also reveal more information within trials. As eye gaze is not under
constant conscious control, it is a more useful measure when participants may not engage with
the task fully, like the four-year-old participants in the present study. The touchscreen, however,
requires very little setup and no explanation (with most participants), and careful experiment
design can turn it into an attention measure. Participants were allowed to take their hands off the
screen in experiment 2, and they did so for most of the time. When participants are instructed to
keep their finger on the screen, or when the task naturally requires that they do, touch-tracking
can provide data that is similar to eye gaze data. The advantage that touch-tracking has over
mouse-tracking is that the mouse is often used as a reading or viewing aid, for example following
gaze “roughly” in a visual search (Bieg et al. 2010:90) or following gaze in the vertical dimension
while remaining quite distant in the horizontal (Rodden and Fu 2007). Touch and gaze are
much closer even in an entirely unconstrained task like the one in this study. In a task that is
designed to keep participants’ fingers on or near the point of processing, such as Hatfield (to
appear)’s self-guided reading task, touch-tracking can approximate eye gaze data very closely.
This is particularly useful to know because touchscreen-based experiments can be delivered as
smartphone apps to thousands of users with relative ease (Dufau et al. 2011), which makes it
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possible to carry out attention-measure studies with unprecedented numbers of participants and
the corresponding gain in statistical power.
8.1 Further research
This study used several measures of difficulty in the data from experiment 3, chief among them
the binary distinction between accurate and inaccurate reproductions of the target sentence. This
analysis assumes that participants are generally capable of reproducing sentences of the length
and complexity used here and that an additional difficulty caused by the factors that were varied
as part of the experiment design negatively affects this capability. However, the most striking
difference in reproduction accuracy was that between the three age groups. Further research
might explore in more detail how the various factors used here as well as others influence this
reproduction difficulty, and how much of the difference in reproduction accuracy is really a more
general effect of children’s memory limitations.
In the realm of the dative alternation, it would be interesting to assess the length effect in more
detail. It is established beyond doubt that shorter objects are preferred before longer ones, but
the results of this thesis suggest that this does not apply in ditransitive sentences where the two
object NPs differ in length by just one syllable. The question that this result leaves open is this:
What is the smallest length difference that will give rise to the length effect? Future studies with
incrementally larger length differences (several syllables, one word, and so on) would answer
that question, giving further insight into the more peripheral features of the human language
faculty that govern these gradient phenomena.
As the dative alternation varies across different varieties of English, a replication of the present
study in varieties other than NewZealand Englishwould be a worthwhile addition to the literature
on the dative alternation as well as a possible source of data for general theories of language
variation.
Finally, while I am confident in the animate-before-inanimate preference found in experiment 2,
this particular ordering effect has not been demonstrated with children before. It would thus be
desirable for another study, preferably with a different methodology, to test for this animacy effect
in child language. If the same effect is found again, it would become more firmly established, and
the complementary nature of experiments and corpora would be given much-needed prominence
and attention.
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B Blocks and trials in experiment 2
recipient animacy-matching theme
option
number-matching theme op-
tion
length-matching theme op-
tion
cows penguin baskets hat
dogs camel baskets lock
frog squirrels bottle hats
bear penguins letter balls
hedgehogs bee hats basket
monkeys crab balls basket
kiwi pigs hat bottles
rabbit pigs ball bottles
keys letter squirrels crab
pears bottle penguins crab
pot letters camel bees
shirt letters camel crabs
hammers ball pigs squirrel
lemons lock pigs squirrel
pillow locks bee penguins
pencil locks bee camels
Table B.1: Experiment 2, block 1: prepositional instruction sentence with gap in place of the
theme (Now give the to the cows.)
theme animacy-matching recipi-
ent option
number-matching recipient
option
length-matching recipient
option
cows penguin baskets hat
dog camels basket locks
frogs squirrel bottles hat
bear penguins letter balls
hedgehogs bee hats basket
monkey crabs ball baskets
kiwis pig hats bottle
rabbit pigs ball bottles
keys letter squirrels crab
pear bottles penguin crabs
pots letter camels bee
shirt letters camel crabs
hammers ball pigs squirrel
lemon locks pig squirrels
pillows lock bees penguin
pencil locks bee camels
Table B.2: Experiment 2, block 2: double object instruction sentence with gap in place of the
recipient (Now give the the cows.)
239
recipient animacy-matching theme
option
number-matching theme op-
tion
length-matching theme op-
tion
cow penguins basket hats
dogs camel baskets lock
frog squirrels bottle hats
bears penguin letters ball
hedgehog bees hat baskets
monkeys crab balls basket
kiwi pigs hat bottles
rabbits pig balls bottle
key letters squirrel crabs
pears bottle penguins crab
pot letters camel bees
shirts letter camels crab
hammer balls pig squirrels
lemons lock pigs squirrel
pillow locks bee penguins
pencils lock bees camel
Table B.3: Experiment 2, block 3: double object instruction sentence with gap in place of the
theme (Now give the cow the .)
theme animacy-matching recipi-
ent option
number-matching recipient
option
length-matching recipient
option
cow penguins basket hats
dog camels basket locks
frogs squirrel bottles hat
bears penguin letters ball
hedgehog bees hat baskets
monkey crabs ball baskets
kiwis pig hats bottle
rabbits pig balls bottle
key letters squirrel crabs
pear bottles penguin crabs
pots letter camels bee
shirts letter camels crab
hammer balls pig squirrels
lemon locks pig squirrels
pillows lock bees penguin
pencils lock bees camel
Table B.4: Experiment 2, block 4: prepositional instruction sentence with gap in place of the
recipient (Now give the cow to the .)
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C Images used in experiment 2
In addition to own works, the following photographs were modified and used to represent the
respective noun in the experiments described here.
apple: User “Pupuli”. 10 February 2008. Apples. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
10943651@N00/3044525754. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommer-
cial-ShareAlike 2.0.
ball: User “bpariedl”. 23 August 2009. Einsamer Ball. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
bpariedl/3861962002. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial--
ShareAlike 2.0.
balls: User “Joe Shlabotnik”. 1 November 2012. Soccer Balls. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/joeshlabotnik/8168644501. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Non-
Commercial-ShareAlike 2.0.
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basket: User “Susann_Schweden”. 18 July 2011. A basket. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:A_basket.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
3.0 Unported.
baskets: User “Oop”. 20 July 2012. Korviväljapanek Tartu hansapäevade Jõelinnas. http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Korviv%C3%A4ljapanek_Tartu_hansap%C3%A4evade_
J%C3%B5elinnas,_20._juuli_2012.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
bear: User “Bastet78”. 15 November 2006. Niedźwiedź brunatny (Ursus arctos L.)Ursus arctos.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:6_maja_06_r._ZOO_161.jpg. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
bears:
• Annette Elisabeth Rudolph. 17 February 2008. mhmm...smelling good today...new
perfume ?. http://www.flickr.com/photos/a_rud_beth/2273717093. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0.
• User “Hswaton”. 9 May 2013. Baer im Alpenzoo. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Baer1.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported.
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bee: Marc Andrighetti. 5 May 2012. Abeille butineuse et son pollen. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Abeille_butineuse_et_son_pollen.JPG. Licensed under
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
bees: User “Wiredwitch”. 28 February 2008. Wild bee hive. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/60509459@N00/2302523896. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share-
Alike 2.0.
bottle: User “keepps”. 18 August 2007. green glass. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
isg-online/1167028571. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial--
ShareAlike 2.0.
bottles: Matthew Solle. 1 September 2012. (Bottles) Still Life. http://www.flickr.
com/photos/matthew_solle/7995697812. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution
2.0.
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camel: User “Bouette”. 11 October 2006. Chameau de Bactriane. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chameau_de_bactriane.JPG. Licensed under Creative Com-
mons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
camels: User “bobosh_t”. 10 June 2011. Three Wisemen’s camels. http://www.flickr.
com/photos/frted/5823449584. Licensed underCreative CommonsAttribution-ShareAlike
2.0.
cherry: LisaConnolly. 20 July 2005. Cherry. http://www.flickr.com/photos/lisaconnolly/
27339281. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0.
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cow: User “Roland zh”. 1 October 2010. Forch towards Pfannenstiel Guldenen (Switzerland).
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Forch_-_Pfannenstiel_2010-10-01_14-22-10.
JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
cows:
• User “Jsome1”. 21 July 2008. Azores. http://www.flickr.com/photos/jsome1/
3240489010. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
• USDA. Pre-November 2003. Holstein cows large. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Holstein_cows_large.jpg. Public domain work.
• Anna Briggs. 5 May 2007. Cow on Kegworth canal bridge. http://www.flickr.
com/photos/anna-b/3160390295. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution--
NonCommercial 2.0.
crab: User “Bhny”. 27 April 2006. Gecarcinus quadradtus (Halloween crab) at Nosara, Costa
Rica. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gecarcinus_quadratus_%28Nosara%
29.jpg. Public domain work.
crabs: User “eileendelhi”. 6 August 2006. Fighters. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
eileendelhi/212775704. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
2.0.
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cup: Louis Kreusel. 22 November 2005. Teacup. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
louiskreusel/82682900. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
2.0.
dog: Małgorzata Miłaszewska-Duda. 2 October 2011. Bernese Mountain Dog. http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bernese_Mountain_Dog_Miedzynarodowa_wystawa_
psow_rasowych_rybnik_kamien_pazdziernik_2011_1.jpg. Licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
dogs: User “barrio dude”. 2 July 2007. i want one!. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
97111149@N00/751565592. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
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duck: User “Paula”. 17 February 2008. Four ducks. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Four_ducks.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
2.0.
fox: Edd Deane. 14 August 2011. Renard roux marchant lentement dans l’eau. http:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Renardriviere.jpg. Licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution 2.0.
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frog: User “Contrabaroness”. 21 May 2010. The Northern Green Frog. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Northern_Green_Frog_-_Tewksbury,_NJ.jpg. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
frogs: User “4028mdk09”. 15 July 2011. Frösche, fotografiert in einem Teich mit Seerosen in
Heidelberg (Baden-Württemberg, Deutschland). http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Fr%C3%B6sche_in_einem_Seerosenteich.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
hammer: User“Tjcase2”. 22October2008. StandardHammer. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Hammer.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported.
hammers: Mauro Cateb. 19 October 2010. Some hammers used in jewellery. http:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jewellery_hammers_%281%29.jpg. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
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hat: Clément Bucco-Lechat. 6 November 2012. Indiana Jones fedora hat. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Indiana_Jones_fedora_hat.jpg. Licensed under Creative
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
hats: Jorge Royan. 26 April 2008. Hat stall owner in a sunday fair. Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amsterdam_-_Hats_-_0932.jpg. Licen-
sed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
hedgehog: Jan-Erik Finnberg. 17 July 2006. A hedgehog. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/17424735@N00/2252528405. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution 2.0.
hedgehogs:
• User “Nopple”. 3 July 2013. Hedgehogs in Garden. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Hedgehogs_Siesta.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Zero
1.0.
• Mikael Miettinen. 20 June 2008. #119 Hedgehog. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
30261851@N06/3324010908. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
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key: Honza Groh. 23 August 2008. Keys from padlocks. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Klice_od_visacu.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Unported.
keys: Tomasz Sienicki. 4 November 2004. padlock. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Padlock_kl%C3%B3dka_ubt.JPG.
kiwi: User “The.Rohit”. 13May 2010. Apteryz mantelli. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
File:Apteryx_mantelli_-Rotorua,_North_Island,_New_Zealand-8a.jpg. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
kiwis: User “barb”. 11 July 2010. Kiwi: right strange looking birds. http://www.
flickr.com/photos/barb/4783570229. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0.
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lemon: GáborHanák. 24 December 2009. A big yellow lemon. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Citrom.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0
Unported.
lemons: User “Dodo-Bird”. 16 April 2006. Lemons. http://www.flickr.com/photos/
dodo-bird/477499717. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
letter: User “sludgegulper”. 17 January 2011. Briefumschlag VEB Schwerarmaturen-
werk ERICH WEINERT Magdeburg. http://www.flickr.com/photos/sludgeulper/
5362224401. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0.
letters: User“Bahar101”. 22 July 2007. SayilmisSecimZarflari. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:SayilmisSecimZarflari.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Attri-
bution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
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lock: Nino Barberi. March 2007. Padlock. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
-_Padlock_-.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5.
locks: Mike Baird. 22 March 2008. Multiple Padlock Farm Gate Mechanism. http://
www.flickr.com/photos/mikebaird/2354116406. Licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution 2.0.
monkey: User “whologwhy”. 29 July 2011. MONKEY BUSINESS. http://www.flickr.
com/photos/hulagway/6010643359. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution 2.0.
monkeys:
• Daisy Seneviratne. 3 November 2011. Monkey Grooming. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/daisysen/6369979195. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Non-
Commercial-ShareAlike 2.0.
• User “BotheredByBees”. 30 November 2007. monkey. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/botheredbybees/2081791806. Licensed under Creative Commons Attri-
bution 2.0.
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pear: User “Genet”. 4 October 2008. Birnen der Sorte ‘Prinzessin Marianne’. http://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pyrus_-_Prinzessin_Marianne_-_Kaiserkrone.
JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
pears: USDA. No date. Image number K5302-1. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:More_pears.jpg. Public domain work.
pencil: User “Démosthène”. 24 June 2012. Matériel de dessinateur: gomme ‘Mie de pain’
et crayon HB. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Crayon%2Bmie_de_pain.
JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
pencils: User “Baselmans”. 15 June 2007. Conte pencil. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Conte_pencil.jpg. Public domain work.
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penguin: Hannes Grobe. 2004. Emperor Penguin, Atka Bay, Weddell Sea, Antarctica. http:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Emperor-cold_hg.jpg. LicensedunderCreative
Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported.
penguins: Ben Tubby. 20 March 2007. Kings on the beach. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/tubby/435342058. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
2.0.
pig: Joshua Lutz. 2 October 2004. Sus scrofa scrofa. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Sus_scrofa_scrofa.jpg. Public domain work.
pigs: Alex Proimos. 22 August 2011. Three Little Pigs. http://www.flickr.com/
photos/proimos/6073731653. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommer-
cial 2.0.
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pillow: Pavel Ševela. 15April 2011. Living room, Building Fairs Brno 2011. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Building_Fairs_Brno_2011_%28210%29.jpg. Licensedun-
der Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
pillows: User “Andrevruas”. 20 February 2010. Almofadas verde, amarela e azul. http:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Almofadas.jpg. Licensed under Creative Com-
mons Attribution 3.0 Unported.
pot: User “FiveRings”. 7 November 2006. Copper saucepot. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Copper-saucepot.jpg. Public domain work.
pots: User “Nemo bis”. 14 July 2011. Pentolini e tegami assortiti. http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pentolini_e_tegami_assortiti,_lungo.jpg. Licensed
under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
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rabbit: Ann Harrison. 4 July 2009. A wild rabbit at Lossiemouth. http://www.geograph.
org.uk/photo/1441920. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution-ShareAlike 2.0.
rabbits: Chris Downer. 16 June 2012. bunnies at the M3 services. http://www.geograph.
org.uk/photo/3007908. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution-ShareAlike 2.0.
ruler: User “Grikalmis”. 31 July 2008. Stahlmaßstab. http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Stahlma%C3%9F.jpg. Public domain work.
shirt: McArthurGlen Designer Outlets. 1 February 2013. DesignerOutletSalzburg_Strenesse_-
gestreiftes Hemd. http://www.flickr.com/photos/93153549@N06/8467163511. Licen-
sed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0.
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snake: User “Chiswick Chap”. 2 September 2008. Sinuously meandering snake on road,
Jianxia, China. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jiangxia-snake-9704_
%28cropped%29.jpg. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Un-
ported.
squirrel: Hernan De Angelis Campephilus. 4 June 2008. Red squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris)
on a tree. Bromma, Stockholm, Sweden. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Sciurus-vulgaris_hernandeangelis_stockholm_2008-06-04.jpg. Licensed under
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
squirrels:
• Kamil Gwóźdź. 23 August 2011. Wiewiórka pospolita. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Wiewi%C3%B3rka_pospolita2.jpg. Licensed under Creative Com-
mons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
• User “Rave”. 21 March 2011. Squirrel in Lazienki 2. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Squirrel_in_Lazienki_2.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
• User “Rave”. 21 March 2011. Squirrel in Lazienki 1. http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Squirrel_in_Lazienki_1.JPG. Licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.
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D Sound files used in experiment 2
In addition to own works, the following sound files were modified and used in the experiments
described here.
User “BristolStories”. 13 April 2008. u_chimes4. http://www.freesound.org/people/
BristolStories/sounds/51711. LicensedunderCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommer-
cial 3.0 Unported.
User “tobyk”. 23 November 2006. Medieval_Fanfare. http://www.freesound.org/
people/tobyk/sounds/26198. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Un-
ported.
User “dobroide”. 17 July 2005. violin.open.strings.chords. http://www.freesound.org/
people/dobroide/sounds/4503. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Un-
ported.
User“dangerbabe”. 22April 2007. Drum. http://www.freesound.org/people/dangerbabe/
sounds/34091. Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported.
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E Sentences and drawings used in experiment 3
The target sentences in Task 3 were presented in the order given below, each accompanied by the
respective drawing. The drawings are reproduced here by kind permission of the artist, Laura
McKinley.
1. Dad gave Anne the coat.
2. Anne gave the drawing to the parents.
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3. Mom gave the cushions Anne.
4. Dad gave the parents to the chairs.
5. Mom gave the shelves the drawing.
260
6. Dad gave the toys to Anne.
7. The cat gave the basket the kittens.
8. Mom gave the baby to the toys.
261
9. The parents gave the chairs the children.
10. Dad gave the kittens to the baby.
11. Mom gave the children the table.
262
12. Anne gave the cat to the parents.
13. The baby gave the car the blocks.
14. Dad gave the glasses to the children.
263
15. The cat gave the milk the kitten.
16. Mom gave the children to the sofa.
17. Ben gave the parents the kitten.
264
18. Anne gave the glass to Ben.
19. Dad gave the cat the kittens.
20. Anne gave the cat to the basket.
265
21. Mom gave the kittens the crackers.
22. The baby gave the cracker to the blocks.
23. Ben gave the cat the crackers.
266
24. The cat gave the crackers to the basket.
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F Information sheets and consent forms
HEC2013/166
The acquisition of sentence alternations
Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Information for adult participants
You are about to participate in a research project on how people use certain types of
English sentences. Your involvement in this project will be to sort pictures according to
two criteria, follow voice instructions while using a touch-screen, and repeat a short story
told to you. This won’t take more than an hour.
The data I will collect is this:
1. how you sorted the pictures
2. your touch-screen computer input
3. where you were looking during the touch-screen task
4. what you were saying in the story task
5. your age, gender, and what language(s) you speak.
You will get a $10 voucher at the end of the experiment.
Please feel free to ask any questions you may have about the project now, or via email,
post, or on the phone later.
You have the right to withdraw from the project at any time with no disadvantage, up
until all individual data is entrenched in the general findings of the study and/or up until
submission of the thesis or any articles stemming from it. If you withdraw, I will delete
any information and data you have provided.
I expect the results of this project will help us understand how these types of sentences
are formed and understood. This may give us other insights into how language works
in the brain, and how children learn language. Also, touch-screens and eye-tracking are
relatively new research methods, and have only been used together very rarely. The
results of this project will show how well they can be used together. If you would like a
summary of the results of this project once they are ready, please be sure to leave your
email or postal address on the consent form.
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a PhD degree by me, Daniel Bu¨rkle,
under the supervision of Dr Heidi Quinn, who can be contacted at  03 364 2008. She
will be available to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.
I will also be happy to address any concerns and answer any questions you may have
about the project.
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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The results of the project will be published as a PhD thesis and possibly in other forms,
but you can be sure of the complete confidentiality of all gathered data: the identity of
participants will not be made public. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, data will
not be stored together with participant names—only anonymous participant numbers
will be used in the actual data. All data will be stored in locked filing cabinets or on
password-protected and encrypted computers, so only my supervisors and I will have
access to this data. Research assistants like Ailsa will have access to the data where
necessary, but are legally bound to strictest confidence. I will destroy all data after 10
years.
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human
Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the project,
you can contact the Committee at  03 364 2987, human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz, or
through its Secretary, Okeover House, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. Any issues
you raise will be treated confidentially, and you will be informed of the outcome.
Thank you.
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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HEC2013/166
The acquisition of sentence alternations
Daniel Bu¨rkle
Telephone: +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Adult participant consent
The information on the information sheet has been explained to me, and I understand
it.
I voluntarily agree to take part in the project.
I understand that I may withdraw at any time (up until individual data is entrenched
in general findings and/or submission of the thesis or articles) without disadvantage,
including withdrawal of information provided.
I consent to the recording of my picture sorting, computer input, eye gaze, and story-
telling. I consent to the secure storage of this data for 10 years. I consent to confiden-
tial access to the data by research assistants if that access is needed for this research
project.
I consent to any publication of anonymous results from this project. I understand that
the published results will be anonymous and that the data will be confidential.
I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury
Human Ethics Committee.
Name:
Age: years
Born and raised in 2 New Zealand 2
Language(s) spoken at home during childhood: 2 English 2
Date: Signature:
2 Yes, I would like to be sent a summary of the results of this research project.
Email or postal address for summary of results:
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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HEC2013/166
The acquisition of sentence alternations
Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Information for parents/caregivers
Your child is invited to participate as a subject in a research project on how children
use certain types of English sentences. Their involvement in this project will be to sort
pictures according to two criteria, follow voice instructions while using a touch-screen,
and repeat a short story told to them. I expect that this will not take more than an hour.
The session will take place at UC (room 201c in the Locke building), and at least one
parent or caregiver has to be with the child throughout the session.
The data I will collect is this:
1. how your child sorted the pictures
2. your child’s touch-screen computer input, to see what they were doing
3. a recording of your child’s eyes during the touch-screen task, to see what they were
looking at
4. an audio recording of your child’s story-telling, to see how they say certain sentences
5. your child’s age, gender, and language(s).
I will of course answer any questions you may have about the project via email, post, or
on the phone.
If you are happy for your child to participate, please talk to them about the project.
Then, simply go to www.tinyurl.com/UCstudy to set up a session, or call me at (03) 364
2987 ext. 8131. When you come in, you will get a $10 fuel voucher, and your child will
get a small gift of their choice from a “box of treasures”.
You and the child have the right to withdraw from the project at any time with no
disadvantage, up until all individual data is entrenched in the general findings of the
study and/or up until submission of the thesis or any articles stemming from it. If you
withdraw, I will delete any information and data you and your child have provided.
I expect the results of this project will help us understand how these types of sentences
are formed and understood. This may give us other insights into how language works
in the brain, and how children learn language. Also, touch-screens and eye-tracking are
relatively new research methods, and have only been used together very rarely. The
results of this project will show how well they can be used together. A summary of the
results of this project will be available for you, once they are ready.
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a PhD degree by me, Daniel Bu¨rkle,
under the supervision of Dr Heidi Quinn, who can be contacted at  03 364 2008 or
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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heidi.quinn@canterbury.ac.nz. She will be available to discuss any concerns you may have
about participation in the project. I am also happy to address any concerns and answer
any questions you may have about the project.
The results of the project will be published as a PhD thesis and possibly in other forms,
but you can be sure of the complete confidentiality of all gathered data: the identity of
participants will not be made public. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, data will
not be stored together with participant names—only anonymous participant numbers
will be used in the actual data. All data will be stored in locked filing cabinets or on
password-protected and encrypted computers, so only my supervisors and I will have
access to this data. Research assistants will have access to the data where necessary, but
are legally bound to strictest confidence. I will destroy all data after 10 years.
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human
Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the project,
you can contact the Committee at  03 364 2987, human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz, or
through its Secretary, Okeover House, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. Any issues
you raise will be treated confidentially, and you will be informed of the outcome.
Thank you.
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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HEC2013/166
The acquisition of sentence alternations
Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Information for participants
My name is Daniel and I’m doing a project at the university. I want to find
out some things about how children understand and speak English.
If you want to help with the project, I will ask you to sit at a computer
and move pictures on a touchscreen according to what the computer voice
asks you to do. After that, I will ask you to listen to a story about some
pictures and repeat the story. When you’re done with that, you will get
to choose a small gift from a “box of treasures” as a thank-you.
The whole thing will take less than one hour, and your mum/dad/other
caregiver will be in the room with you all the time.
The computer will record how you move the pictures on the screen, and a
little box on the table will record where you are looking. When you tell
the story, we will also record your voice. All of these recordings will be
stored on safe computers or in locked drawers. In 10 years, I will delete all
that. Your name will not be on the recordings, there will only be a code
number. Some people will maybe need to see the recordings, but they
can’t tell anything about that to anybody.
When the project is finished, you and your parents/caregivers can get a
report on what I found out.
If you have any questions, you can talk to your parents/caregivers or to
me. If you change your mind about being in the project, that’s fine too.
All you need to do is tell me.
Thank you for helping!
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Caregiver consent
The information on the information sheet has been explained to me, and I understand
it.
I voluntarily agree for the participant named below to take part in the project.
I understand that I or the participant may withdraw at any time (up until individual
data is entrenched in general findings and/or submission of the thesis or articles) without
disadvantage, including withdrawal of information provided.
I consent to the recording of the participant’s picture sorting, computer input, eye gaze,
and story-telling. I consent to the secure storage of this data for 10 years. I consent
to confidential access to the data by research assistants if that access is needed for this
research project.
I consent to any publication of anonymous results from this project. I understand that
the published results will be anonymous and that the data will be confidential.
I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury
Human Ethics Committee.
Name(s) of parent(s)/caregiver(s):
Child’s name: and age: years, months
Child was born and raised in 2New Zealand 2
Language(s) spoken at home: 2 English 2
Date: Signature(s)
2 Yes, we would like to be sent a summary of the results of this research project.
Email or postal address for summary of results:
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Participant assent
I have been told about Daniel’s project, and I am happy to help with the
project.
I know that any information collected about me will not be told to anyone
else and will be stored away in a locked cabinet or a safe computer for 10
years. Daniel will not use my name or my parents’ names in the project.
I know that only very few people will see my information, and they can’t
tell anything about me to anybody. I know that my parents can ask for a
report on the project.
I understand that I can change my mind about being in this project and
no-one will mind.
I know that if I have any questions I can ask my parents or Daniel.
Name:
Date: Signature:
University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140. www.canterbury.ac.nz
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Daniel Bu¨rkle +64 3 364 2987 extension 8131
Email: daniel.buerkle@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Information for adult participants
Thank you for your cooperation in the project. The project is aimed at how children’s
brains expect certain sentences to work out and how children say these sentences. Your
results will be incorporated into a ‘baseline’, so that I know the end-point of children’s
development. As you may have guessed from the experiment, I am interested in sentences
like these:
• “Charlie gave the dog a bone.”
• “Charlie gave a bone to the dog.”
These sentences are part of what linguists call the ‘dative alternation’. What I’m par-
ticularly interested in is the way children choose between the two alternatives, based on
the animacy, length, and grammatical number of the two objects. In the example above,
“the dog” is alive, “a bone” isn’t, and it seems that adults subconsciously prefer the first
sentence because it has the living object before the inanimate one. We don’t know if
children also show these kinds of preferences, which is why I’m doing this study.
If I had given you this detailed information beforehand, your reactions and language may
not have been perfectly natural. Natural data is always the best, so I kept the initial
information to a minimum in order to get more reliable results.
This was reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Commit-
tee, who can be contacted at 03 364 2987, human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz, or through
its Secretary, Okeover House, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140.
Note that all the information from the first information sheet is true. You have the right
to withdraw at any time up until submission of the thesis or any articles stemming from
it, and the information and data you provided will be deleted if you withdraw. Only
touch-screen usage, eye gaze, and story-telling were recorded. Participant data will be
stored securely. Participant information will be stored securely and separately from data.
Access to data is restricted. Anyone with access is bound to confidence. The results
will only ever be published without participant names. You may of course exercise your
right to withdraw now or at a later date; should you withdraw, information and data you
provided will be deleted. I will be available to answer your questions or concerns, and
I’ll send you a summary of results (once they are ready) if you wish.
Thank you again.
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Information for caregivers
Thank you for your cooperation in the project. The project is aimed at how children’s
brains expect certain sentences to work out and how children say these sentences. As
you may have guessed from observing the experiment, I am interested in sentences like
these:
• “Charlie gave the dog a bone.”
• “Charlie gave a bone to the dog.”
These sentences are part of what linguists call the ‘dative alternation’. What I’m par-
ticularly interested in is the way children choose between the two alternatives, based on
the animacy, length, and grammatical number of the two objects. In the example above,
“the dog” is alive, “a bone” isn’t, and it seems that adults subconsciously prefer the first
sentence because it has the living object before the inanimate one. We don’t know if
children also show these kinds of preferences, which is why I’m doing this study.
If I had given this detailed information beforehand, the child’s reactions and language
may not have been perfectly natural. Natural data is always the best, so I kept the initial
information to a minimum in order to get more reliable results.
This was reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Commit-
tee, who can be contacted at 03 364 2987, human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz, or through
its Secretary, Okeover House, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140.
Note that all the information from the first information sheet is true: At no time was the
child in any risk. You have the right to withdraw at any time up until submission of the
thesis or any articles stemming from it, and the information and data you provided will be
deleted if you withdraw. Only touch-screen usage, the child’s eyes, and their story-telling
were recorded. Participant data will be stored securely. Participant information will
be stored securely and separately from data. Access to data is restricted. Anyone with
access is bound to confidence. The results will only ever be published without participant
names. You and your child may of course exercise your right to withdraw now or at a
later date; should you withdraw, information and data you provided will be deleted.
I will be available to answer your questions or concerns, and I can send you a summary
of results (once they are ready) if you wish.
Thank you again.
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Information for participants
Thank you for helping with the project!
I can now tell you what exactly I’m trying to find out: I want to know
what children like you do with sentences like
• “Charlie gave the dog a bone.” and
• “Charlie gave a bone to the dog.”
Other projects have found out that the first sentence in this example would
be said more often. This happens probably because it has “the dog”,
which is alive, before “a bone”, which isn’t. However, nobody has done a
detailed project on what children do with these sentences, and that’s why
I’m looking at it.
If I had told you that earlier, you might have said the sentences differently
than you normally would.
All the things I said before are still true. The computer did only save
what you pressed on the screen, the little box recorded where you were
looking, and we recorded your story. All of these recordings will be stored
on safe computers or in locked drawers. Your name will not be on the
recordings, there will only be a code number. Some people will maybe
need to see the recordings, but they are forbidden to tell anything about
that to anybody.
If you have any questions, you can talk to your mum/dad/caregiver or to
me. If you change your mind about being in the project, that’s fine too.
All you have to do is to tell me.
Thanks again!
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G Statistical computation in R
Data analysis and simulations presented in this thesis were run in version 3.1.1 of the R language
(R Development Core Team 2011), using the base packages plus
• boot (Canty and Ripley 2015), version 1.3-16,
• cvTools (Alfons 2012). version 0.3.2,
• e1071 (Meyer et al. 2014), version 1.6-4,
• ggplot2 (Wickham 2009), version 1.0.0,
• ggthemes (Arnold 2014), version 1.7.0,
• gridExtra (Auguie 2012), version 0.9.1,
• gss (Gu 2014), version 2.1-3,
• lme4 (Bates et al. 2014), version 1.1-7,
• mvtnorm (Genz et al. 2014), version 1.0-1,
• plyr (Wickham 2011), version 1.8.1,
• PolynomF (Venables 2010), version 0.93,
• psych (Revelle 2015), version 1.5.1,
• xtable (Dahl 2014), version 1.7-4,
and their dependencies.
The code used for the examples and simulations presented in Section 5.2 is available online at
dbuerkle.github.io/ssanova.R and .../simulations.R or on request.
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